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A. Not necessarily. It may be smaller. Q. 55. I fendant urges that an examination of the Now, ever since you began in 1886, as I under- whole of the witness' testimony shows that stand, to examine these cases you have made that diagnosis; that people have traumatic to be the fact. Sufficient, however, appeared neurosis or neurasthenia from accident, trauma, in the testimony of the witness and in his injury, I want to know the length of time you former deposition to furnish a basis for the have been doing it? A. Well, I should like to plaintiff's claims that they were contradicinclude also what I have done besides the length of time. I have examined and given tory. Whether or not they were inconsistent opinions on these cases since certainly that was a matter for the jury to determine in time, say 1886. When I have made the diag- passing upon the value of the witness' tesnosis I have made it as I did here in this case, so-called traumatic neurosis. I carefully timony. If this evidence was otherwise adused the word 'so-called,' in view of the fact missible, it should not have been excluded, that it is not all due to the accident." as the defendant now urges, because the The plaintiff was then permitted to ask jury might fail to understand it, or to comthe witness, against the defendant's objec-prehend the distinctions properly to be tion, if in a deposition given by the witness drawn. It must always be that some memin another case he had not made certain general statements with regard to the diagnosis of neurasthenia resulting from accident, to which the witness replied that he had. The answers of the witness, contained in said deposition, in which these statements appeared were the following:

"Well, to tell the honest truth, the diagnosis of neurasthenia resulting from accident is one that I practically never make. I practically never made it. I don't regard accidents as a cause of neurasthenia ;" and answer: "I mean I don't think that accidents cause neurasthenia as such. Neurasthenia may be set up by worry, anxiety, overwork, and I have sometimes made the diagnosis litigation neurasthenia in cases in which I thought that the worry and anxiety of litigation was putting the person into a more or less neurasthenic condition, but I don't think that an accident in itself is a legitimate

cause of neurasthenia."

bers of a jury are liable to become confused in the consideration of testimony relating to scientific and medical subjects, fail to understand some of the language employed by expert witnesses, or fail to draw just conclusions as to the effect of their testimony. But when a party offers such direct testimony, he cannot properly object to cross-examination on the grounds that it may still further confuse the jury and that they may not ther confuse the jury and that they may not place a correct interpretation upon the answers, which may be given.

[4] The defendant at the trial excepted to the ruling of said justice excluding testimony offered by the defendant to show the result of certain so-called counts of the blood of defendant's counsel. It was a part of the claim of the plaintiff that, as a result of said injuries, she was suffering from hyperthyroidism, that an examination of her blood showed an abnormal condition indicating a lymphocytosis, or an excess of lymphocytes in the blood stream, and that lymphocytosis is a corroborative symptom in cases of hyperthyroidism. The defendant claimed that the count of lymphocytes in the blood of the plaintiff was not in excess of the number of such cells appearing in the blood count of a normally healthy person, and sought to show the count which had been made of the blood of defendant's counsel. Said justice excluded this on the ground that no evidence had been introduced tending to show that said counsel was in a normally healthy condition at the time of taking the sample of which the count had been made. We think the evidence was rightly excluded.

[1-3] The grounds of the defendant's objection to this cross-examination is that it was testimony given in another case between different parties; that the answers contained in the deposition are not inconsistent with the testimony of the witness given upon the stand in this case, and that the examination must have created the impression upon the minds of a jury of laymen that there was such an inconsistency, although none existed. We do not find merit in the exception. It is proper cross-examination of an expert witness, who in his testimony has given an opinion upon some matter connected with the art or science of which he has special skill or knowledge, to ask such witness if he has always been of that opinion, or if he has not at some certain time, which is specified, made a statement which is inconsistent with his present testimony. The scope of the cross-examination of an expert witness for the purpose of testing the value of his opinion is largely within the discretion of the judge presiding at a jury trial. It is a prop-justice on said motion was as to the proer exercise of such discretion to permit such a witness to be asked if on a former occasion he has not expressed a different opinion. The cross-examiner may call the witness' attention to such former statement of opinion, whether the same was made orally, in some written work, or, as in this instance, in a deposition. Later in his testimony, the witness in this case insisted that his statements on the stand were in harmony with those in the former deposition, and the de

