secretary has been made, canceling an entry, no subsequent entry of the same lands can be made until the decision has been officially communicated to the local land officers, and a notation of the cancellation made on their plats and records, is a proper, just, and reasonable rule, as is also a rule that applications for entry can only be received by the local officers at their offices, and during the prescribed office hours. Id.

The rule that, after the local land officers made their reports to the commissioner of a contest over an entry of land, they should "thereafter take no further action affecting the disposal of the land in contest until instructed by the commissioner," was in force in 1889. (1901) James v. Germania Iron Co., 107 Fed. 597, 46 C. C. A. 476, appeal dismissed (1904) 25 Sup. Ct. 786, 195 U. S. 638, 49 L. Ed. 356.

The regulations of the general land office department have the force of enactments of which the courts may take judicial notice. Nurnberger v. U. S. (1907) 156 Fed. 721, 730, 84 C. C. A. 377.

Regulation concerning disposition of lands made by the commissioner within the scope of his authority is presumed to have been made under the direction and with the sanction of the secretary, and for all practical purposes such regulation is not only the act of the secretary, but of the president, and is therefore an "executive act" of which the courts take judicial notice. U. S. v. Barnhart (D. C. 1887) 33 Fed. 459. 461, 462.

Under the department's rules a field survey of a township held insufficient to designate school sections, so as to vest title thereto in the state prior to the filing of certified and approved duplicate plats in the local land office. U. S. v. Cowlishaw (D. C. 1913) 202 Fed. 317.

13. Effect upon equitable titles of subsequent rules or modifications.The equitable title to land acquired by a lawful entry cannot be devested or affected by subsequent decisions of the land department, or subsequent rules or modification of rules of practice therein. Germania Iron Co. v. James (1898) 89 Fed. 811, 32 C. C. A. 348; James v. Germania Iron Co. (1901) 107 Fed. 597, 46 C. C. A. 476 (appeal dismissed [1904] 25 Sup. Ct. 786, 195 U. S. 638, 49 L. Ed. 356); Howe v. Parker (1911) 190 Fed. 738, 111 C. C. A. 466. 14. Judicial notice of rules.-The courts take judicial notice of the rules and regulations of the general land office, and such rules need not be pleaded or proven. Leonard V. Lennox (1910) 181 Fed. 760, 104 C. C. A. 296; U. S. v. Bedgood (D. C. 1891) 49 Fed. 54; Peters v. U. S. (1894) 33 Pac. 1031, 2 Okl. 116; Stansbury v. U. S. (1894) 37 Pac. 1083, 2 Okl. 151; Dempsey v. U. S. (1894) 44 Pac. 382, 2 Okl. 151.

15. Repeal or abrogation.-Neither the Secretary of the Interior nor the commissioner of the general land office has power to make a retroactive decision abrogating rules of the land department. Germania Iron Co. v. James (1898) 89 Fed. 811, 813, 817, 32 C. C. A. 348.

Rules of practice of the land department of the United States formally established and promulgated by authority of the secretary of the interior can be repealed or abrogated by like formal action and publication only. Decisions or opinions of the secretary and the commissioner in contests between claimants for specific tracts of land ignoring or violating rules neither repeal nor modify them. James v. Germania Iron Co. (1901) 107 Fed. 597, 46 C. C. A. 476, appeal dismissed (1904) 25 Sup. Ct. 786, 195 U. S. 638, 49 L. Ed. 356.

16. Presumption of regularity.-The presumption of law is in favor of the regularity of all proceedings in the land office anterior to the issuance of the patent. Harkrader v. Carroll (D. C. 1896) 76 Fed. 474; Hestres v. Brennan (1875) 50 Cal. 211; Rierson v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. (1898) 51 P. 901, 59 Kan. 32; Newport v. Cooper (1836) 10 La. 155.

It will be presumed that a decision by the Secretary of the Interior that certain lands were within reserved territory, and not subject to private entry, was based upon facts which it was his duty to ascertain and determine the effect of, and upon reasons which he deemed adequate. McKenzie v. Fisher (1913) 40 App. D. C. 74.

When it appears that the commissioner has withdrawn railroad land from pre-emption, it will be presumed that it was withdrawn by the direction of the secretary of the interior. Weaver v. Fairchild (1875) 50 Cal. 360.

