found in controversial writings of the same class. Men have written in defence of morality and religion, as if the sacredness of the subject absolved them from all obligations to use courtesy and fairness towards an opponent, and justified all wiles and stratagems by which a victory might be obtained. Paley stooped to no such unworthy practices, and his fairdealing is rewarded by the docility of the reader, who soon finds himself compelled to follow submissively the train of argument, and seldom closes the book without having conceived an affection for the author. Indeed, the whole character of the writer, in all its strong and honest features, is imprinted on the work; Montaigne did not convey a livelier image of himself to his readers. Much of the indefinable charm, which invests his writings, must be attributed to this unconscious self-portraiture, though much is due also to the admirable qualities of his style. His chapter on "Reverencing the Deity," has always appeared to us one of the most masterly compositions in the English language. It will suffer little by comparison with Lord Bacon's noble essay on Atheism, which, like the chapter in Paley, consists of only three or four pages, but is lighted up by the most brilliant flashes of the writer's glowing imagination.

The great merit which belongs to Paley for his work on. "Natural Theology" may be best seen by comparison. Look at the state of the science since his death. An English nobleman bequeaths a princely sum to be given to some person for writing a book on a branch of the same subject. By the advice of the Bishop of London, the legacy is divided, and given in equal portions to six individuals, among the most distinguished in their respective sciences of any in the country; and in a few years the result comes forth in the shape of six or eight thick octavos, called the "Bridgewater Treatises." Their publication may be of some advantage to the other sciences, but, as a contribution to Natural Theology, they can hardly be said to possess any merit whatever. Dr. Buckland has written a very good treatise on Geology, and Dr. Roget a very admirable one on Physiology, but the theological comments in each might be omitted altogether without detriment. The reader perceives at once, that the argument in respect to the Deity is a mere secondary affair; that it is interpolated in an ordinary scientific treatise, with which it has no proper connexion. The por

tion of the general subject allotted to Dr. Chalmers was of such a nature, that he seemed compelled to confine himself to the theme assigned by the noble donor. Yet he has done his best to escape from the trammels, and frankly confesses some incongruity between the title and the subject matter of his volumes. He embraced the opportunity to expatiate upon the philosophy of mind; and the result of his labors only proves, that Dr. Chalmers is a clumsy writer, a weak reasoner, and a metaphysician equally deficient in learning, originality, and discretion. It is an act of charity towards the writers to pass over some of the other treatises altogether. We have mentioned those only, which possess some claims to attention. In spite of the high expectations created by the benevolent purpose of the Earl of Bridgewater, and the great efforts that were made to carry his wishes into effect, it seems that the loss of Paley's small volume would still be irreparable.

Lord Brougham and Sir Charles Bell, in the volumes now before us, have limited their ambition to preparing a new edition of Paley's work, with copious notes and supplementary dissertations. They considered rightly, that their own lucubrations stood a better chance of being noticed and studied, if published in such a connexion, than if they appeared in an independent form. The desire of illustrating the original, we consider as a mere pretence. Paley's command of language and illustration renders all aid unnecessary, even for the most shallow capacity. He who runs may read and understand. Even the anatomical portions of the work do not require the aid of engravings in order to be fully understood. A description couched in the simplest and most graphic terms, and a homely comparison, the latch or hinge of a door, the teeth of a saw, or the packing of a box,-make the whole structure in question as plain as day. That Paley was not a surgeon by profession only renders his explanations the more intelligible to ordinary minds. There was less danger of sliding unawares into the use of technical terms, or of presuming too much on the reader's stock of previous knowledge. Though Sir Charles Bell writes with a fair share of ease and perspicuity, it will generally be found, when he adds a note for the mere purpose of elucidating the text, that the explanation is less clear than the original. He supplies a few other instances of adaptation from

the structure of the human frame, but adds nothing to the argument, and his labors, on the whole, rather encumber the work.

Lord Brougham's "Preliminary Discourse" has already been noticed at length in our pages, and we have nothing to add to that estimate of its merits and defects. The noble writer at least confines himself to the subject, whatever may be thought of the ability with which it is treated. But we cannot say as much of the "Dissertations," two thick volumes of which are appended to this edition. They contain a parade of various, though not very profound learning, on a number of subjects, some of them bearing about the same relation to Natural Theology that they do to the study of Sanscrit, or the science of ship-building. Thus, about half of the second volume is occupied with an analysis of Newton's "Principia," which might with equal propriety have been printed in connexion with his Lordship's translation of Demosthenes "concerning the Crown." It answers no purpose except to display the writer's acquaintance with mathematics. An account of Cuvier's work on Fossil Osteology is not out of place to the same degree, though all the relations of the subject to Natural Theology might be stated in five pages, as well as in a hundred and twenty. We can hardly hope much from any attempt to throw light upon the deep and dark problem of the origin of evil, and Lord Brougham is certainly the last person, from whom aid in such a case could reasonably be expected. His long dissertation upon the subject contains nothing new, and will not increase the writer's reputation for learning, or skill in handling metaphysical questions. Four dialogues upon Instinct, and an account of the structure of the cells of bees, occupy a whole volume, but contribute very little, by way either of argument or illustration, to the reasoning of Paley. In fine, the supplementary Dissertations serve to display a versatile genius and much general information; but they show neither originality nor depth of thought, and are utterly valueless in the place they now occupy.