[5] We shall consider together the plaintiff's and the defendant's exceptions to the decision of said justice upon the motion for a new trial. The only question before the

priety of the amount of the jury's award. The defendant did not deny its liability. It is plain that the plaintiff was very seriously injured. The accident occurred on August 12, 1910. The plaintiff was then 25 years old, and up to that time had been in excellent health. She was thrown violently to the ground from a wagon in which she was riding, by a collision, in which the defendant's electric street car struck against the rear of said wagon; she had been physical

of illegal excess and give the plaintiff an opportunity to remit. If we had fixed upon an amount of such excess greater than that fixed by the superior court it plainly would have been our duty under the statute to do so. Merely because the amount of improper excess which we have found agrees with the determination of the superior court the plaintiff is not to be deprived of that privilege, for the verdict in fact will be set aside by our order.

ly incapacitated up to the time of the trial [ to whether the verdict was excessive; we in June, 1913. The testimony is conflicting have said that it was, and that it should be as to the disease from which the plaintiff set aside. In our opinion a proper construcis suffering. Witnesses for the plaintiff tion of the statute, quoted above, requires diagnosed her ailment as traumatic hyper- that, before the verdict shall be set aside thyroid neurasthenia; those for the defend- by our order, we must determine the amount ant were of the opinion that she was suffering from traumatic neurosis. The plaintiff's chances of improvement are much greater if the latter diagnosis is the true one. There was testimony from which the jury might reasonably find that, while the plaintiff's present condition will probably be somewhat relieved and, under proper treatment, some of her more distressing symptoms may disappear, she will never be completely restored to health. After a consideration of the whole testimony and the written decision of said justice, we agree with him that the case demands very substantial damages, but that, in view of the probable improvement of the plaintiff's physical condition in the future and upon a reasonable computation of her probable pecuniary loss, the evidence does not warrant the full amount of the jury's verdict. What sum will justly amount to compensation it is very difficult to determine. Said justice has made a thorough review of the testimony, and has carefully computed the items of damage. The amount of $20,000 fixed upon by him appears to us to be as nearly adequate compensation for the plaintiff's injuries as can be given in money damages in a court of law. Upon this very difficult question we agree with said justice, and find no error in his decision on the motion for a new trial.

The question now arises as to the order which shall be made in remitting the case to the superior court. Both the plaintiff's

and the defendant's exceptions are to be

The exceptions of the plaintiff and the defendant are overruled. The case is remitted to the superior court for a new trial unless the plaintiff, on or before July 20, 1914, shall file in the superior court her remittitur of all of said verdict in excess of $20,000. In case the plaintiff shall duly file such remittitur the superior court is directed to enter its judgment for the plaintiff for. $20,000.

HOWARD v. MCPHAIL.
(Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

(37 R. I. 21) (No. 282.) July 7, 1914.)

1. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (8 84*)-EXECUTIONREQUISITES-VALIDITY-SURRENDER of Pos

SESSION-RECORD.

Under the express provisions of Gen. Laws 1909, c. 258, § 10, requiring that chattel mortgages shall be recorded within five days or possession of the property delivered to the mortgagee, such a mortgage is valid as between the parties, though neither of such requirements is complied with.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mort

CHASER.

Dig. §§ 588-603; Dec. Dig. § 219.*]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Sales, Cent.

3. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (§ 155*)-LIEN-PUR-
CHASER WITH NOTICE-INVALID MORTGAGE—
ESTOPPEL.

overruled. We have agreed with said justice gages, Cent. Dig. § 152; Dec. Dig. § 84.*1 that the verdict is excessive in amount, and 2. SALES (8 219*)-TITLE-RIGHTS OF PURthat his determination as to a proper amount Otherwise than by estoppel, a buyer of per is just. The plaintiff comes here upon an ex-sonal property acquires no better title than that ception to a decision granting a new trial of the seller from whom he buys. unless she should remit a part of the verdict before a certain day. That day has passed; she did not remit, and we have overruled her exception to the decision. Shall we send the case back for a new trial in accordance with the decision; or, as we have approved the amount of damages which was fixed by the court, shall we order judgment to be entered in the superior court for that amount, or shall we give to the plaintiff another opportunity to remit the improper excess before the verdict is set aside by our order? Chapter 298, § 12, Gen. Laws, 1909, provides as follows:

"A verdict shall not be set aside as excessive by the supreme or superior court until the prevailing party has been given opportunity to remit so much thereof as the court adjudges excessive."