Where nothing appears to the contrary, every intendment must be that the local land officers did their duty. Randall v. Edert (1862) 7 Minn. 450 (Gil. 359).

The presumption is in favor of the correctness of the action of the officers designated to execute the laws made for that purpose in canceling a preemption entry for fraud. Hill v. Miller (1865) 36 Mo. 182.

No presumption will arise in favor of the validity of an award of land by the Commissioner of the General Land Office during the life of a lease as against the validity of his action in making the lease. Buchanan v. Barnsley (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) 112 S. W. 118.

In a proceeding to review a decision of the secretary of the interior on a question of title to land, it will be presumed that the secretary found as proved sufficient facts to support his judgment, where his findings of fact are not set out, but the evidence on which the judgment is based is outlin

ed.

Wiseman v. Eastman (1899) 57 P. 398, 21 Wash. 163.

17. Cancellation of entry-Power to ancel.-The Commissioner of the Gen"al Land Office has power to cancel entry. Harkness Underhill 61) 1 Black, 316, 323, 17 L. Ed. J8; U. S. v. Steenerson (1892) 50 ded.

V.

504, 1 C. C. A. 552; Bates v. Herron (1859) 35 Ala. 117; Bellows v. Todd (1872) 34 Iowa, 18; Darcy v. McCarthy (1886) 35 Kan. 722, 12 Pac. 104; Bettis v. Amonett (1849) 4 La. Ann. 363; Scuddy v. Shaffer (1855) 10 La. Ann. 133; Forman v. Healey (N. D. 1909) 121 N. W. 1122; Pierce v. Frace (1891) 2 Wash. St. 81, 26 Pac. 192; Orchard v. Alexander (1891) 2 Wash. St. 108, 26 Pac. 196.

The land department may investigate the bona fides of a homestead claim, and cancel the same, if no patent has issued. Holmes v. State (1895) 108 Ala. 24, 18 South. 529.

If registers and receivers sell land not subject to sale by law, their acts are void for want of authority, and the commissioners of the general land office may suspend, if not annul, titles granted by them, until congress or the can act. Barton's Ex'x V. Hempkin (1841) 19 La. 510.

courts

A register and receiver, with the approbation of the commissioner of the general land office, have power to cancel a certificate of entry. Dickinson V. Brown (1847) 17 Miss. (9 Smedes & M.) 130.

The commissioner of the general land office has no authority, where the receiver has taken the price of land, and given a receipt therefor, to cancel the entire entry, because of a conflict as to one of the tracts embraced therein, without first giving the party in interest the right of election as to whether he desires to retain the tract not in controversy. Cornelius v. Kessel (1883) 58 Wis. 237, 16 N. W. 550.

18.Power to cancel as affected by subsequent transfer.-The power of the commissioner to cancel an entry is not affected by a transfer of the land by the entryman. Swigart v. Walker (1892) 49 Kan. 100, 30 Pac. 162; Fernald V. Winch (1892) 50 Kan. 79, 31 Pac. 665; Parsons v. Venzke (1894) 4 N. D. 452, 61 N. W. 1036, 50 Am. St. Rep. 669.

1 19.

Time for cancellation.-A homestead entry of public lands of the United States may be canceled for fraud by the officers of the land department, even after final proof has been made, but before the issuing of the patent. American Mortg. Co. of Scotland v. Hopper (1894) 64 Fed. 553, 12 C. C. A. 293

(affirming judgment [C. C. 1893] 56 Fed. 67): Jones v. Meyers (1891) 2 Idaho, 793, 26 Pac. 215, 35 Am. St. Rep. 259; Sorrenson v. Same (1891) 2 Idaho, 802, 26 Pac. 218; Judd v. Ran

dall

(1886) 36 Minn. 12, 29 N. W. 589;

Pfund v. Valley Loan & Trust Co. (1897) 72 N. W. 480, 52 Neb. 473; Caldwell v. Bush (1896) 6 Wyo. 342, 45 Pac. 488.

The land department has jurisdiction to cancel an original entry for public lands at any time before a patent is issued. Hawley v. Diller (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 986, 989, 178 U. S. 476, 44 L. Ed. 1157 (affirming decree, Diller v. Hawley [1897] 81 Fed. 651, 26 C. C. A. 514); Freese v. Rusk (1894) 54 Kan. 274, 38 Pac. 255; Haydel v. Nixon (1850) 5 La. Ann. 558.

