a receiver, where such course is proper. Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Miller (C. C. 1899) 97 Fed. 681.

A bill asserting rights based on the location of a mining claim under the laws of the United States, which shows that the validity of such location depends on the question whether or not the locators discovered a mineral deposit within the limits of the claim prior to its location, within the meaning of such laws, and which sets out in full the facts relating to such alleged discovery discloses a question arising under the laws of the United States, which gives a federal court jurisdiction where the requisite statutory amount is involved.

Id.

197. Extralateral rights.-Where a controversy between owners of adjoining mining claims as to the right of one to follow the vein outside of the vertical line of his claim clearly depends upon a question of fact under the statutes as finally construed by the supreme court, such controversy no longer presents a federal question. Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. C. C. & S. Min. Co. (1898) 85 Fed. 867, 29 C. C. A. 462.

198.

Issuance and validity of patent.-A bill alleging that a patent for a mining claim was procured by defendant from the land department by fraud, and without a compliance with the statute as to notice or proofs, and that it was issued without authority of law, and asking that defendant be decreed to hold such patent in trust for complainants, as the legal owners of the claim, states a cause of action necessarily involving the construction or effect of laws of the United States, of which a federal court has jurisdiction. Cates v. Producers' & Consumers' Oil Co. (C. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 7.

199.

Quieting title.-A suit to quiet title to a mining claim may be maintained in a federal court though the complainant has not yet obtained the legal title from the United States. Gillis v. Downey (1898) 85 Fed. 483, 29 C. C. A. 286.

In a suit to quiet title to a placer mining claim, a claim of title by defendant by reason of a location after issue of the patent, on a quartz vein known to exist before application for the placer patent, involves an interpretation of the federal statute which excludes known lodes or veins of quartz from patents for placer mining claims. Haggin v. Lewis (C. C. 1894) 66 Fed. 199.

A complaint seeking to quiet the title to mining claims, alleging that defendants claim under relocations made by them, on the pretense that the original locators did not do the proper assessment work for one year, and did not resume work before such relocations, and that certain persons made a loca

tion of certain claims so as to include 160 acres of land solely in the interest of one of defendants, presents issues of fact merely, and does not involve the construction of R. S. § 2324, post, § 4623, requiring a certain amount of work to be done on mining claims, so as to give jurisdiction to a federal court. Wise v. Nixon (C. C. 1896) 76 Fed. 3.

A bill to quiet title to a mining claim, eliminating all allegations relating to the claims and contentions of defendants, though complainant's claim of title is based on the mining laws of the United States, does not show that the construction or effect of such laws is in dispute, as it is open to defendants to allege any other ground of defense, and the only controversy, after issue has been joined, may be in regard to questions of fact. California Oil & Gas Co. of Arizona v. Miller (C. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 12.

200. Trespass.-Parties who attempt to enter beneath the surface, within the side lines of the lands of another, and to mine and take ore therefrom, are prima facie trespassers, and where such entry is claimed to be made under the mining laws of the United States, and the right to enter turns upon the construction to be given to such laws, the case is within the jurisdiction of the United States court. Cheesman v. Shreve (C. C. 1888) 37 Fed. 36.

A trespass upon a mining claim does not raise a federal question, nor does a claim of right based upon a mere location of a mining claim, as against a patent regularly issued by the land department, under authority of law, for the land covered by such location. Peabody Gold Min. Co. v. Gold Hill Min. Co. (C. C. 1899) 97 Fed. 657.

201. Laws relating to water courses and water rights.-The questions of priority of possession of a water right, and of conformity to local customs, laws, and decisions, do not constitute federal questions, under R. S. § 2339, post, § 4647, which will give jurisdiction to a federal court, but are merely preliminary to or the possible basis of a federal question. Telluride Power-Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 245, 175 U. S. 639, 44 L. Ed. 305, dismissing appeal (1897) 51 P. 146, 16 Utah, 125.

The nature and extent of the riparian rights and the rights in percolating waters of certain patentees from the United States whose titles were derived from Spain and Mexico by virtue of grants to their predecessors from those countries, which were confirmed by the board of land commissioners, acting under Act March 3, 1851, c. 41, 9 Stat. 631, are not federal questions, but are questions of state or general law. Devine v. City of Los Angeles (1906) 26

Sup, Ct. 652, 202 U. S. 313, 50 L. Ed. 1046.