The exceptions of the plaintiff and the defendant brought before us the question as

A buyer of personal property subject to a mortgage which had not been recorded within the statutory period, with notice of the mortgage, could not acquire title freed from the lien of the mortgage by estoppel.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 264, 270; Dec. Dig. § 155.*] 4. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (§ 41*)-SUFFICIENCY OF INSTRUMENT-AGREEMENT TO CREATE

LIEN-INVALIDITY.

Under the rule that equity considers that as done which the parties intended to do and which ought to be done as against the parties and purchasers with notice, an agreement intended to effect a mortgage on chattels or create a lien thereon or an equity therein, though lacking in some legal requisite, will be upheld in purchaser with notice, will raise a trust and equity, and the court, as against the party or a decree that the party or purchaser holds the

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

OF PROPERTY.

property in trust for the lienor to the extent of | chattels, and did not file said mortgage for the lien. record until October 26, 1910. Said mort[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Chattel Mortgage is now held by the respondent, and the gages, Cent. Dig. § 84; Dec. Dig. § 41.*] debt as security for which said mortgage was 5. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (§ 225*)-TRANSFER given has not been paid. At some time in Where the owner of certain personal prop- November, 1910, the complainant had actual erty executed a mortgage thereon, but the prop-notice of the existence of said mortgage and erty was neither delivered to the mortgagee nor of the record of said mortgage in New Shorethe mortgage recorded within five days, as required by Gen. Laws 1909, c. 258, § 10, a buyer ham. On July 18, 1911, said Julia M. Vaill, of the mortgaged property from the mortgagor the mortgagor in said mortgage, executed with notice of the agreement of the seller to cre- and delivered to the complainant a bill of ate a valid mortgage on the property would be sale of the personal property covered by said regarded in equity as a trustee for the mortgagee to the extent of the latter's interest un- mortgage. The consideration named in said der the mortgage.. bill of sale was $2,000. Thereupon the complainant took possession of said personal property, still retains possession thereof, and has filed this bill to restrain the respondent from interfering with said chattels, and also for the cancellation of said mortgage.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 468-470; Dec. Dig. § 225.*] 6. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (§ 155*)-STATUTORY INVALIDITY-PURCHASER WITH NOTICE

FRAUD.

Where a chattel mortgage was unenforceable at law because of the mortgagee's failure to take possession of the property or record his mortgage within five days, as required by Gen. Laws 1909, c. 258, § 10, and the mortgagor sold the property to complainant, who took with notice of the facts and the mortgagee's rights in the premises, complainant was in particeps criminis with the mortgagor in seeking by such sale to defeat the mortgage, and was therefore not entitled to a decree in equity restraining the mortgagee from taking possession of the property and from foreclosing or treating the mortgage as valid.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 264, 270; Dec. Dig. § 155.*] Vincent and Parkhurst, JJ., dissenting.

The complainant's prayer is based upon her interpretation of section 10, c. 258, Gen. Laws 1909. The portion of said section, pertinent to the case, is as follows:

"No mortgage of personal property hereafter made shall be valid as to the assignee in insolvency of the mortgagor, or any other person except the parties thereto and their executors and administrators, until possession of the mortgaged property be delivered to and retained by the mortgagee, or the said mortgage be recorded, * ** which said recording or taking and retention of possession as aforesaid shall be made or taken within five days from the date of the signing thereof."

The complainant relies largely upon the auCase Certified from Superior Court, Provi-thority of Burdick v. Coates, 22 R. I. 410, 48

dence and Bristol Counties.

Suit by Katherine V. Howard against Donald T. McPhail. On certificate from superior

court. Bill dismissed.