The commissioner may declare void a certificate of a purchase of lands the law forbids to be sold. Wilson v. Fine (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 52, 54, 5 L. R. A. 141; Garfield v. United States (1908) 31 App. D. C. 338; Guidry v. Woods (1841) 19 La. 334, 36 Am. Dec. 677.

The power of the commissioner of the general land office to cancel entries of public lands after final proof has been made and a final certificate issued extends only to cases of entries made upon false testimony or without authority of law. Stimson v. Clarke (C. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 760.

The land department has no authority of its own motion to set aside or cancel the final certificate of a settler under the pre-emption law. American Mortg. Co. of Scotland v. Hopper (C. C. 1891) 48 Fed. 47.

The commissioner of the general land office or the secretary of the interior had power to cancel a pre-emption entry after the local land officers have approved the evidences of settlement and improvement, received the purchase money, and issued the receiver's final receipt. Parsons v. Venzke (1894) 61 N. W. 1036, 4 N. D. 452, 50 Am. St. Rep. 669, affirmed (1896) 17 Sup. Ct. 27, 164 U. S. 89, 41 L. Ed. 360.

20. -Grounds for cancellation.Fraud in the entry or selection, or any mistake of law or lack of authority on the part of the officers of the Land Department to make the entry, sale, or exchange, as the case may be, of the public lands, may be inquired into and determined by that department at any time prior to the issuance of patent. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. U. S. (1910) 176 Fed. 706, 101 C. C. A. 117, affirming judgment U. S. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1909) 170 Fed. 498, and appeal dismissed (1912) 32 Sup. Ct. 533, 223 U. S. 746, 56 L. Ed. 640.

Where, before a patent is issued, the commissioner of the general land office is advised that the assignment of a bounty warrant which has been located by the assignee is a forgery, he has power to suspend further proceedings under the entry, and, upon a proper showing, to vacate it. Durham v. Hussman (1893) 88 Iowa, 29, 55 N. W. 11.

and to cancel existing entries, while the legal title remains in the United States, is not unlimited or arbitrary, and can be exercised only after notice to parties in interest and due opportunity for a full hearing. Peyton v. Desmond (1904) 129 Fed. 1, 63 C. C. A. 651.

The decision of the Land Department on questions of fact involving the cancellation of an entry and in awarding the land to a party entitled thereto is final and conclusive, if the parties interested had an opportunity to be heard. Forman v. Healey (N. D. 1909) 121 N. W. 1122.

Disregard of rules as to a hearing on the question of the cancellation of an entry, if any, which does not result in the loss of an opportunity to be heard, will not affect the decision of the Land Department. Id.

Though the land department may cancel a desert land entry for fraud, or on the ground that the land is nondesert land, after a hearing, of which the entryman has notice, a cancellation without such hearing and notice is a nullity. Delles v. Second Nat. Bank (1897) 50 P. 190, 7 Wyo. 66, 75 Am. St. Rep. 875.

22. Form of judgment of cancellation.-A letter of the secretary of the interior to the commissioner of the general land office saying, "Your judg ment from which an appeal has been taken * *is affirmed," is a judgment of cancellation, being relative to a protest against issuance of a patent, on the ground of fraud in obtaining receipts for entry on land, in which matter the commissioner had rendered a decision of cancellation of the entry. Murray v. Polglase (1896) 17 Mont. 455, 43 Pac. 505.

23.

Effect of cancellation.-As to the conclusiveness of cancellation see line "Finality and conclusiveness of decisions," post, under this section.

The land department has jurisdiction to permit an amended entry to be made and to cancel an entry on the ground of fraud, and, having done so in a particular proceeding, and determined that a fraud was perpetrated on the government by one making an entry conflicting with an amended entry permitted to be made, and that his entry was fraudulent, his alleged rights thereunder were void ab initio. Baldwin Star Coal Co. v. Quinn (1909) 105 P. 1101, 46 Colo. 590.

The cancellation of an entry by the commissioner of the general land office does not vacate the entry, he not being a judicial officer, and his determination as to the validity of the sale concludes no one in his rights. Brill v. Stiles (1864) 35 Ill. 305, 85 Am. Dec. 364.