A suit by a riparian owner to enjoin the construction of a bridge contiguous and injurious to his property, upon the ground that the defendant is not authorized to build the same by a certain act of congress, as it pretends and claims, arises under said act, and is within the jurisdiction of the proper circuit court. Hughes v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1883) 18 Fed. 106.

One who has acquired a right to the use of water from a stream flowing through the public land for domestic or irrigation purposes, in accordance with the laws of the state, is protected therein by R. S. §§ 2339, 2340, post, §§ 4647, 4648, and the jurisdiction of a federal court to determine the conflicting rights of parties is not affected by the fact that their lands and their points of diversion of the water are in different states. Anderson v. Bassman (C. C. 1905) 140 Fed. 14.

202. Laws relating to navigable waters-Construction of docks.-A suit which involves the question of the right to construct a dock in a navigable river under certain acts of Congress and a permit from the Secretary of War, which are alleged to be in execution of the power of Congress, under the Constitution, over the navigable waters of the United States, is one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Cummings v. Chicago (1903) 23 Sup. Ct. 472, 475, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. Ed. 525; Calumet Grain & Elevator Co. v. Same (1903) 23 Sup. Ct. 477, 188 U. S. 431, 47 L. Ed. 532.

203. Obstruction of navigation.To bring obstructions and nuisances in navigable waters lying within a state within the cognizance of the federal courts, there must be some statute of the United States directly applicable to such streams. U. S. v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co. (1897) 81 Fed. 658, 26 C. C. A. 547, affirming judgment (C. C. 1896) 72 Fed. 585, judgment reversed (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 343, 176 U. S. 211, 44 L. Ed. 437; Hatch v. Wallamet Bridge Co. (C. C. 1881) 6 Fed. 780.

The act of Congress admitting Oregon into the Union and providing that all navigable waters of the state shall be common highways, and forever free to the inhabitants of the state and to all other citizens of the United States without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor, does not prohibit obstructions to the navigation of such waters, and, in the absence of Congress assuming police power over the Willamette river in Oregon, a bill by one citizen of Oregon against another to enjoin the erection of a bridge over the river at Portland authorized by state act does not present a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch

(1888) 8 Sup. Ct. 811, 819, 125 U. S. 1, 31 L. Ed. 629.

The conformity of a log boom to the provisions of a state statute, so as to exempt it from prohibition under section 10 of the river and harbor Act of 1890, is not a question for the state courts alone, but must be decided by a federal court, when suit is brought for an injunction against the boom as an obstruction to navigation prohibited by the federal law. U. S. v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co. (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 343, 176 U. S. 211, 44 L. Ed. 437, reversing decree (1897) 81 Fed. 658, 26 C. C. A. 547.

The question of what constitutes an unlawful obstruction to navigable waters arises under a law of the United States, and therefore the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit involving the same. Hatch v. Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. (C. C. 1881) 6 Fed. 326; Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch (C. C. 1884) 19 Fed. 347; Sunflower River Packet Co. v. Georgia Pac. R. Co. (C. C. 1889) 39 Fed. 229.

The Wallamet river being declared "a common highway" by congress, the question of what constitutes a needless and therefore unlawful obstruction thereto arises under a law of the United States, and therefore the United States circuit court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit involving the same. Hatch v. Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. (C. C. 1881) 6 Fed. 326; Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch (C. C. 1884) 19 Fed. 347, decree reversed Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch (1888) 8 S. Ct. 811, 125 U. S. 1, 31 L. Ed. 629. A suit arises out of a law of the United States, when the controversy involved in it turns upon the proper construction or application of such law; and therefore a suit by the owner of a vessel authorized to engage in the coasting trade upon the Wallamet river, and by riparian owners thereon, to enjoin the erection of a bridge over said river at Portland, as being in violation of the act of congress under which said vessel was enrolled and licensed, and the act (11 Stat. 383) declaring said river a free and common highway, arises under said laws, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought or not. Hatch v. Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. (C. C. 1881) 6 Fed. 326.

The federal courts have jurisdiction of an action by a steamboat company to recover damages of a railroad company for obstructing a navigable river of the United States by building a bridge across it, regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Sunflower River-Packet Co. v. Georgia Pac. R. Co. (C. C. 1889) 39 Fed. 229.

