promised. The Latins reply that the procession and the mission are parallel processes, the one ad intra, the other ad extra. (b) The equality of essence (ópoovaia) of the Father and Son to the exclusion of every kind of subordinationism (since Augustin) requires the double procession. The Spirit of the Father is also the Spirit of the Son, and is termed the Spirit of Christ. But, as already remarked, Augustin admitted that the Spirit proceeds chiefly from the Father, and this after all is a kind of subordination of dignity. The Father has his being (ovaia) from himself, the Son and the Spirit have it from the Father by way of derivation, the one by generation, the other by procession. (c) The temporal mission of the Spirit is a reflection of his eternal procession. The Trinity of revelation is the basis of all our speculations on the Trinity of essence. We know the latter only from the former. (d) The Nicene Creed and the Nicene fathers did not understand the procession from the Father in an exclusive sense, but rather in opposition to the Pneumatomachi who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Some Greek fathers, as Epiphanius, Cyril of Alexandria, and John of Damascus, teach the Latin doctrine. This is not the case exactly. The procession of the Spirit "through the Son," is not equivalent to the procession "from the Son," but implies a subordination. (e) The Latin fathers are in favor of Filioque, especially Ambrose, Augustin, Jerome, Leo I., Gregory I.' (f) The insertion of the Filioque is as justifiable as the other and larger additions to the Apostles' Creed and to the original Nicene Creed of 325, and was silently accepted, or at least not objected to by the Greek church until the rivalry of the Patri 1 Hilary of Poitiers is also quoted, as he uses the formula a Patre et Filio (Trinit. II. 29) as well as the other ex Patre per Filium. Tertullian, however, is rather on the Greek side: "Spiritum S. non aliunde puto quam a Patre per Filium." Adv. Prax. c. 4. So also Novatian, De Trinit. arch of Constantinople made it a polemical weapon against the Pope of Rome. To this the Greeks reply that the other additions are consistent and were made by common consent, but the Filioque was added without the knowledge and against the teaching of the East by churches (in Spain and France) which had nothing to do with the original production. This controversy of the middle ages was raised from the tomb by the Old Catholic Conference held in Bonn, 1875, under the lead of the learned historian, Dr. Döllinger of Munich, and attended by a number of German Old Catholic, Greek and Russian, and high Anglican divines. An attempt was made to settle the dispute on the basis of the teaching of the fathers before the division of the Eastern and Western churches, especially the doctrine of John of Damascus, that is, the single procession of the Spirit from the Father mediated through the Son. The Filioque was surrendered as an unauthorized and unjustifiable interpolation. But the Bonn Conference has not been sanctioned by any ecclesiastical authority, and forms only an interesting modern episode in the history of this controversy, and in the history of the Old Catholic communion.1 § 109. The Monotheletic Controversy. Literature. (I.) Sources: Documents and acts of the first Lateran Synod (649), and the sixth cecumenical Council or Concilium Trullanum I., held in Constantinople (680), in MANSI, X. 863 sqq. and XI. 187 sqq. ANASTASIUS (Vatican librarian, about 870): Collectanea de iis quæ spectant ad controv. et histor. Monothelit. hæret., first ed. by Sirmond, 1 See the theses of the Conference in the Proceedings published by Dr. Reusch, Bonn, 1875, p. 80 sqq., and in Schaff's Creeds of Christendom, vol. II. 552 sqq. Formerly Dr. Döllinger, when he was still in communion with Rome, gave the usual one-sided Latin view of the Filioque-controversy, and characterized Photius as a man "of unbounded ambition, not untouched by the corruption of the court, and well versed in all its arts of intrigue." Hist. of the Church, trans. by E. Cox, vol. III. 86. Comp. his remarks on the Council of Photins (879), quoted in ? 70, p. 317. Par. 1620, in his Opera, III., also in Bibl. Max. PP. Lugd. XII MAXIMUS CONFESSOR: Opera, ed. Combefis, Par. 1675, Tom. II. 1–158, and his disputation with Pyrrhus, ib. 159 sqq. Also in Migne's reprint, "Patrol. Gr." vol. 91. THEOPHANES: Chronographia, ed. Bonn. (1839), p. 274 sqq.; ed. Migne, in vol. 108 of his “Patrol. Græca" (1861). (II.) FRANC. COMBEFISIUS (Combefis, a learned French Dominican, d. 1679): Historia hæresis Monothelitarum ac vindicia actorum Sexti Synodi, in his Novum Auctuarium Patrum, II. 3 sqq. Par. 1648, fol. 1-198. PETAVIUS: Dogm. Theol. Tom. V. 1. IX. c. 6–10. Jos. SIM. ASSEMANI, in the fourth vol. of his Bibliotheca Juris Orientalis. Romæ 1784. CH. W. F. WALCH: Ketzerhistorie, vol. IX. 1–666 (Leipzig 1780). Very dry, but very learned. GIBBON (Ch. 47, N. Y. ed. IV. 682-686, superficial). SCHRÖCKн, vol. XX. 386 sqq. NEANDER, III. 175-197 (Boston ed.), or III. 353-398 (Germ. ed.). GIESELER, I. 537-544 (Am. ed.). The respective sections in BAUR: Gesch. der Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung (Tüb. 1841-43, 3 vols.), vol. II. 96-128; DORNER: Entwicklungsgesch. der Lehre