A statement of the commissioner of the general land office in a letter, to the effect that he has canceled a certificate, does not amount to an eviction which should rescind a sale between third per

sons. McDonold v. Vaughan (1859) 14 La. Ann. 716.

24. Appeal and review.-Pending appeal from an order of the local land office rejecting a desert land entry, the local office's decision was suspended, and the officers thereof were without jurisdiction to deliver a patent to another under a homestead entry. Anderson v. Woodward (Colo. 1914) 140 Pac. 198.

There being no fixed time in which appeals from registers and receivers shall be taken to the department at Washington, a reasonable time will be understood. Moore v. Fields (1860) 1 Or. 317.

A party aggrieved by an erroneous decision of the federal Land Department must exhaust his remedies in that department before he can resort to the courts, and, where one instituting a contest in a local land office against a homestead entry did not appeal to the General Land Office or to the Secretary of the Interior from an order dismissing the contest because not sufficiently regular to constitute a valid contest, he was bound thereby, and he could not resort to the courts. Kendall v. Long (Wash. 1911) 119 P. 9.

On certiorari a finding by the commissioner of public lands, based on evidence, cannot be upheld because he was not confined to evidence taken at the hearing. Crouch v. Ross (Wash. 1914) 145 Pac. 87.

25. Matters reviewable.-The jurisdiction of the Land Department over public lands continues so long as the legal title remains in the United States, and the decisions and rulings of that department in proceedings to acquire title to such lands, prior to the act which passes the legal title from the government, are interlocutory, and are as much open to review or reversal by the Land Department, while the legal title remains in the United States, as are the interlocutory decrees of a court open to review upon the final hearing. Peyton v. Desmond (1904) 129 Fed. 1, 63 C. C. A. 651.

The decision of the register and receiver, upon a pre-emption claim, is examinable by the commissioner of the general land office, for fraud, if not for mistake. Wynn v. Garland (1855) 16 Ark. 440.

A decision of the United States land department cannot be reviewed because of fraud, where an issue as to the existence of the fraud was made before the department, and evidence was offered in support thereof. Wiseman v. Eastman (1899) 57 P. 398, 21 Wash. 163.

26. Notice of motion for review. -See Acers v. Snyder (1899) 8 Okl. 659, 58 Pac. 780.

the interior on a contest preliminary to the issuance of patent to public lands cannot be invoked to preclude a re-examination by a successor, on the principle of res judicata. Beley v. Naphtaly (1898) 18 S. Ct. 354, 169 U. S. 353, 42 L. Ed. 775 (affirming [1896] 19 C. C. A. 392, 73 Fed. 120); Gage V. Gunther (1902) 68 Pac. 710, 136 Cal. 338, 89 Am. St. Rep. 141.

The Secretary of the Interior, having complete jurisdiction of a contest before the Land Department, is not bound by prior findings of fact made by his predecessor. Beley v. Naphtaly (1898) 18 Sup. Ct. 354, 358, 169 U. S. 353, 42 L. Ed. 775; Greenameyer v. Coate (1909) 29 S. Ct. 345, 348, 212 U. S. 434, 53 L. Ed. 587, affirming decree (1907) S8 Pac. 1054, 18 Okl. 160.

The ruling of a secretary of the interior finally disposing of an application to purchase public land may, on a reasonable application, be reconsidered and reversed by his successor, when no steps have been taken looking to the conclusion of the proceedings, in accordance with the original decision. Beley v. Naphtaly (1896) 73 Fed. 120, 19 C. C. A. 392, distinguishing Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 147 U. S. 165, 37 L. Ed. 123, and U. S. v. Stone (1864) 2 Wall. 525, 17 L. Ed. 765, and following City of New Orleans v. Paine (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 303, 147 U. S. 261, 37 L. Ed.

162.

A secretary of the interior has no power to annul a decision of his predecessor which determines the rights of the parties to a contest for entry of public lands; such determination being a judicial act, which can only be reviewed by the courts. Emblem v. Lincoln Land Co. (1900) 102 Fed. 559, 42 C. C. A. 499, affirming order (1899) 94 Fed. 710, and decree affirmed (1902) 22 S. Ct. 523, 184 U. S. 660, 46 L. Ed. 736.