A suit by private parties to enjoin the maintenance of a bridge across a navigable river, which is wholly within a state, from which complainants allege they suffer special injury, on the ground that such bridge has been declared by

the secretary of war, acting under the provisions of a federal statute, to constitute an unreasonable obstruction to navigation, and that it is therefore a public nuisance, is one arising under the laws of the United States, of which a federal court has jurisdiction, without regard to the citizenship of the parties. E. A. Chatfield Co. v. City of New Haven (C. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 788. 204. Riparian and littoral rights. -Whether the grantee of land on the shores of a navigable bay, under a grant by the United States, takes such an interest in the soil below high-water mark as will enable him to make a valid conveyance thereof, depends upon the local law of the state where the land is situated, and is not a federal question, giving jurisdiction to the federal courts. Kenyon v. Knipe (C. C. 1891) 46 Fed. 309.

Riparian or littoral rights are not an appurtenance of the land, but a mere incident of its ownership, arising out of the local or common law; and a grant by the United States of the land is not such a conveyance of the riparian rights as will give jurisdiction to a federal court of a contest over such rights, as involving a federal question. Id.

The general doctrine that local laws must determine the riparian rights of owners of real estate bounded on navigable rivers is subject, in all cases, to a consideration of the primary right of the United States in navigable waters for the purposes of commerce; and, in construing a grant by the United States bounded on such a river, a consideration of other matters besides the local law may become necessary in determining the intent and scope of the grant. King v. City of St. Louis (C. C. 1899) 98 Fed. 641.

205. Waters within national control. When congress has declared a navigable river to be a common highway, the state cannot authorize an obstruction therein, and anything which materially interferes with or limits the navigability thereof, considering the use which it is or may be subject to, is an obstruction and a violation of such act of congress, over which the United States circuit court has jurisdiction, under the Judiciary Act of 1875 (18 Stat. 470), to prevent or abate by injunction. Hatch v. Wallamet Bridge Co. (C. C. 1881) 6 Fed. 780.

In the absence of a federal statute assuming police jurisdiction of the navigable waters within the limits of a state, a contest as to whether certain erections therein are a public nuisance presents no federal question. Kenyon v. Knipe (C. C. 1891) 46 Fed. 309.

By 24 Stat. 326, appropriations were made for the improvement of certain rivers in California, with a provision that part of such appropriation should not be used until certain hydraulic mining, hurtful to navigation, had ceased

on such rivers, and the secretary of war was authorized to institute legal proceedings to prevent the continuance of such mining. Held, that this legislation was a sufficient assumption of national jurisdiction over the waters in question to confer on the federal courts jurisdiction of a suit by the United States to enjoin the deposit of mining débris injurious to navigation. U. S. v. North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. (C. C. 1892) 53 Fed. 625.

The question as to the rights of a state over marsh and tide lands on the borders of the sea or its estuaries is one of local law, to be determined by the supreme court of the state. Chisolm v. Caines (C. C. 1894) 67 Fed. 285, following Shively v. Bowlby (1894) 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 331.

206. Laws relating to commerce.See, also, post, § 992 et seq., and notes thereunder.

207.

Enforcement of interstate commerce acts.-A bill by one railroad company against another and its employés to enforce the interstate commerce act by enjoining defendants from refusing to receive plaintiff's cars presents a case arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. Ex parte Lennon (1897) 17 Sup. Ct. 658, 660, 166 U. S. 548, 41 L. Ed. 1110, affirming judgment (1894) 64 Fed. 320, 12 C. C. A. 134; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (C. C. 1893) 54 Fed. 746, 19 L. R. A. 395, appeal dismissed Ex parte Lennon (1893) 14 Sup. Ct. 123, 150 U. S. 393, 37 L. Ed. 1120.

Jurisdiction, in a federal court, of an original proceeding by mandamus to compel an interstate carrier to make the report which the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized by the act to regulate commerce to require, cannot be inferred from the grant of authority to the commission to enforce that act, or from the direction to district attorneys of the United States or the Attorney General to institute all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of its provisions. U. S. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1905) 25 Sup. Ct. 538, 197 U. S. 536, 49 L. Ed. 870.

That property affected by a judgment in ejectment rendered by a state court is used as a highway for interstate commerce and as a national mail route cannot be urged in support of the jurisdiction of a federal court over a suit to restrain the enforcement of the judgment, which is brought by a party not suing or authorized to sue on behalf of the public, and in which the United States or the attorney general is not a party complainant. Central Trust Co. v. Grantham (1897) 83 Fed. 540, 27 C. C. A. 570.

