File No. 861.00/2216 The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] HARBIN, July 3, 1918, 3 p. m. Eight hundred refugees now living tents and freight cars at Manchuria [station]; homes destroyed by advancing Bolsheviks and war prisoners after Semenov's 1 retreat. Fifty per cent children, thirty per cent women, completely destitute; mostly farmers, coal miners, railway employees, village traders. Are being fed now by Semenov's private means but he can not furnish supplies; have appealed to Russian and American Red Cross for clothing and homes sufficient during warm weather but if winter comes before order restored they will require shelter. In any case many driven out before they could plant crops and there will be no harvest; they must be fed during winter. Thirty thousand Buriats also driven from Siberia by war prisoners' advance, have taken refuge in Manchuria, destitute of everything. To-day they appealed to Horvat 2 and all the consular agents and American Red Cross for help and we must have immediate follows [answer?]. Please inform National Red Cross committee that I request authority to appoint investigators and to draw sufficient funds in my discretion to give our share of assistance through local Red Cross chapter. File No. 861,00/2484 MOSER The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State3 [Telegram] Moscow, July 6, 1918, noon. 700. The Union of Cooperative Societies appeals to America through its director Berkenheim for assistance in feed ing the people of northern Russia during the coming winter. It is calculated from figures which he furnishes that to bring the necessary grain from America would require twenty-five voyages monthly of 5,000 tons each. In view of the general tonnage situation, if for no other reason, such shipments are obviously out of the question. On the other hand it appears from figures supplied by the Cooperative Union that their appeal should be met and famine averted by proper organization of the distribution of the grain stores in western 1 Ataman of the Far Eastern Cossacks. 2 Russian Governor and General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 3 Sent via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway. Siberia. According to statistics prepared for them by Prokopovich, Minister of Food Supplies in the Kerensky government, the amount of these stores, consisting principally of surplus from the large 1917 crop, is from 3,000,000 to 3,500,000 short tons. Of this Prokopovich estimates that, owing to the poor state of transportation, only 750,000 tons could be moved into European Russia, but that with extraordinary measures to improve transportation this amount might be somewhat more than doubled. Allied intervention will create that situation of order which will make distribution possible. At the present moment shipments into European Russia are prevented by the Czech conflict, but as from August 1917 to April 1918 only 275,000 tons were moved, it is clear that even in the absence of the Czech difficulty neither the Bolshevik nor probably any other Russian government would be able to meet the situation adequately. The same military program is necessary in order to solve the famine problem as should be adopted if only military and political considerations were involved. Intervention in Siberia must be executed with sufficient forces to support the Czechs in their present positions and to effect a prompt junction with the Allied groups entering at Murman, Archangel. The Cooperative Societies request succor for the eight governments of Archangel, Vologda, Novgorod, Petrograd, Olonets, Tver, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma, but the actual extent of territory which can be defended and nourished will depend of course on military considerations. In order to make effective distribution the front to be created should, however, include Vologda. As in the case of the military program, time is of the essence. By the end of October the Dvina will be frozen and conditions of distribution will become exceedingly difficult. In Siberia also the grain must be moved down the rivers to the railroad before winter sets in. The general plan of distribution must be worked out and directed by Allied citizens. The Cooperative Societies agree to do the field work. Commercial Attaché Huntington and Wardwell of Red Cross have been present at the conference with the Cooperative Societies [securing?] further data and will telegraph the Red Cross. Huntington joins me in affirming that the relief of northern Russia is a task which our Allies can not and should not avoid. If the problem is not anticipated and immediate steps taken for its solution, the famine will soon take on the proportions of a tragedy such as will imperatively command the attention of the Allies whether they will or no. We earnestly recommend that the intervention problem be studied in this light, that is, not solely from the political and mili 117328-32- -12 tary points of view but with the unavoidable humanitarian demands of the national subjects clearly in mind. Please refer in this connection to my No. 683.1 If the Department perceives no objection, I should be glad to have Mr. Crane 2 informed of this situation owing to his deep humanitarian interests in the Russian people. Please acknowledge. POOLE File No. 861.48/675 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, July 11, 1918, 4 p. m. 222. Your 250 [260], June 11, 8 p. m., received July 3. No tonnage available for such quantities as you state are required or to relieve distress of vast numbers of Russian people who will need grain. Effort will be made to send relief ship as you recommended