A decision of a Secretary of the Interior concerning the public lands, general in its intention and application, and covering all lands within the description of certain statutes, is obligatory upon his successors, who can neither reverse his rulings nor reopen the controversy by transferring a claim fairly covered by the decision to the Court of Claims, under the Bowman Act. State of Illinois v. U. S. (1885) 20 Ct. Cl. 342.

not such a final determination of the controversy as to preclude his successor from a re-examination of the decision. Id.

28.

Review by succeeding Commissioner.-Commissioner of the General Land Office cannot annul or cancel the act of his predecessor. Lane v. Watts (1913) 41 App. D. C. 139, decree affirmed (1914) 34 S. Ct. 965, 234 U. S. 525, 58 L. Ed. 1440.

Rules of procedure of the United States land department pertaining to a re-review of a decision of the secretary of the interior cannot deprive a

succeeding secretary of authority to

review

a

decision of his predecessor.

Gage v. Gunther (1902) 68 P. 710, 136
Cal. 338, 89 Am. St. Rep. 141.
Under R. S. § 453, incorporated in

this

tary

section, the decision of a secrereversing the commissioner's deon a contest preliminary to is

cision

suance of a patent to public lands is

Irregularity of proceeding warrants the Commissioner of the General Land Office in reviewing the decision of his predecessor. Morse V. Odell (Or. 1907) 89 Pac. 139.

29. Finality and conclusiveness of decisions. The decisions of the general land office are unassailable by the courts, except by direct proceedings. Cragin v. Powell (1888) 9 Sup. Ct. 203, 206, 128 U. S. 691, 32 L. Ed. 566; Knight v. United Land Ass'n (1891) 12 Sup. Ct. 258, 262, 142 U. S. 161, 35 L. Ed. 974; Hartman v. Warren (1896) 76 Fed. 157, 22 C. C. A. 30; New Dunderberg Min. Co. v. Old (1897) 79 Fed. 598, 25 C. C. A. 116; James v. Germania Iron Co. (1901) 107 Fed. 597, 46 C. C. A. 476 (appeal dismissed [1904] 25 Sup. Ct. 786, 195 U. S. 638, 49 L. Ed. 356); Mora v. Foster (C. C. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 9,784; Le Marchel v. Teegarden (C. C. 1904) 133 Fed. 826; U. S. v. Cain-Bonness Lumber & Timber Co. (D. C. 1914) 215 Fed. 212; Rogers v. De Cambra (1900) 60 P. 863, 132 Cal. 502, affirmed (1901) 64 P. 894, 132 Cal. 502; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Pratt (1902) 67 P. 464, 64 Kan. 118; Kinney v. Degman (1882) 12 Neb. 237, 11 N. W. 318; Abbott v. Perry (Okl. 1915) 149 Pac. 202.

Decision of Secretary of Interior that patents to public lands should issue held not conclusive against the government, suing to cancel such patents for fraud. Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. U. S. (1915) 35 Sup. Ct. 440, 236 U. S. 574, 59 L. Ed. 725, affirming decrees (1912) 196 Fed. 593, 116 C. C. A. 267, and (1913) 203 Fed. 394, 121 C. C. A. 498.

Judgments of the land department permitting entries of land and the patents based thereon bind all the parties to the proceedings, but do not estop those who were not, and were not required to be, parties from establishing the truth as to any facts material to their claims in any litigation between them and the holders under the patents. Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co. v. Creede & Cripple Creek Min. & Mill. Co. (1902) 119 Fed. 164, 57 C. C. A. 200, judgment affirmed (1905) Creede & Cripple Creek Min. & Mill. Co. v. Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co., 25 Sup. Ct. 266, 196 U. S. 337, 49 L. Ed. 501.

The rulings of the Land Department are persuasive and should not be overruled without good reason, but they are not conclusive upon the courts. Hem

mer v. U. S. (1912) 204 Fed. 898, 123 C. C. A. 194, reversing decree U. S. v. Hemmer (D. C. 1912) 195 Fed. 790.

The doctrine of the conclusiveness of judgments and decrees of courts, as between those who are parties to the litigation, is not applicable to the United States in regard to the proceedings before the land officers in granting patents for the public land. U. S. v. Rose (C. C. 1885) 24 Fed. 196.

