rescue of public economy from the hands of empirics, whose highest achievements are to bewilder and dazzle the weak and the indolent with phantasmal demonstrations. Mr. Colton has not rejected the title of "political economy" because he proposed to enter a different field, or because the subject and argument have no relation to political society, but chiefly because the term political has been so much abused in this country by the rude agitation of what are commonly called politics, that he does not think the word now used with us comports with the dignity of the theme; and the second part of his title is adopted from a conviction that the economical principles of states are to be deduced from their separate experience and adapted to their individual condition. The task which he proposed to himself is, the exhibition of the merits of the Protective and Free Trade Systems as they apply to the United States. He expresses at the outset his opinion that the settlement of the question he debates is one of the most desirable, and will be one of the most important results which remain to be achieved in the progress of the country; and we can assure him that the accomplishment of it will be rewarded by the best approval of these times, and an enduring name. The second chapter of Mr. Colton's work is devoted to a statement of the New Points which it embraces. By new points he does not mean that all thus described are entirely original, though many of them are so; but that on account of the importance of the positions he has assigned them, as compared with the positions they occupy in other works of the kind, they are entitled to be presented as new. Many of them involve fundamental and all-pervading principles, that have not hitherto appeared in speculations upon the subject, but which are destined hereafter to have an important influence in its discussion. Some of the most prominent of these points are: I. His definition of Public Economy, that it is the application of knowledge derived from experience to a given position, to given interests, and to given institutions, of an independent state or nation, for the increase of public or private wealth. II. That Public Economy has never yet been reduced to a science, and that the propositions of which it has been for the most part composed, down to this time, are empirical laws. III. That the propositions relating to the minor questions in debate have been subjected to the most rigid test of the recog nized canons of experimental induction. IV. That labor is capital, and the parent of all other capital. V. That protective duties in the United States are not taxes, and that a protective system rescues the country from an enormous system of foreign taxation. VI. That different states of society require a corresponding adaptation of the systems of public economy to each. VII. That popular and general education is a fundamental element of public economy. VIII. There are new points on the subject of money and a monetary system, which are regarded by the author as vital and fundamental in public economy, and exhibited under new and impressive aspects. IX. That freedom is a thing of commercial value. X. That protection as opposed to free trade is identified with freedom, and with the principle of the American revolution, XI. That the history of freedom for centuries, for all time, shows it to be identical with protection. XII. That the American revolution is the opening of a new era in the history of freedom, demonstrating that the protective principle lies at the bottom of the struggles after freedom. XIII. The history of the rise and progress of the free trade hypothesis is made a point of importance, and of much interest and instruction. XIV. The interests of the American people are represented as necessarily wedded to the protective principle, and the masses who have been for a time seduced by the deceptive promises of free trade, are supposed to be after protection under false colors. XV. The different cost of money and labor in the United States, as compared with their cost in the countries with which we trade, is made the foundation of the necessity of a protective system; and this necessity is averred to be the result of the organization of society on freedom princi- | a fruit of the reflection of years-Mr. Colton makes the following observations: ples. XVI. That the destiny of freedom is but imperfectly achieved, and is contingent on a protective system. XVII. That an American commercial system, adapted to this end, is required. XVII. That the principle of free trade is identical with that of anarchy. XIX. That those parts of the world which are most free, require protection against those which are less so, because the sole object of protection is to maintain and fortify freedom. XX. The great amount of agricultural products and labor which go forth in the form of manufactures, is made a distinct point of, to show how necessary manufactures are to an agricultural country, and how it is impoverished by allowing itself to be dependent on other countries for its manufactured products. XXI. That public economy differs from private, not in principle, but in the comprehensiveness of its interests; and that there cannot be two kinds of economy, any more than two kinds of honesty. "We have tried our best to tolerate the introduction of the term, science, into this definition, as the substantive part of it, in accordance with general usage, such as the science of national wealth, &c.; and we do not repudiate the idea that science is implied in it, or that it is a proper subject of science. But we are forced to deny, that, as yet, the subject has ever been reduced to a science, and that down to this time, it has any other form of a system than a collection of what the logicians call empirical laws. If it shall be admitted that we have contributed, in any degree, so to sift these empirical laws, and so to adjust them in a scientific form, as to subject them to recognized canons of experimental induction, as we propose to attempt to do, still our definition stands in a form not inconsistent with the definition of a science; and though we fail in our proposed task, the purpose of our definition is not impaired. Its terms indicate sufficiently the class of sciences among which it must take rank, if it is deemed worthy to be called a science. It is a science composed of contingent propositions-contingent on the peculiar position, the peculiar interests, and the peculiar institutions of the country to which its