A national court has full jurisdiction to entertain a suit to enjoin state officers from preventing the owner of natural gas from taking it out of the state

for the purpose of interstate commerce. Haskell v. Cowham (1911) 187 Fed. 403, 109 C. C. A. 235.

Federal courts have jurisdiction of a bill in equity to restrain violations of the interstate commerce law to the irreparable injury of complainant, be cause of the subject-matter, and without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (C. C. 1889) 37 Fed. 567; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (C. C. 1893) 54 Fed. 730, 19 L. R. A. 387, appeal dismissed Ex parte Lennon (1893) 14 S. Ct. 123, 150 U. S. 393, 37 L. Ed. 1120.

A suit against the state constables to restrain them from acting under the South Carolina dispensary law, on the ground that it is an interference with interstate commerce, involves a federal question. Donald v. Scott (C. C. 1895) 67 Fed. 854, decree modified Scott v. Donald (1897) 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 165 U. S. 107, 41 L. Ed. 648.

A suit to compel an interstate carrier to receive and transport goods tendered to it for shipment, which it wholly refuses to do, is one to compel the performance of a duty imposed on it by law, and within the jurisdiction of the courts; and complainant is not required to resort in the first instance to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Danciger v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (C. C. 1907) 151 Fed. 379.

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208. Federal employers' liability act.-Act April 22, 1908, post, § 8657, making railroads engaged in interstate commerce liable for injuries to ployés, creates a statutory right of action not existing at common law or in chancery, and the action is one which, if warranted by the federal Constitution, may, under the general laws of the United States, be made subject to judicial proceedings in the federal courts as a suit of a civil nature arising under the laws of the United States. Clark v. Southern Pac. Co. (C. C. 1909) 175 Fed. 122; Hoxie v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (1909) 73 A. 754, 82 Conn. 352.

A bill by an express company to restrain a messenger's wife from suing a railroad company for her husband's death because of the messenger's contract to save the express company and any of its contracting railroads harmless from any liability resulting from personal injuries to him, etc., did not state a case arising under Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10, relating to interstate commerce, or under the fourteenth amendment of such Constitution, so as to entitle complainant to sue in the federal courts on that ground. Rountree v. Adams Express Co. (1908) 165 Fed. 152, 91 C. C. A. 186.

In an action for injuries to a switchman in a railroad yard, the declaration held to sufficiently charge that at the time of decedent's injury both he and

defendant company were engaged in interstate commerce within the purview of the federal Employers' Liability Act. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Reaves (1913) 208 Fed. 141, 125 C. C. A. 599.

Act April 22, 1908, § 2, post, § 8658, which makes common carriers by railroad within the territories of the United States liable for injuries to employés as therein stated, supersedes the common law in the territories with respect to such liability, and any cause of action within its terms is necessarily one arising under a law of the United States, and on that ground within the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court, where the requisite amount is involved. Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1909) 173 Fed. 527.

Where a petition in an action against an interstate carrier for injuries to a brakeman in one of the territories of the United States alleged injury to plaintiff by the negligence of a carrier while plaintiff was in the performance of his duty, it sufficiently showed that the action was based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, § 2, post, § 8658, though it did not so allege in terms. Clark v. Southern Pac. Co. (C. C. 1909) 175 Fed. 122.

Since by the terms of Judiciary Act March 3, 1887, § 1, as amended by Act Aug. 13, 1888, an action for injuries based on federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, post, §§ 86578665, between citizens of Wisconsin could only be brought originally in the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in the state of Wisconsin for the district in which the defendant resided, federal jurisdiction depending on the contention that the case was one arising under the laws of the United States, and, such suit having been brought in the state courts of Minnesota, it was not removable by the defendant over plaintiff's protest to the federal Circuit Court in the district of Minnesota. Hubbard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1910) 176 Fed. 994.

was

Where, in an action against an interstate carrier for death of a servant, the complaint alleged that defendant engaged in transporting both freight and passengers, and of interstate and foreign commerce, such averment did not allege that defendant was engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers "in" interstate and foreign commerce, and must therefore be taken as an averment of the transportation of freight and passengers in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 871, judgment reversed Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Troxell (1910) 183 Fed. 373, 105 C. C. A. 593, writ of certiorari denied Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1911) 31 S. Ct. 469, 219 U. S. 584, 55 L. Ed. 346.