Eliot G. Parkhurst and Edwards & Angell, all of Providence, for complainant. Irving Champlin and Hammill & Bradford, all of Providence (John C. Knowles, of Providence, of counsel), for respondent.

SWEETLAND, J. This is a suit in equity wherein the complainant seeks to restrain the respondent from taking possession of certain personal property and from foreclosing or treating as valid a mortgage thereon. The complainant also prays that said mortgage be ordered to be delivered up for cancellation.

Atl. 389, which was an action at law upon a state of facts unlike that of the case at bar, and did not involve a consideration of the principles of trusts and of fraud which should govern the determination of the case before us.

[1] An important provision in said section is that the mortgage remains valid as to the parties, although possession of the mortgaged property be not delivered to, and retained by, the mortgagee, and the mortgage be not recorded. The situation, then, on July 18, 1911, before Julia M. Vaill made the bill of sale of said chattels to the complainant, was that Miss Vaill had by a valid instrument conveyed the title of said chattels to this respondent defeasible on payment of the mortgage debt. For a personal property mortAfter the pleadings were closed and after gage is more than a security; it transfers hearing in the superior court for final decree the legal title subject to defeasance only on upon an agreed statement of facts, the cause performance of the conditions. Although was certified to this court for final determi- she was permitted by the respondent to renation. The essential facts set out in the tain possession of said chattels, Miss Vaill's agreed statement are as follows: On Septem-possession was that of a bailee; there remainber 28, 1910, one Julia M. Vaill, now deceas- ed in her only the right to redeem said proped, for valuable consideration, executed and erty on performance of the conditions of the delivered to the respondent, McPhail, a chat- mortgage. The question before us therefore tel mortgage covering certain personal prop- is: Will a court of equity, by reason of the erty then owned by, and in the possession of, provisions of said section of the statute, dethe mortgagor, located in the town of New cree that Miss Vaill, who was without title Shoreham. The respondent, said mortgagee, herself, nevertheless was able to convey title did not take possession of the mortgaged to this complainant, who had actual notice *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

and full knowledge of the respondent's rights | favor of the respondent against the comunder the mortgage and of the impropriety of plainant. Miss Vaill's act? For whatever may be determined as to the position of the complainant, Miss Vaill was guilty of actual fraud in selling said chattels in disregard of the rights of the respondent, unless her bill of sale shall be considered in equity merely as a disposition of her right to redeem, and not as an attempt to convey title to said property; in which case the complainant clearly would not be entitled to the relief which, she seeks.

[2] This court, in Goodell v. Fairbrother, 12 R. I. 233, 34 Am. Rep. 631, and Woods v. Nichols, 21 R. I. 537, 45 Atl. 548, 48 L. R. A. 773, has stated the generally recognized principle that otherwise than by estoppel the purchaser acquires no better title than the vendor from whom he buys.

[3] The complainant cannot claim that any doctrine of estoppel works in her favor against the respondent; because, although he allowed the mortgaged property to remain in the mortgagor's possession, nevertheless before the complainant took said bill of sale she had knowledge of the mortgage and that it had been recorded. She must claim that in some way, by reason of the statute, despite the absence of circumstances creating an estoppel, and, in spite of her knowledge of the facts, she has acquired from Miss Vaill a title that Miss Vaill herself did not have, and that equity will confirm that title to her. The purpose of statutes requiring the registry of mortgages or other conveyances is to prevent fraud and deception, by protecting bona fide purchasers and creditors from the effect of secret incumbrances. Their purpose is to prevent, not to assist, fraudulent transactions. transactions. This court said with reference to the absolute language of a recording act under consideration in Wilson v. Esten, 14 R. I. 621: "The statute, however, must receive a reasonable construction." In well-considered cases in this court registry statutes have received a reasonable construction. This court has not lost sight of the purpose of such statutes and the fundamental principles of equity; and has recognized that, even where the language of the statute, taken literally, is absolute, it may still be the subject of exception. Wilson v. Esten, 14 R. I. 621; Miller v. Coffin, 19 R. I., at page 168, 36, Atl. 6; Westerly Savings Bank v. Stillman, 16 R. I. 497, 17 Atl. 918. The last case will be considered more fully later. The complainant has invoked the aid of a court of equity, and her suit must be considered in accordance with equitable principles. Before taking up the important question of the effect upon the complainant's rights of her vendor's fraud, of which she had full notice and in which she participated, I will consider how far the knowledge by the complainant of the respondent's rights in the mortgaged property, at the time of her purchase, raises a trust as to said property in

