33D CONG....2D Sess. the then President of the United States, to say that the extra compensation should never have been given. Taking it, as admitted then, that in 1852 it was right and proper that Collins & Co. should be allowed extra compensation, the inquiry most naturally arises, what circumstance has arisen to make the extra compensation then allowed, impolitic or improper at this time? Certainly the expense of navigating these vessels has not diminished; upon the contrary, the fuel consumed as well as seamen's wages, have largely increased since 1852. The average expense of the round trip of one of the Collins steamers, up to the time of the extra allowance given under the act of June, 1852, was $63,000. The average since that time has been increased to $75,000. This increase is made up by the rise of fifty per cent, on the price of coal in England, and seventy-five per cent. increase on the same article in this country; thirty-three per cent. increase in seamen's wages; twenty-five per cent. increase in provisions; and thirty per cent. increase in repairs in machinery, consequent upon the increase in the speed in these steamers. The whole extra compensation amounts to $13,750 per voyage, out and in-$12,000 of which is used up in the increased expense of each voyage, consequent upon the circumstances just detailed, and over which neither Mr. Collins nor the Government have any control. It cannot be claimed that this extra compensation should cease in consequence of the loss of the noble Arctic, so afflictive to Mr. Collins himself; so detrimental to the pecuniary interests of the company; so much deplored and mourned over by the whole American people, and which the amendment I propose requires to be replaced within a period of two years. And here, sir, allow me to say, that from my personal knowledge of Mr. Collins, his enterprise, his experience, his patriotism, and his pride of character, if my amendment prevails, I predict that the Adriatic will not be excelled by any steamer that floats upon the ocean. It cannot be that the discontinuance of this extra compensation is demanded in consequence of any default upon the part of Mr. Collins and his associates, in the faithful performance of this contract; for the Postmaster General, in his late report, makes special mention of the faithful, prompt, and efficient manner in which this line has performed its service. And in addition to this, it will be borne in mind that a special committee of this House, with power to send for persons and papers, through their chairman, the honorable Mr. MACE, at the last session of Congress, made a report. highly creditable to the Collins line. Neither can it be claimed, Mr. Chairman, that the extra compensation should be withheld on account of any falling off in the postage accruing from this line. For, sir, the postal revenue derived from it, has constantly and steadily increased. That I might be able to speak intelligently and understandingly, I addressed a letter to the Postmaster General, asking information upon this point. The following is the response of the Auditor of the Post Office Department, sent me through the Postmaster General: AUDITOR'S OFFICE, POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT, SIR: I have the honor to furnish herewith the statements called for by your note of the 5th instant. I am, very respectfully, yours, &c. WM. F. PHILLIPS, Auditor. Hon. JAMES CAMPBELL, Postmaster General, Ho. OF REPS. ing revenue from this line. In addition to the above, it should be borne in mind that every artifice, every stratagem has heretofore been employed by the British Government to induce, nay, almost to compel, the transmission, not only of the British, but of the continental correspondence through the mails carried by the Cunard steamers. So manifest has been this practice that it has been a frequent cause of complaint upon the part of our Government. The following extract from a letter addressed by Postmaster General Hubbard to Viscount Canning, dated February 24, 1853, will give some conception of the extent to which this practice affects the amount of letters, carried by the Collins line. It is as follows: "I have now before me a report, from the New York office, of the number of letters received at that office from Great Britain and Ireland, by twelve successive arrivals lately, (six on the Cunard, and six on the Collins line,) showing the following result: By the Cunard line, six mails.... ..131,827 letters, By the Collins line, six mails.............. 81,538 letters. Difference in favor of the Cunard line...... 50,289 letters. The British post office not only holds letters over for the Cunard line, but it has heretofore so arranged its schedule of time, as to bring all letters from the continent to that office just in time But to meet the sailing of the Cunard steamers. now, since four of those vessels have been withdrawn, and sent to aid in the blockade of Sebastopol, the weekly service of the Cunard line has been reduced to a semi-monthly service, and made to alternate with the Collins line. In consequence of this reduction of service, the game of withholding letters for the Cunard steamers cannot any longer be practiced to the extent complained of by Postmaster General Hubbard. Under our new mail arrangement, by which the Collins steamers alternate with the Cunarders, our revenues will be increased to an amount nearly equal to what is paid to the Collins line, including the extra compensation. I have a statement, furnished by the Post Office Department, showing the amount of mailable matter transmitted through the Collins steamers each voyage, which has been made under our new arrangement with the British post office. It is as follows: Received by steamer Pacific, 13th December, 1854: British Mail-Letter postage......... 