209. Killing of stock by carriers. -Act July 4, 1884, granting to the

Southern Kansas Railway Company a right of way through the Indian Territory, and providing that the federal circuit and district courts for the Northern district of Texas, Western district of Arkansas, and district of Kansas shall have jurisdiction, without reference to amount, over "all controversies" arising between said company and the nations or tribes and their inhabitants through whose territory the railway shall be constructed, confers jurisdiction of a suit by an inhabitant of the Chickasaw Nation to recover for the wrongful killing of stock by the company's

trains. Southern Kansas

Ry. Co. v. Briscoe (1892) 144 U. S. 133, 12 Sup. Ct. 538, 36 L. Ed. 377, affirming Briscoe v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co. (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 273.

210. Municipal franchises.-A proceeding to exclude a bridge company from the use of a franchise to operate railroad tracks in a public street does not raise a. federal question, though such tracks lead to its bridge, built under Acts July 14, 1862, and Feb. 17, 1865, authorizing the con. struction of a railroad bridge over the Ohio river, and declaring that it "shall be a lawful structure, and shall be recognized and known as a post route," as those acts do not attempt to give the right to the use of the street as an approach. Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Louisville Bridge Co. (C. C. 1890) 42 Fed. 241.

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211. Rates and charges.-An action by a shipper against a railroad company engaged in interstate merce to recover damages because of an alleged discrimination in exacting a charge from one class of shippers, which is not required from another class, although the service is the same in both cases, is not within the jurisdiction of a federal court, as one arising under the interstate commerce law, where it is not alleged that the charge is not in accordance with a schedule of rates duly published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, nor that any application has been made to the Commission to correct such alleged discrimination. Clement v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (C. C. 1907) 153 Fed. 979.

A federal court has jurisdiction of a suit by a shipper to enjoin a railroad company from putting into effect a proposed rate alleged to be unlawful, as in violation of the interstate commerce law, either as unreasonable and unjust in itself or discriminatory, when the jurisdictional amount is involved. Jewett Bros. & Jewett v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1907) 156 Fed. 160.

Court held to have no jurisdiction to enjoin the establishment or enforcement of an interstate rate by a carrier. Columbus Iron & Steel Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1909) 171 Fed. 713

212.

Special remedies under interstate commerce act. The special remedies provided by the interstate commerce act are cumulative, and not exclusive of the general remedies given by the federal judiciary act conferring jurisdiction of all suits and controversies arising under an act of congress, regardless of any diversity of citizenship between the parties. Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. (C. C. 1891) 47 Fed. 771, appeal dismissed (1895) 16 Sup. Ct. 189, 159 U. S. 698, 40 L. Ed. 311.

a

an action to enjoin the taxation of a bridge by the local authorities as toll bridge, it being so taxed as a part of complainant's railroad, is not conferred on a federal court on the ground that a federal question is involved, by an allegation that the bridge was built under authority of an act of congress, where the right of the state to tax the bridge is conceded, and the controversy is as to the method of taxation under the state laws. St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Steele (1897) 17 Sup. Ct. 925, 927, 167 U. S. 659, 42 L. Ed. 315.

The federal courts have no jurisdiction of an original action in mandamus to compel the return of a franchise tax collected under the authority of a state statute, although the basis of the relief sought is the alleged repugnancy of the tax to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Hager (1906) 27 Sup. Ct. 24, 203 U. S. 109, 51 L. Ed. 111.

214. Telegraph companies.-The United States District Court has jurisdiction of an action by a telegraph company to restrain the enforcement of a tax of $1,000 by the municipality, on the ground that it is a tax on interstate commerce and is discriminatory; it being alleged that the damage to the complainant was greatly in excess of $2,000. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Mobile (C. C. 1909) 179 Fed. 955.

The question whether a railroad company which cuts down poles and wires belonging to a telegraph company interfering with the road's construction and operation, such telegraph company hav ing duly filed a written acceptance of the restrictions and obligations required by Act July 24, 1866, with the postmaster general, is liable therefor, is a federal question involving the construction of such act, and, in the absence of the express adjudication of such question by the supreme court of the United States, the action will be dismissed. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Franklin