[4] Equity looks upon that as done which the parties intended to do and which ought to be done. As against the parties themselves and those who purchase with notice, an agreement, intended to effect a transfer of property or to create a lien upon it or an equity in it, though lacking in some legal requisite, will be upheld in equity which binds the conscience; and in such circumstances a court of equity, as against the party himself and as against a purchaser with notice, will raise a trust. Legad v. Hodges, 1 Ves. Jr. page 477.

Coble v. Nonemaker, 78 Pa. 506, was a suit by a mortgagee of an unrecorded chattel mortgage against a subsequent purchaser of the chattels covered by said unrecorded mortgage, of which the purchaser had notice at the time of his purchase. The court said: equally plain. While the title remained in Eves "Considered in another aspect, the case seems [the mortgagor], he held it bound by the trust for the benefit of the plaintiff which the mortgage had created. When the title was passed to the defendant, he, having notice of the plaintiff's equities, became, by operation of law, invested with the character of trustee with precisely the same obligations that the contract expressly imposed on Eves [the mortgagor]. A trust alsubject-matter, is created de novo as against a ready in existence, and annexed to the present person who takes by a title derivative from the original trustee. Lewin on Trusts, 205. If an estate be passed by trustee to a stranger by conveyance, then the grantee, if he be a volunteer, will be bound by the trust, whether he had notice of it or not; for, though he had no actual notice of the equity, yet the court will presume Id. 206; Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, it against him where he paid no consideration. 681. But if the grantee be a purchaser of the estate at its full value, then, if he take with notice of the trust, he is bound to the same extent and in the same manner as the person of whom he purchased (Dunbar v. Tredennick, 2 B. & B. 319); for, knowing another's right to the property, he throws away his money voluntarily and of his own free will (Mead v. Lord Orrery, 3 Atk. 328 [236]). And the rule applies not only to the case of a trust properly so called, but to purchasers with notice of any equitable incumbrance, as of a covenant or agreement affecting the estate (Daniels v. Davison, 16 Vesey, 249), or a lien for purchase money (Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Vesey, 329). The defendant [the subsequent purchaser] then held these goods subject to the equities of the plaintiff [the mortgagor] under the mortgage.'

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In the early and leading case in this country of Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 644, Fed. Cas. No. 9,673, Judge Story said: "It seems to me a clear result of all the authorities that wherever the parties, by their contract, intended to create to create a positive lien or charge, either upon real or upon personal property, whether then owned by the assignor or contractor or not, or, if personal property, whether it is then in esse or not, it attaches in equity as a lien or charge upon the particular property, as soon as the assignor or contractor all persons asserting a claim thereto, under him, acquires a title thereto, against the latter, and either voluntarily, or with notice, or in bankruptcy."

In accordance with this principle it was held in Williams v. Winsor, 12 R. I. 9, that

a mortgage of personal property to be subse-1 matter of agreement at least against the party quently acquired, though invalid at law, will himself, and third persons who are volunteers be upheld in equity.

ed as required by statute. The court said:

or have notice. For it is a general principle in equity that as against the party himself, and any claiming under him voluntarily or with notice, such an agreement raises a trust."

Mr. Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisdiction (2d Ed.) § 591, says:

In Westerly Savings Bank v. Stillman, 16 R. I. 497, 17 Atl. 918, this court considered the validity of the mortgage of a corporation to which the treasurer had affixed a seal and as to which act of the treasurer there "When a person is acquiring rights with rewas no allegation of authorization, which spect to any subject-matter, the fact whether he is so acting with or without notice of the intermortgage was not acknowledged and record-ests or claims of others in or upon the same subject-matter is regarded throughout the whole range of equity jurisprudence as a most material circumstance in determining the extent and even the existence of the rights which he actually acquires. In conformity with this view, the general rule has been most clearly established that a purchaser with notice of the right of another is in equity liable to the same extent and in the same manner as the person from whom he made the purchase. The same rule may be thus expressed in somewhat different language: A person who acquires a legal title or an equitable title or interest in a given subject-matter, even for a valuable consideration, but with notice that the subject-matter is already affected by an equity or equitable claim in favor of another, takes it subject to that equity or equitable claim."