66 66 Paper 66 28,242.... 2,028 ounces Prussian closed mails at 40 c... 129 papers 68 .$10,177 69 at 40 c... 578 52 811.20 2.58 1,383 40 325 68 at 2 c... 72.40 9. 90 By the several lines for 1849...$221,901 51 1850... 663,098 441851... 874,159 88 1852... 952,464 53 1853... 921.782 07 1854... 979,648 30 $4,613,054 73 480.921 88. 3,458 ounces Canada 469,019 79 527,703 07 at 40 c... 27 60 50 papers แ at 2 c.. 3 217,809 81 ounces Mexican 5 papers 66 .$943,781 57 240,912 44 274,741 16 $931,087 14 Total revenue....... 10 $13,391 27 By the Collins line for 1850.....$10,391 41 NOTE.-The postal treaty with Great Britain was ratified at Washington on the 15th of February, 1849; and the Niagara-Cunard line-left Boston with a mail, under the treaty, on the 21st of the same month. The first steamer of the Collins line left New York on the 27th of April, 1850. That the committee may fully understand the statement furnished by General Phillips, it may be as well that I should inform the House that, under our postal treaty with Great Britain, we pay that Government a percentage on all letters carried by the Collins steamers, and England pays us the same percentage on all letters carried by the Cunard line. This treaty is consequent upon the establishment of the Collins line; and, of course, would be abrogated upon the withdrawal of the line, unless a new mail service should be established. In consequence of this treaty, in estimating the revenues derived from the Collins line I deduct the percentage paid by our Government to Great Britain on the letters carried by the Collins steamers, and I add the percentage paid us by England upon the letters transmitted by the Cunard line. With this explanation, we may set down the total credits of the Collins line as follows: For the year ending June 30, 1830........$135,662 68 For the year ending June 30, 1851......... 300,205 75 335.637 51 For the year ending June 30, 1852... For the year ending June 30, 1853........ 361,336 04 For the year ending June 30, 1854.. 397,481 96 The foregoing exhibits show a steadily increas ... Sent by Pacific, 27th December, 1854: British Mail-Letter postage.. Paper 66 1.00 .1 20 .$13,028 32 ...53,217..... 1,081 76 6,294 ounces Prussian closed mails, at 40 c... 2,517 0 762 papers " 1,000 ounces east of Canada “ 5,000 papers 66 200 ounces east of Calf'nia" 200 papers Total revenue...... 15.24 400 (0 100 00 80.00 4.00 at 2 c... at 40 c... at 2 c... at 40 c... at 2 c... $17,227 12 . $10,272 81 453 18 1,048 00 at 2 c... at 40 c... 3.40 128 10 21 16 3204 ounces Canada 1,208 papers 221 Total revenue........ Sent by Atlantic, 10th January, 1855; British Mail-Létter póstage.. .50.953..... 1,33 24 86 Paper 66 759 papers 66 at 2 c... 1,000 5,000 at 40 c... 15 18 400 00 10 CO 227 ounces California 186 papers Total revenue..... at 40 c... 66 90 0 372 .$16,056 77 43 papers 66 at 2 c.. 86 3 ounces Mexican 8 papers 66 Total revenue....... 16 $10,679 22 By the foregoing statement it will be seen that the postage on the mailable matter carried by the Pacific her last voyage in and out, amounted to $30,613 13; that by the Atlantic her last voyage, amounted to $28,121 34; that by the Baltic's passage one way was $10,679 22. Supposing her passage out to be the same as the Atlantic's, and the round trip would be $27,906 34. The average of these voyages would be only $4,119 73 less than the full amount paid by the Government per voyage, including the extra compensation. From this exhibit I hazard nothing in saying that for our present fiscal year, ending on the 30th of June next, the revenue from postages on mail able matter carried by the Collins line will exceed $500,000 and should the same arrangement be continued, the next fiscal year they will amount to more than $700,000. I repeat, then, Mr. Chairman, that it cannot be claimed that this extra compensation should be withheld on account of any supposed falling off in the revenues derived from this line. It has, in this respect, more than realized the expectations of its warmest friends. It cannot be said, Mr. Chairman, that this extra compensation should be withheld in consequence of any failure on the part of these steamers to make their contract time: for we have not only the testimony of the Postmaster General that Coĺlins & Co. have faithfully performed their service, but I have the evidence to satisfy this committee that they have, at a large expense, more than performed their every engagement. By their contract these steamers are not bound to make any specified time. They are only required "to be vessels of great speed." Now, sir, at the time this contract was made, thirteen or fourteen days in making the voyage from New York to Liverpool was considered "great speed." This time, then, would fully answer the requirements of the contract. 