rules are applied at any given time, and contingent on the changes, in these particulars, to which that country may be subject in the succession of events. It will be seen, therefore, that our definition is a new point, and that it rescues the whole subject, entirely, from the position which has been claimed for it by the Free-Trade economists, as a science of uniform propositions-uniform for all countries and for all times. Every person must see, that one of the essential attributes of Free Trade is the uniformity of its propositions for all nations, and that any departure in a system of public economy from such uniformity, is not The poles of a planet, therefore, cannot be Free Trade, but a violation of its principles. wider apart, nor the heavens farther from the earth, than the main position of these two antagonistical systems. The propositions of the one are the same for all nations, in all time, while those of the other are contingent on the position, interests, and institutions of the country to which they are applied for the time being. "It will be observed, that we have not only departed from usage, in our definition of public economy, by denominating it the application of knowledge derived from experience, instead of In regard to the first point, it will be calling it a science; but that we require a girconceded that in all investigations of this en position, given interests, and given institusort, definitions comprehend or suggest the tions, of a state or nation, in order to know how to make the application. The very terms of scope and laws of argument, and are indisour definition, therefore, take the whole subpensable to its perspicuous and satisfacto-ject from the determinate and immutable laws ry conduct. In offering this definition of Free Trade, and place it on what may be We have not stated these new points either in the order or in the form in which they appear in the work itself; nor have we given all of them; but these are sufficient to show, that the author has extended his views much beyond the common range, not to say that he has gone more profoundly than most writers into the rationale of political philosophy. We proceed to citations from the author himself on some of the points above specified, and perhaps on others. It is in the discussion of these propositions that Mr. Colton evinces his highest powers; and while the reader will understand that little justice can be done either to the propositions or to the arguments by which they are maintained, in so brief an article as this or indeed within less space than the close-thinking and terse-writing author himself devotes to them-he will be instructed by the hasty abstract which we shall make of so much of the work as relates to them most directly and forcibly. * * * * * * * called a contingent basis, itself subject to a variety of contingencies. In Free Trade, we have only to understand its propositions, and then we know what they prove, or pretend to prove. But in our theory of public economy, we consult facts, experience, under a given state of things, in order to form the right propositions. In Free Trade, the propositions lead; in our system, they follow. In the former, the propositions determine results, or affect to do so; in the latter, facts, by their practical operation, determine the propositions, because they determine results. In the former case, the theory, or, rather, the hypothesis, is first, and the results are hypothetical; in the latter, the theory is last, and is made to depend on the facts. Our theory, therefore, is not one of propositions, formed irrespective of facts, but a theory growing out of facts." * * * * "It will also be seen, that, from our definition, as a starting point, the field of public economy opened by it is entirely new. It is not the world, it is not all nations, it is not any two nations; but it is one nation in particular. The law of the definition necessarily brings the subject within these limits. This imparts an entirely new character to the argument. With general propositions, we have nothing to do; it is a particular case. It is a system of public economy for the United States alone, which we are required to frame. It has been shown above, that it is not possible to construct one for all nations, nor even for two. All pretensions of this kind are utterly baseless, and can do nothing but evil so far as they are influential." in our classification of the laws of public economy, in their historical condition down to this time, as being empirical, let them tell us under what category of dogmas they should be ranked; or let them say, if they choose, that they do not all belong to this class. We are not tenacious on that point. We only say, they have never yet been reduced to a science. That is evident, because there is no certainty of science in them. There is no uncertainty in figures, in mathematics, in geometry, in astronomy, or in the physical sciences generally, so far as their respective domains have been explored; nor is there uncertainty in any science, the elements of which have been ascertained and adjusted in scientific order and relations. There can be none. It is the very nature of science to realize its predictions. We do not affirm confidently, that all the dogmas which ever have been uttered on public economy, will fall within the logician's definition of empirical laws: but we think they will generally be found there; nor can we conceive how a more respectable rank could fairly be assigned to them. It is not simply for the convenience of classification, that we have put them there; but because we could not find a more legitimate place. "Now, let us consider what the characteristic of an empirical law is, as presented in the above citation, [from John Stuart Mill:] 'The property of being unfit to be relied on beyond the limits of time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations have been made.' It may not always be so good as this; but it cannot be better. It must be seen, therefore, that it entirely cuts off the generalizations of Free Trade, Under the second point above specified, and falls directly in the line of our definition. our author says :— "Both the novelty and importance of the position here taken, demand some exposition. If it be well authorized, truc in fact, for the purpose we have in view, it cannot be too well understood. When Free Trade economists have arrogated the high and dignified title of a science for their theme, one naturally asks, what sort of a science is it? In what