v. d. Person Christi (second ed. 1853), II. 193–305; NITZSCH: Dogmengesch. I. 325 sqq.; and HEFELE: Conciliengeschichte (revised ed. 1877) III. 121–313. Also W. MÖLLER in Herzog 2 X. 792–805. The literature on the case of Honorius see in the next section. § 110. The Doctrine of Two Wills in Christ. The Monotheletic or one-will controversy is a continuation of the Christological contests of the post-Nicene age, and closely connected with the Monophysitic controversy.1 1 The name Monotheletism is derived from uóvov, one, and véλnua, will. The heresy, whether expressive of the teacher or the doctrine, always gives name to the controversy and the sect which adopts it. The champions of the heretical one-will doctrine are called (first by John of Damascus) Movoveλntai, or Movovenτal, Monotheletes, or Monothelites; the orthodox two-will doctrine is called Dyotheletism (from duo vεhuara), and its advocates Avođeλīrai, Dyothelites. The corresponding doctrines as to one nature or two natures of the Redeemer are termed Monophysitism and Dyophysitism. This question had not been decided by the ancient fathers and councils, and passages from their writings were quoted by both parties. But in the inevitable logic of theological development it had to be agitated sooner or later, and brought to a conciliar termination. The controversy had a metaphysical and a practical aspect. The metaphysical and psychological aspect was the relation of will to nature and to person. Monotheletism regards the will as an attribute of person, Dyotheletism as an attribute of nature. It is possible to conceive of an abstract nature without a will; it is difficult to conceive of a rational human nature without impulse and will; it is impossible to conceive of a human person without a will. Reason and will go together, and constitute the essence of personality. Two wills cannot coexist in an ordinary human being. But as the personality of Christ is complex or divine-human, it may be conceived of as including two consciousnesses and two wills. The Chalcedonian Christology at all events consistently requires two wills as the necessary complement of two rational natures; in other words, Dyotheletism is inseparable from Dyophysitism, while Monotheletism is equally inseparable from Monophysitism, although it acknowledged the Dyophysitism of Chalcedon. The orthodox doctrine saved the integrity and completeness of Christ's humanity by asserting his human will.1 The practical aspect of the controversy is connected with the nature of the Redeemer and of redemption, and was most prominent with the leaders. The advocates of Monotheletism 1 This benefit, however, was lost by the idea of the impersonality (anhypostasia) of the human nature of Christ, taught by John of Damascus in his standard exposition of the orthodox Christology. His object was to exclude the idea of a double personality. But it is impossible to separate reason and will from personality, or to assert the impersonality of Christ's humanity without running into docetism. The most which can be admitted is the Enhypostasia, i. e. the incorporation or inclusion of the human nature of Jesus in the one divine personality of the Logos. The church has never officially committed itself to the doctrine of the impersonality. were chiefly concerned to guard the unity of Christ's person and work. They reasoned that, as Christ is but one person, he can only have one will; that two wills would necessarily conflict, as in man the will of the flesh rebels against the Spirit; and that the sinlessness of Christ is best secured by denying to him a purely human will, which is the root of sin. They made the pre-existing divine will of the Logos the efficient cause of the incarnation and redemption, and regarded the human nature of Christ merely as the instrument through which he works and suffers, as the rational soul works through the organ of the body. Some of them held also that in the perfect state the human will of the believer will be entirely absorbed in the divine will, which amounts almost to a pantheistic absorption of the human personality in the divine. The advocates of Dyotheletism on the other hand contended that the incarnation must be complete in order to have a complete redemption; that a complete incarnation implies the assumption of the human will into union with the pre-existing divine will of the Logos; that the human will is the originating cause of sin and guilt, and must therefore be redeemed, purified, and sanctified; that Christ, without a human will, could not have been a full man, could not have been tempted, nor have chosen between good and evil, nor performed any moral and responsi ble act. The Scripture passages quoted by Agatho and other advocates of the two-will doctrine, are Matt. 26: 39 ("Not as I will, but as Thou wilt"); Luke 22: 42 ("Not my will, but thine be done"); John 6: 38 ("I am come down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me"). For the human will were quoted Luke 2: 51 ("he was subject" to his parents); Phil. 2: 8 ("obedient unto death"), also John 1: 43; 17: 24; 19: 28; Matt. 27: 34; for the divine will, Luke 13: 34; John 5: 21. These Scripture passages, which must in the end decide the controversy, clearly teach the human will of Jesus, but the other |