1 admit, sir, that it would not answer the wishes and expectations of the American people. But, nevertheless, it would be filling the stipulations "of the bond." Now, sir, Mr. Collins, as I shall soon demonstrate, can make the time in fourteen days, even with his present large steamers, and save money without the extra compensation. But, sir, the American people are a fast people. To use a backwoods phrase, they can "dive deeper, stay under longer, and come up dryer," than any other people on the face of the globe. Sir, we are like the Kentuckian, who said that "if he was riding a streak of lightning, he should want to whip up." We have "the fastest horses, the prettiest women, and the best shooting guns " in the world, and we must, also, have the fastest steamers. Nothing short of this will answer the expectations of the American people. The Collins steamers must beat the British steamers. Our people expected this of Mr. Collins, and he has not disappointed them. The following schedule of time shows that the Collins steamers beat the Cunarders nearly two days on the voyage in and out: I will not trouble the committee by giving the time of each voyage for the entire year of 1854. I have it before me; and any gentleman who desires to do so, may examine it for himself. I will content myself by giving the recapitulation: Being a difference of nearly two days in favor of the Collins line over the Cunarders, and nearly three and a half days over the Bremen line. The time table, which I here exhibit, shows nearly two days gained upon the Cunard steamers on the round trip. I will not stop to demonstrate how much is gained to our commercial community in the way of interest consequent upon this saving in time. The amount, however, is very large. Now, then, let it be remembered, Mr. Chairman, that the Postmaster General does not hesitate to tell us, that he considers it of great importance to the mail service that the time made by the Collins steamers should be continued. But does this committee understand that this extra time costs Mr. Collins more than all the extra pay we give him? Such, sir, is the fact. And if I can have the attention of the committee, I will satisfy every one that I am not mistaken. In reply to a note of mine upon this point, Mr. Collins has furnished me his estimate of the extra expense consequent upon this extra speed. Inasinformation touching other points, I will read the much as his communication furnishes valuable whole of it. It it as follows: WASHINGTON, January 19, 1855. DEAR SIR: In answer to your interrogatories of yesterday, I have to reply as follows: First. The additional cost of the Collins steamers, in making the passages in so much less time than the Cunarders In admitting that the British Government pay the Cu narders only (General Rusk will tell you otherwise) as follows.. Saving going to Boston..... .$16,666 00 10,120 00 $25,786 00 Add additional cost, and make the Collins time, 16,800 00 $43,586 00 Deduct from that the pay to the Collins line.... 33,0.0 00 $10,120 00 Showing conclusively that the Collins line, by making the time they do, (which the Cunard steamers in all their endeavors cannot make,) that the Collins line should be paid $10,000 more, to be paid equal to the English steamers. I am, very respectfully, yours, E. K. COLLINS. Hon. EDSON B. OLDS, Chairman of the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads. Mr. Chairman, previous to receiving the statement of Mr. Collins, I had addressed, through the Secretary of the Navy, a letter to Mr. Martin, the engineer-in-chief of the United States Navy, asking from him information relative to the increased expense of navigation by steam, consequent upon increase in speed. His reply fully sustains the statement given me by Mr. Collins, and must remove all doubt upon this point. The following is Mr. Martin's reply: OFFICE OF ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF,WASHINGTON, D. C., January 12, 1855. SIR: In obedience to your order of the 11th instant, accompanying the request of the Hon. E. B. OLDS, chairman of the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, I have the honor to answer the questions propounded as follows: Question. What is your present occupation? Answer. Engineer-in chief of the United States Navy. Question. How old are you? 8 50 Answer. Forty-one. 11 Question. How long have you been an engineer? Answer, Twenty-four years since I first took charge as chief engineer. HO. OF REPS. Question. How long have you been employed as engineer at sea? Answer. Since January, 1842, when I entered the Navy. Question. How many years in the Government service? Answer. Thirteen years, but not constantly employed at sea, but have been in some way connected with sea going Vessels, it having been my only business. Question. How long in the merchant service? Answer. I was in the Collins mail steamers two years by Government permission. Question. What vessels in the Government service, and how long on each? Answer. Mississippi, at various times about three and-a half