is its artificial structure apparent? Where are the principles and rules by which we arrive at infallible conclusions? A science, well and truly formed, can predict results with certainty; it is the very nature of science to do this, and any pretension of this kind that fails in its predictions, is thereby proved false. Have the laws of public economy ever yet been so adjusted as to produce this result? Manifestly not. If they had, all the world would have known it, and there would be no controversy. The truth is, the whole subject still remains a wide field of empirical laws, not entirely useless, but yet unadjusted as to scientific order and relations, having not the slightest claim to the dignity of a science. If any should think we have failed No law of public economy can be safely trusted except for the time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations have been made;' that is, the observations which have established the law. The principle necessarily restricts every system of public economy to one nationto that nation where the observations that have dictated its laws, have been made. Within these limits empirical laws may be serviceable, and by proper attention may be reduced to a science. For a wider range it is not possible that a science should be made of them on this subject. In the language of Mr. Mill, it is not simply absurd, but abstractedly impossible."" From under the third head, where the tion are cited, and according to which the recognized canons of experimental inducauthor professes to have constructed his general argument, we make the following extracts: "We for a long time thought that public economy never could be made a science in the strict sense of the term. But that position can hardly be maintained, if it be allowed that everything is a subject of science, and capable of being brought into its place as such; and if, moreover, it be considered, that it is a part of science to adapt itself to the nature of the subject. A science of contingent propositions, for aught that can be seen, is as supposable as one of uniform and immutable propositions. The propositions of public economy, as we hold, must necessarily change with a change of data; and it cannot be denied, that such changes are constantly transpiring in every commonwealth. It will be found that this principle of a liability to a change of data, presents itself on the threshold, and that it lies at the foundation of the science of public economy. It is impossible to cast it aside, or turn the back upon it, with any hope of a successful investigation, or useful result. A public measure required at one time, may, by events, or even by its own operation in the complete fulfilment of its purpose, require to be modified, or suspended, or superseded, at a subsequent period; and the same measure may be of the greatest importance to one nation, which would be injurious to another, possibly to all others. Nothing can be more contingent than the propositions of public economy. "It must be admitted, that nothing is more desirable, in public economy, than that the certainties of science should be brought to bear upon it; and nothing is more evident than that, hitherto, they have never been so directed. The reasons are obvious, as shown in our citations, here and there, from Mr. Mill. It was impossible that a science on this subject should be constructed out of the common experience of nations for common use, or out of the experience of one nation for the use of another. It is only in the line of the experience of one nation that the rigid principles of such a science can be applied, and for that nation only. All beyond this field is a region of empirical laws, as before shown; and of that precise category of empirical laws, which are utterly incapable of being reduced to a science." * In the chapter devoted to labor, one of the longest and strongest of the work, besides presenting his subject in many novel aspects, Mr. Colton avers that heretofore labor has occupied a false position in systems of public economy, and that a vast amount of doctrinal and practical error has been the result; in short, that, as labor is so important and all-pervading an element in public economy, any system which does not give to labor its true position, must necessarily be vitiated to its core and foundation. "Labor," says Mr. Colton "Labor is capital, primary and fundamental. The position which is usually awarded, in systems of public economy, to what is called capital, as if labor were not capital, and capital of the most important kind, has tended to degrade labor, and to strip it of its essential attributes as the producer of all adventitious wealth, or of that state of things which distinguishes civilized society from barbarism. It has also tended to cloud one of the most important branches of public economy in obscurity, and led to much embarrassment in the consideration of others. The natural order of things is thus reversed; that which ought to be first, is put last; the cause stands in place of the effect; the agent is taken for the instrument; the producer for the thing produced. Although it will be convenient in this work, in order to avoid frequent repetition and unnecessary circumlocution, to employ the customary phrase, capital and labor, in the usual sense, it is due to a just consideration of the comparative claims of these two things, to assert the prior and paramount rights of labor, as to the position to which it is entitled in a system of public economy. Labor is capital of its own kind, not as a subject to be acted upon for the increase of its own value, but as an agent that imparts value to every other kind of capital which it creates, or which, after having created, it employs as an instrument, or takes in hand for improvement. It is doubtless true, that the faculties or powers of labor are subjects of culture and use, for the increase of their skill and effectiveness; and in this sense are subjects of action for the increase of their value. In this particular, the faculties or powers of labor occupy the position of any other kind of capital, as subjects of improvement by labor itself. It will be observed, however, that it is not labor, but the faculty of labor, the value of which is thus increased. 