"The statute, however, only applies to deeds, and it is not clear that the mortgage in question is a deed; for, though the treasurer of the corporation affixed a seal to it, it is not alleged that he was authorized to do it. If the mortgage be not a deed, it is inoperative at law as a conveyance, and would bind the estate only in equity, where it would undoubtedly be enforced between the parties according to its intent. Would it likewise bind the estate as against a subsequent mortgagee or purchaser for value with notice? We think so. The general rule is, that a purchaser with notice of the right of an other is in equity liable to the same extent and in the same manner as the person from whom he purchases."

In Mayo v. Newhoff, 47 N. J. Eq. 31, 38, 19 Atl. 837, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey recognized the general rule laid down by Lord Cottenham in Folk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil, 772, that if an equity is attached to property by its owner, no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the owner, and that this rule is applicable to personalty.

In Porter v. Parks, 49 N. Y. 566, the court

said:

"While, therefore, the law is well settled, as claimed on behalf of the respondents, that where a party, by his own act and consent, has given to another the evidence of ownership and the apparent jus disponendi of property, a bona fide purchase from the apparent owner, or one who advances money or incurs responsibilities on the faith of the title, will be protected, it is equally well settled that, if the party dealing with the apparent owner has actual notice of the rights of the true owner, he acquires no better title than the transferor or apparent owner can lawfully convey. In other words, the purchaser or pledgee is not a bona fide purchaser as against the rightful owner, and is not within the protection of the rule invoked by the defendants, and must rely upon the actual, rather than the apparent, authority of the individual with whom he deals for his protection."

[5] It therefore appears clear from the authorities that, in equity, this complainant, having knowledge of the agreement between, Miss Vaill and the respondent to create a lien upon the chattels in question, would take the same bound by the trust as Miss Vaill was bound and subject to the equities of the respondent, although the instrument which evidenced the agreement be defective in legal form and in execution, and be lacking in the requisites of acknowledgment and registry necessary to make a mortgage valid in law. It is a well-recognized, equitable principle that an attempt to make a legal mortgage which fails for want of some solemnity, may yet create a lien valid in equity. Therefore, if we should grant the prayer of the complainant's bill, we should effect this result: That a decree shall be entered in this cause in equity which will permit the complainant to hold said mortgaged property freed from the trust by which, in good conscience and according to established principles of equity, she should be bound.

I will now consider the question of fraud which is involved in the cause. As we have said above, Miss Vaill, in selling said chattels in disregard of the title and ownership of the respondent, was guilty of actual fraud. What was the position of the complainant in the transaction as it relates to another equitable consideration important in the case? Story says (1 Story Eq. Juris. § 395):

In Bernheimer v. Verdon, 63 N. J. Eq. 312, the court affirmed a decree of the Vice Chancellor, whose opinion is reported in 49 Atl. 732. The Vice Chancellor held that, where the purchaser of personalty located in a certain place has notice of another's claim to a mortgage thereon, before taking the bill of sale, equity will direct the execution of a "Another class of constructive frauds consists mortgage by the purchaser on such person- of those where a person purchases with full noalty as was in such place at the time of pur-sons to the same property. In such cases he will tice of the legal or equitable title of other perchase, and still remaining in the purchaser's not be permitted to protect himself against such hands.

In 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, at page 577, the author says:

"Indeed, there is generally no difficulty in equity in establishing a lien not only on real estate but on personal property, or on money in the hands of a third person, wherever that is a

claims, but his own title will be postponed, and injustice to allow him to defeat the just rights made subservient to theirs. It would be gross of others by his own iniquitous bargain. He becomes by such conduct particeps criminis with the fraudulent grantor; and the rule of equity as well as of law is: 'Dolus et fraus nemini patrocinari debent.' And in all such cases of pur

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