years; Saranac, in construction, erecting, and running, two years and four months; General Taylor, one year; Polk two months; Michigan four months. Question. What vessels in the merchant service, and how long on each? Answer. Pacific one year, and Arctic one year. Question. What quantity of coal per day will it require to propel the Collins steamers nine knots per hour? Answer. With calm winds and smooth sea, they will average about thirty-two tons. Question. How much coal will the Collins steamers consume in making the voyage between Liverpool and New York in the following time: in ten days, eleven days, in twelve days, in thirteen days, and in fourteen days? Answer. With calm winds and smooth sea, taking the distance at 3,060 miles, ten days 850 tons, eleven days 704, twelve days 588, thirteen days 501, and fourteen days 443 tons. Question. What difference per voyage do you suppose would take place in keeping the engines in repair on the Collins steamers in making ten days' passage, or one in fourteen days? Answer. The expense would not exceed one fourth or twenty-five per cent. at fourteen, what it is for ten days' passages, with the same circumstances of weather. Question. What gain is it to the Cunard steamers going to Boston from Liverpool by the way of Halifax instead of coming direct to New York? Answer. The Asia, Africa, and Arabia, would burn on an average from one hundred and eighty to two hundred tons of coal between Halifax and New York, and as they take in a supply of coal at Halifax, they would leave Liverpool with that much less weight of coal on board, consequently could take that much more freight, which, with measurement goods, which they always carry from Liverpool, would be at least two hundred tons: "the freight per ton, when I was on the ships, was £6 sterling per ton, making a difference in the freight of £1,200 sterling; the difference in coal between going to New York or Boston would be about sixty tons, which was worth in Liverpool last summer, whilst I was there, 26 shillings sterling per ton, making a difference on the cost of coals for the voyage, of £78 sterling, supposing the coals at Halifax to be of the same price as at Liverpool, making a difference in freight and coals of £1,278 sterling. I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, DANIEL B. MARTIN, Engineer-in-Chief. Hon. J. C. DOBBIN, Secretary United States Navy, Washington, D. C.. This statement of Mr. Martin, refers only to the voyage from Liverpool to New York. Since receiving it, I have had placed in my possession another communication from him, which gives the extra expense upon the voyage out-the two together, making the round trip. His second letter is as follows: OFFICE OF ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF, SIR: In reply to your question, I would state that my report to the Secretary of the 12th instant, is for the difference of one voyage from Liverpool to the ports then named, and not for the return voyage, and as you inform me that the price of freight from this side is $15 per ton, and coal $7 per ton, therefore the difference in return freight will be two hundred tons at $15-$3,000; and sixty tons of coal at $7-$420; making $3,420 on the return voyage, to be added to my estimate in the letter above referred to for a voyage to Liverpool and back. I am respectfully, your obedient servant, DANIEL B. MARTIN, Engineer-in-Chief United States Navy. E. K. COLLINS, Esq., Washington, D. C. By these two letters it will be seen that Mr. Martin sustains Mr. Collins fully as to the expense consequent upon the increased speed, and varies but slightly as to the increased expense consequent upon making New York the end of the voyage, instead of making the trip to Boston by the way of Halifax. Mr. Collins estimates the latter expense at $10.120 the round trip, and Mr. Martin makes $9,810 the round trip. The difference in the two estimates being only $310. By the statement of Mr. Collins, fully confirmed by the communications of Mr. Martin, it will be seen that the superior speed of the Collins over the Cunard line costs $16,800-the voyage in and out-and the difference in making New York, instead of Boston, the end of the voyage, costs the Collins line $9,810 the round trip, the two together amounting to $26,610 the voyage. This much, then, Mr. Collins could save by making the voyage the same as made by the Cunard line. 33D CONG....2D Sess. After this demonstration, I trust, Mr. Chairman, that we shall no more be told that, because Cunard transports the British mail at $16,686 the trip, Collins should be denied his extra pay. I think I cannot have failed in satisfying every one that, under the attending circumstances, Collins, with his extra pay, is $10,000 per voyage worse off than is Mr. Cunard, with the compensation allowed him by the British Government, even admitting that Mr. Cunard gets nothing extra from the secretservice money of the British admiralty. As a still further evidence, sir, that the Collins line cannot be sustained if you withhold this extra "compensation, I may here be permitted to state a fact. It is this: The Collins line, with all its extra compensation, has never yet been able to make a dividend upon its capital