previously but the bulk of Russia's supplies of grain can come only from Russia. Consequently important that Siberian Railway be kept open for supplies from western Siberia to parts of European Russia beyond zone of German control. Position of Czecho-Slovak troops will be endangered and their friendly purpose to aid fellow Slavs towards freedom from German domination will be misunderstood wholly if they are blamed for interruption of food supply from Siberia for northeastern Russia. LANSING File No. 861.00/2353, 2354 The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State3 [Telegram] Moscow, July 16, 1918, 6 p. m. [Received July 24, 9.35 p. m.; July 26, 4.30 a. m.] 714. Oil supplies in north Caucasus enormous stocks by the arrivals in Moscow and flax near German lines [sic]. In majority cases purchase of commodities and transportation Archangel for eventual shipment or destruction is impossible. Our plan is rather break up concentrated stocks and distribute beyond power of Germans to recollect. For this we utilize the Central Union of Consumers' Societies, the only element in Russian commercial and credit apparatus which has survived complete destruction wrought by crude and 3 1 Not received at Department. Charles R. Crane, member of the Root mission to Russia. Sent via the Embassy in France; by wireless from Moscow to Paris. Another copy of the second paragraph received Aug. 11, via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway (File No. 861.00/2460). 1 violent Bolshevik nationalization. For economic and political status of Cooperatives see reports 1 of Consulate General latter part of 1917 Our method is to finance Central Union as [follows]: In case of textiles, [union,] following failure governmental department, has received monopoly for distribution Moscow stocks among the peasants. The sunflower oil is shipped to factories in interior where converted into soap for wide distribution amongst population. Such economic warfare is effective, humanitarian, and associates us with a powerful permanent democratic force in Russia. Present program contemplates ultimate finance of Rs. 500,000,000, of which America's share one-third, equals $17,000,000 at rate of 10 [rubles] on the dollar. Six million dollars already granted, but we must have further credit ten million immediately, which beg you urge, remarking that large part of money actually merely loaned on fair security. Furthermore prompt [advantageous realization] cash ruble sums required by secret [means] selling foreign exchange impossible because: (1) absence foreign trade, (2) painful shortage currency, through nationalization of banks, preventing possessors of current accounts drawing them. However, Central Union is willing accept dollars deposited their account in New York at agreed rate, if possible utilize these immediately for purchases Union [prime] necessities. Accumulation of dollars for speculation or future use not interesting. Again therefore, I earnestly beg that "Goods Exchange" be advised at once through Allied Ambassadors how much tonnage will be assigned Archangel this season. Merchandise and food from the Allies will have tremendous effect here now, accentuating fundamental difference between Allied policy provision and German policy of plunder. Can not emphasize too strongly relapse of economic life of a former great nation to primitive conditions, money has limited use. Head of Cooperatives doubts that prospective good harvest will save Moscow and cities from famine because peasants refuse cede grain without receiving manufactures. POOLE File No. 861.00/2216 The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Moser) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, July 17, 1918, 5 p. m. Your July 3, 3 p. m., somewhat garbled. As emergency measure and without commitment to permanent support Red Cross authorizes you to draw up to $5,000. Meanwhile please report: (1) Organiza 'Not printed. tion and competence of personnel Harbin Red Cross Chapter; (2) any additional funds urgent now; (3) probable requirements both material and financial for 30,000 refugees in Manchuria. POLK American Project of an Economic and Educational Mission to Siberia, July 17, 1918-Organization in England of the Siberian Supply CompanyArrangements with the Allies for Provisioning the Northern RegionConsent of the United States to British Control of Neutral Trade with Northern Russia File No. 861.00/3054b The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors [Aide-Mémoire-Extract 1] It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward-moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks. WASHINGTON, July 17, 1918. File No. 861.00/2568 The British Embassy to the Department of State [A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was left at the Department of State on July 26, 1918:] The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington (Reading) July 25, 1918. The general scheme of mission proposed by the United States Government has our warm approval and we should be glad to cooperate in such a mission in any way that may be required. It is most important that we should learn as soon as possible exactly along what lines Americans are working and how we can best consult with them about the general form and details of organization. Will you please ascertain this? The following is a rough summary of our views as to the best method of supplying goods to relieve the present necessities of the Siberian population. We fully realize that considerations of geographical neighbourhood, economy of tonnage and available supplies make it inevitable that the main task of supply 'Printed in full in vol. II, p. 287. |