66 'European economists, for the most part, if not universally, regard labor as a mere power, like horse-power, or any other brute force; and what Ricardo and the Adam Smith school mean by the proportion of the whole produce of the earth allotted' to labor, is simply that which is necessary for its subsistence, as for that of a horse, an ox, or any other brute. The three chief elements of public economy, as taught by Smith, Ricardo, and others of the same school, arerent, profit and wages.' It must be seen that a system of public economy, constructed on such principles, is entirely unsuited to American society; and though its doctrines in the abstract may often be correct, its whole must be totally inapplicable to a state of things radically, fundamentally, and essentially different from that for which such a system is designed. It was morally impossible, from the social position of these economists, that they should be able to adapt a system of public economy to American society, not having thought it incumbent on themselves to make any other provision for labor, than to save it from starvation, and to get the greatest profit out of it, as the owner does out of his ox or his horse; and believing, as they do, that system the best which will secure this end most effectually. There can be no redeeming quality with Americans, for a system of public economy, one of the fundamental principles of which is of this kind, pervading it throughout, imparting its character to it, and constituting a part of its very essence. The three words, rent, profit, and wages,' in the sense in which they are employed by Smith and his school, as representing the three comprehensive parts of their system, are sufficiently declaratory of its character, and look back to a feudal state of society. The things here intended are not to be found in this country, and are not tolerated by its institutions. * * * * * "Labor-capital is the parent of all other capital. Other capital is chiefly, if not altogether, the creature of civilization, though the same thing, in substance, may be found in a savage state. But as a subject of public economy, it is regarded as one of the things receiving its definite form and measure from the hand of civil polity. It will be found, indeed, that the entire structure of civilization owes its existence to labor, and of course those parts of it which derive their tangible value from its forms, and which are regulated by them. Civilization itself is secondary and ministerial, in relation to all the capital which labor creates, and comes in to define and protect it. It was in part the value of these products of labor which made civilization necessary, that it might receive a definite form, and be made secure. No man can apply his hand or point his finger to a thing regarded as capital, which is not the product of labor. All intrinsic values are but fictions of the imagination, always imapalpable, vanishing as they are approached. The diamond and the pebble are of equal value in the eye of the barbarian, and would be equivalents in every other eye, but for the existence of that capital, the product of labor, which is able to purchase the diamond at a high price. We do not, however, mean to say, that it is improper, or without significance, to use the terms, intrinsic value. They are employed in this work in the usual sense, and are pertinent when so used, because they represent a practical idea. It will be found, however, that this value is entirely the product of labor; and this conclusion may be justified by the doctrines of all the economists worthy of respect. * * * "Labor, in its true position, defines human rights, without a word, and men will scarcely fail to recognize them, while it remains there. But, when thrust out of place, into a false position, and chained to slavery; when it is made to occupy this position in all the systems of public economy most in vogue in the world, it is no wonder that men who are entitled, and who ought, to be free, should be slaves. In its proper position, it proclaims a great truth, the consequences of which are stupendous, when carried out to all its legitimate results, in a system of public economy, morally and socially considered, as well as commercially-and more especially in the former aspects. "The rocking of the cradle of American independence, jostled into one those distinctive elements on which the Free-Trade economists have founded their system. It broke down the barriers of classes, which form the peculiar features of that system, and the doctrine was then proclaimed, that all men are born free and equal.' As before, more especially from that time, this nation became a community of working men, in whose eyes labor is an honor; and he who does not work, is the exception to the general rule. Labor, therefore, in the United States, occupies an elevated, influential, honorable position. It is not the man that lives by work, but the man that lives without work, that is looked upon with disrespect. A gentleman of fortune and of leisure, who does nothing, has far less consideration than he, who, though equally able to live without work, devotes himself to some useful pursuit. * * "Labor, work, is the spirit, the genius of the American people. It was so from the beginning by necessity; it became a fixed habit of the community; and has ever been a part of the morale of the country. It is a grand political element; it was born of a great political exigency; it was nourished in a political cradle; it graduated into manhood with political honors; it made with its own hands, and has ever worked, the machinery of the political commonwealth; it lies at the foundation of the social edifice, pervades the entire structure, and its escutcheon stands out in bold relief from the pediment. And is this the thing, the element, the power, that is to content itself with the position and the doom of the third class enumerated, defined, and described by European economists, whose measure of degradation and of comfort could not be expressed by Adam Smith and others, as seen in the citations from them, without a picture drawn from slavery. "It should be observed that labor is never independent, when it has no alternative; that is, when it is not strong enough in its own position to accept or reject the wages offered to it in any given case, if unsatisfactory, and when, in such a case, it cannot turn away, and live and prosper. When it can do this, it not only has a voice in its wages, but the parties in contract, the employer and the employed, stand on a footing of equality. This principle is equally applicable to the producer of commodities of any description, as the proprietor of a farm, workshop, or any other producing establishment, over which he presides, and where, per |