force of

In examining the merits of the affair between sir 1805. Robert Calder and M. Villeneuve, we shall take each

July day's proceeding by itself. The battle was fought, as has already been shown, between 14, or, gratui. tously adding the Dragon, (for she was not engaged till at the very close,) 15 british, and 20 french and spanish sail of the line. Cases have occurred, where Relathe French have enumerated frigates as a part of tive the force opposed to them. Here, be it observed, the there were seven on one side, and two only on the parties other: those seven frigates had also been ordered, as will hereafter be made manifest, to take a part in the action, and one frigate did, for a short time, along with other ships, engage the Windsor-Castle. If, between the four 80-gun ships in the combined fleet and the four 98-gun ships in the british, any allowance is expected

for the nominal (for it is not real*) superiority of the latter, Jet four of the five surplusage frigates be added to the former ; which will be leaving three opposed to the british two, because one of the latter, the Egyptienne, mounted 24-pounders on her main deck. When also it is considered, that, from the weight of metal and number of men she carries, a french 74 is of greater force than a british 74, no objection, on the part of the French or Spaniards, can be urged against an estimate which, grounded on the numerical line-of-battle strength on each side, fixes the ratio'of force in their favour as four is to three.

With, then, the inferiority of one fourth in point of force, the British succeeded in capturing two ships out of the adverse line. If these were slow sailers and bad workers, how many slow sailers and bad workers did the british fleet contain ? If the density of the fog obstructed the French and Spaniards in their mancuyres, what effect must it have had upon the British, to whom, in spite of all that has been urged to the contrary, so many signals were

* See vol, ii, p. 269,

M.

neuve's
in-

1805. made and so few seen or understood; and who ac-
July.

tually performed the evolution, which brought on the
close action, without a signal at all? The tacking
of the Hero, for instance. Certainly, too, the fog,
combined with the smoke, incommoded the British,
who were to-leeward, more than the French and
Spaniards, who were to-windward. A victory, there-
fore, it was that sir Robert Calder had gained, but
not a " decisive,” nor a “ brilliant” victory. To
haye made the action decisive, one way or the other,
was exclusively in the power of M. Villeneuve; but
he kept his wind, and the firing ceased, owing prin-
cipally, if not wholly, to his having hauled out of
gun-shot.

It may throw some light upon the proceedings of
Ville-, M. Villeneuve, both in this action and generally

since he last quitted Toulon, if we transcribe a por-
struc- tion of the instructions which, on the eve of his de-
to his parture, he addressed to the captains of his fleet. “I
fleet. do not,” he says,“'intend to go in search of the enemy:

I would even avoid him in order to get to my destin-
ation ; but, should we meet him, let there be no dis-
creditable evolution : it would dishearten our men
and ensure our defeat. · If the enemy be to-leeward
of us, having the power to adopt what evolution we
please, we will form our order of battle, and bear
down upon him in line abreast; each ship to close
with her natural opponent in the enemy's line, and
to board him should a favourable opportunity present
itself.”—“Every captain, who is not closely en-
gaged, is not in his station; and a signal to recall
him to his duty will be a stain upon his character.
The frigates must equally take part in the action :*
no signals to that effect will be necessary; they must
proceed to the point where their cooperation may be
most advantageous, whether to hasten the surrender
of an enemy's ship, or to cover a french ship too

marks

closely pressed, and to take her in tow or otherwise 1805. assist her.* No shyness betrays itself here; an July. additional proof that, in his apparent disinclination to close with an inferior force, vice-admiral Villeneuve was acting a compulsory part.

On the 23d of July the parties, in point of relative Reforce, stood nearly the same.

The combined fleet on sehad been reduced from 20 to 18 ships, and the cond british from 15 to 14, But the one had its seven meetfrigates ready to act upon any service; while the ing. other had its two frigates employed in towing the prizes of the preceding day; and which prizes, in the attention they otherwise claimed, impeded the british fleet in its progress, and prevented it from attempting any manoeuvre whereby an advantage might be gained. Considering the little value of the vessels, the San-Rafaël, a ship of 34, and the Firme, a ship of 51 years old, and both battered to pieces, their destruction would have been not only a justifiable measure, but, under circumstances, the most eligible that could have been devised.