While the Land Decisions of the Interior Department are not binding on the federal courts, yet, when the construction of a doubtful or obscure statute by the department has been uniform, the court will accept such interpretation as the proper one. U. S. v. Burkett (D. C. 1907) 150 Fed. 208.

As between the government and those seeking to become purchasers or grantees of the public lands, the final action of the Land Office has always been regarded as final by the judiciary. Hale v. U. S. (1874) 10 Ct. Cl. 289.

On the determination of a contest in the land office, there is no error in admitting in evidence the decision of the land department, in a suit to quiet title, though such decisions have not the formalities of judgments. Potter v. Randolph (1899) 58 Pac. 905, 126 Cal. 458.

The decision of the general land office being subject to an appeal to the secretary of the interior is not technically res judicata. Butler v. Watts (1858) 13 La. Ann. 390.

United States grant of land over opposition in which the question of possession alone was considered held not res judicata in subsequent possessory action by the parties who had opposed the grant. Smith v. Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. (1912) 58 South. 153, 130 La. 471.

Though the action of the land office in issuing a patent to public land be considered as conclusive as the judgment of a judicial tribunal, it may be overthrown where the circumstances indicate a lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the person whose rights are involved which would render a judgment void. Tonopah & G. R. Co. v. Fellanbaum (Nev. 1910) 107 Pac. 882.

The proceedings before the secretary in matters pertaining to the disposal of the public lands are not void by reason of failure to give notice to interested parties. The secretary has power to determine all such matters on his own motion, and mere irregularities will not render such proceedings void. Acers v. Snyder (1899) 58 Pac. 780, 8 Okl. 659.

A finding by the Secretary of the Interior that a subsequent contest is not a separate action, but merely a proceeding supplemental to the original contest brought before him, will in a collateral action be adopted by the courts of the territory. Best v. Frazier (1906) 85 P. 1119, 16 Okl. 523.

The findings of the secretary of the

interior under former Act Cong. March 14, 1864, approving the selections of land sold by territorial authorities prior to its passage, are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive. Keane v. Brygger (1891) 3 Wash. St. 338, 28 Pac. 653.

30. Judicial or discretionary acts. -The land officers of the United States, on the hearing and determination of a contest between two rival claimants of the right to purchase a tract of public land under the land laws of the United States, act judicially, and their judgment is conclusive at law. Litchfield v. Register (C. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 8,388; Plummer v. Brown (1886) 70 Cal. 544, 12 Pac. 464; Lewis v. Lewis (1845) 9 Mo. 183, 43 Am. Dec. 540.

Where the power of the officers of the land department of the United States is judicial or purely discretionary, their acts and decisions are conclusive. State v. Bachelder (1861) 5 Minn. 223 (Gil. 178), 80 Am. Dec. 410; Garton v. Cannada (1867) 39 Mo. 357.

Neither injunction nor mandamus will lie against an officer of the Land Department to control him in discharging an official duty which requires the exercise of his judgment and discretion. U. S. v. Hitchcock (1903) 23 Sup. Ct. 698, 701, 190 U. S. 316, 47 L. Ed. 1074.

The question whether certain land is open for settlement or has passed under a railroad grant requires the exercise of judicial power and discretion by the land department, with which the courts of the United States cannot interfere by injunction or otherwise. Sioux City & St. P. R. Co. v. U. S. (C. C. 1888) 34 Fed. 835.

The act of the Secretary of the Interior in approving or rejecting a railroad indemnity land selection is not merely formal or ministerial, but judicial and not subject to review by judicial mandate. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Arnold (1912) 124 Pac. 829, 162 Cal. 726.

The action of the register and receiver of a United States land office, in accepting the proofs furnished by a preemptioner as satisfactory, and receiving his money and issuing to him the usual duplicate, is a judicial determination of his rights, which is conclusive in all collateral proceedings. Boyce v. Danz (1874) 29 Mich. 146.

The allowance of an application to contest the final entry of public land is, by rule of the Land Office, vested with the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and the courts will not interfere with his discretion unless it is a denial of a clear right. Parryman v. Cunningham (1905) 82 Pac. 822, 16 Okl. 94.

31. Jurisdiction to receive applications. The refusal of subordinate officials of the Land Department, acting under instructions, to accept an application to purchase coal lands in the United States, is not subject to review in the courts. Plested v. Abbey, 33