We are disappointed in this edition, for we had hoped that the concluding volumes would carry out some of the hints in the Preliminary Discourse, and, by a fair examination of

*See North American Review, Vol. XLII., p. 467 et seq.

Paley's argument, either supply its alleged deficiencies, or remove the belief in their existence. The great questions agitated in that work have been much complicated of late by skeptical quibblings and metaphysical difficulties. The legitimacy of the whole reasoning has been called in doubt, and the points to be proved have been varied and distorted by the makers of philosophical systems. Some complaints might be done away, and much obscurity be dispelled, if the nature of the evidence were once fairly considered, and the relation fully determined which this subject bears to other sciences. This was the scheme of Lord Brougham's first Discourse, but the execution was imperfect, and these volumes. do not complete the design. As the subject is of great interest in both a religious and a philosophical view, some desultory remarks upon it may be acceptable to a portion of our readers.

The great problem of Natural Theology is to prove the existence of a God, all the other questions being subsidiary to this, and in great measure dependent upon its solution. Two modes or classes of proof are presented, called the argument a priori and a posteriori. These appellations are unhappily chosen, for in such a case reasoning a priori is impossible, without assuming the very point at issue; we cannot argue from cause to effect in order to prove the existence of a First Cause. And if the meaning of the term be restricted to original and intuitive perceptions, which are independent of experience, the distinction implied by the two phrases does not exist. These first principles of belief are implied in every act of ratiocination; they are taken for granted in the argument from experience, and in every other proof. Besides, we cannot go behind the Divine existence in order to find a basis of proof; we cannot assume a more comprehensive proposition, from which the fact itself can be deduced. We must reason upward to the first principle of all things; and every argument urged with this design must be a posteriori.

But the implied distinction really exists, though improperly designated by two such phrases. In the one case we proceed by moral evidence, and the conclusion is termed in logic only probable, though it may amount to the highest degree of certainty, of which any argument based on experience is susceptible. In the other, the steps are linked together by demonstrative evidence, and the conclusion follows with mathVOL. LIV. NO. 114.

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ematical certainty. We take no account of those, who assume the Divine existence as an intuitive truth, because their opinions admit of no argument, and to them Natural Theology does not exist as a distinct science. The question between the two modes of proof may appear to be one of pure curiosity, for the inquirer will surely ask, why they cannot be placed side by side, since neither excludes or limits the other, but only offers it fresh support. It is not enough to answer, that a position is improved in strength by removing every rotten or useless prop, which gives at least the appearance of insecurity to the fabric. The very existence of the dispute shows that neither of the proofs is wholly unnecessary, for there are some minds which rest with greater assurance on one argument, and some on another. Neither can remove

what is useless to himself, without doing injury to his neighbour. To justify the rejection of either mode of reasoning, it must be shown, that our idea of the point to be proved is affected by the nature of the argumentative process. If the method a posteriori leads to an imperfect or grovelling conception of the Divine Existence, if it abandons the inquirer when he has advanced only half-way, forcing upon him a contingent truth, in place of that absolute and necessary conviction, which, on such a subject, his nature imperatively requires; or if the argument a priori conducts only to a confused and pantheistic notion of a God; if it destroys his personality, and identifies him with an abstract principle, then it becomes a duty not only to prefer one mode of proof, but to expose the fallacy of the other. Here lies, we apprehend, the real ground of dispute. Not only are the two methods unlike; the ultimate theories are contradictory. The question of preference between them ceases to be merely speculative. It exerts a direct and practical influence on our whole scheme of religious belief.

One preliminary remark is necessary, before entering upon the main question. The process by which belief is formed, often differs widely from the manner in which it is substantiated. Our opinions are often imbibed from education, or instinct, or casual circumstances. When attacked, they are often defended by arguments, which had no share in their formation, and in fact never occurred to us, before we had occasion to use them. Such is the case with the elements of religious truth. They were taught to us in infancy, or our minds were predisposed to receive them. "Man," says