With respect to the power of commencing the action, a continuance of the same wind kept it where it had been on the day previous; yet, with the exception of an hour's demonstration, or show-off, as it may be termed, the party possessing that power declined to use it. On the 24th a change of wind, to nearly an on opposite point of the compass, produced a corre- third. sponding change in the position of the two fleets; but still they approximated no nearer. The truth is that, since the close of the first day's proceedings, sir Robert Calder, unless some unlooked-for advantage should offer itself, did not intend to be a second time the assailant: he would neither attack nor retreat , nor would he deviate one point from the course necessary to convoy his crippled ship and his two worthless prizes beyond the reach of danger. Each fleet, therefore, on the afternoon of the 24th,

* For the original of this curious production, see Appendix, No. 3,

M.

neuve's
res-

1805. pursued its route, as if the other were not present,
July.

or that no hostility existed between them.

“ Notre intention est que vous fassiez votre joncVille-, tion en évitant le combat,” says Napoléon, in his

instructions to M. Villeneuve; and, in another place,
trictive « Si vous prenez le parti de faire votre réunion avec

l'escadre de Brest, vous devez tenter de le faire
sans combat.” Buonaparte, also, when writing to
M. Decrès, asks, “A quoi aboutissait une bataille ?"
and immediately answers the question himself,
“ A rien."* If one admiral, therefore, had the mis-
fortune to act under orders that forbade him to fight
unless with such odds in his favour as would ensure
success, the other was also controlled, in some
degree, by extraneous circumstances; sufficient, if
not to excuse him for declinir~ to assail an equal
force, to justify him in acting a peculiarly cautious
part, when himself assailed by a force decidedly su-

perior. Sir Robert Calder knew that the very ships
Can- composing his fleet had been abstracted from watch-
impo- ing as many enemy's ships, as had composed the

combined fleet on his first meeting it: he himself,
sir Ro- with 10, had been ordered from off a port in which
Calder. lay 15, waiting, as he had every reason to believe,

solely for his departure, to slip out and join M.
Villeneuve. Rear-admiral Stirling, also, with five
ships, had been called from off another port, out of
which he knew, and informed sir Robert, that five
french ships had been seen getting under way, just as
the blockading squadron was disappearing from the
coast;t and which five ships, since known to havesailed
on the 18th, were endeavouring to effect their june-
tion, either with M. Villeneuve at sea, or with rear-
admiral Gourdon at Ferrol. So well grounded were
sir Robert Calder's apprehensions on this head, that,
on the 23d of July, rear-admiral Allemand, with his
squadron, was on the very spot on which the battle

* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi. pp. 248, 252, and 276.

+ See Minutes of the court-martial upon sir Robert Calder, rear-admiral Stirling's evidence.

sed upon

para

in official letter.

of the preceding day had been fought. Moreover, 1805, sir Robert had been ordered by the admiralty, and July. by the commanders in chief of the Channel and of the Mediterranean fleets, to be on his guard in case of a junction between the fleet of M. Villeneuve and the squadron from Ferrol; whose united force would have been at least 35, and, if the Rochefort squadron had joined, 40 sail of the line.

Matters would have passed off, and sir Robert Calder's success, in having, with a fleet of 15 sail of the line, captured two out of an enemy's fleet of 20 sail of the line, been taken as an earnest of how much more would have been effected, had the parties met on fairer terms. But the accounts on shore Supmarred all. The british admiralty suppressed an

pressed important paragraph in sir Robert's letter to admiral graph Cornwallis ; taking care that the published extract (to confirm the delusion, stated to be a copy of the official letter) should end where hopes were held out of a renewal of the engagement; thus : “They are now in sight to-windward; and, when I have secured the captured ships and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any opportunity that may offer to give you a further account of these combined squadrons.” The suppressed paragraph was this: “At the same time it will behove me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port ;* therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant, with the whole squadron.” The admiralty, it is true, may have acted thus upon the oral information of the officer bearing the despatches; and which, in every version of it, conveys an absolute intention on the part of sir Robert Calder to renew

have arisen from the Defiance's signal of the preceding day at noon having been for 22 " sail of the line,” when on the morning of the 23d, 18 only were counted.

VOL. IV.

* This

may

C