stock, and that, within a very few weeks, that stock has been sold in the market for sixty cents upon the dollar. With these facts before us, is not a vote to withhold the extra pay equivalent to a vote to strike down this service, and yield the palm of victory to Great Britain? We may, perhaps, be told, sir, that the striking down of this line is of no consequence; and that the building of an additional steamer is of no importance, inasmuch as these steamers can never be converted into war vessels. And in support of this denunciation, we shall be told that experienced naval officers have passed their judgment upon these vessels, and have pronounced them useless for war purposes. I am aware, sir, that, on the 10th of March last, the Secretary of the Navy, in compliance with a resolution of this House, addressed us a letter giving his views as to the adaptability to war purposes, of the steamships employed in the ocean mail service of the United States. I am also aware that, in that communication, the honorable Secretary says that "it is impracticable to convert them into vessels of war, to be relied upon for efficient service as regular men of war." This opinion of the Secretary of the Navy is based upon the judgment of various heads of bureaus in the Navy Department. Indeed, the Secretary of the Navy accompanies his communication with the various letters addressed to him by the naval officers in the different bureaus. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the whole objection to this appropriation for the Collins line must rest upon the unfitness of these steamers for war purposes, I must be pardoned for introducing such testimony as will utterly upset the opinion thus expressed by the honorable Secretary. I do this, sir, in all kindness to the Secretary, believing that his opinion has been based upon the judgment of the "Old Fugies" in the various bureaus around him, rather than upon the judgment of scientific engineers and experienced naval officers. Sir, it is notoriously the fact, that in no Department of this Government is such unmixed and unmitigated "old fogyism" to be found, as in the various bureaus connected with the Navy Department. This is so unquestionably the fact, that it is generally understood that any and all improvements in the models and construction of vessels which involve a departure from the preconceived notions of the heads of the various bureaus belonging to that Department, are sure to be condemned upon foregone conclusions. Mr. Chairman, I could, did my time permit, pile up a volume of testimony, showing that every vessel, no matter how perfect her model, how superior her construction, how excellent her sailing qualities, if built in any other than a Government navy-yard, and under the superintendence of any other than some "Old Fogy" belonging to the Bureau of Construction, it would, as a matter of course, receive the condemnation of all belonging to that bureau. They condemn all private enterprise, because they consider themselves entitled to all this kind of Government patronage. Like the Ephesians of old, they make a "great uproar," believing "their craft in danger." Mr. Chairman, in order to show that those who have manufactured the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy, relative to the Collins steamers, have been influenced by their prejudice, I must be permitted to produce the testimony of other naval officers and engineers, far more competent to judge, and who have formed their opinions from personal observation, and from having witnessed the performance of these steamers under all cir Collins Steamers-Mr. Olds. cumstances. The following is an extract from a letter of Commander W. F. Lynch, United States Navy, explorer of the Dead Sea, &c.-a passenger per steamer Arctic, from New York to Liverpool, November 13, 1852-dated in London, November 29, 1852: "Our passage was retarded by prevalent head winds and a heavy head sea; but, while disappointed by the delay of a few hours, I could not withhold my admiration of the weatherly qualities of the ship. Whether the wind and sea were ahead, abeam, on the quarter, or astern, she neither lurched nor plunged, but cleaved through the waves and sped along, swaying from side to side with a graceful, easy motion. I examined her closely, and do, as far as am capable of judging, consider that in strength and beauty of construction, in stability, combined with buoyancy, in dryness and in speed, she surpasses any other vessel, national or mercantile, I have ever known; and I have three times before crossed the Atlantic by steam, and twice commanded steamers." Commodore Perry, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated February 18, 1852, in speaking of the Collins line of steamers, says: "According to my calculations, the cost of the conversion of either the before-mentioned vessels, exclusive of armaments, repair of machinery, &c., would not, or certainly ought not to cost for each steamer over $20,000; and it could readily be done for this at any of our navy-yards. With respect to the description and weight of their respective armaments, I am clearly of the opinion that the first class steamers already named could easily carry four teninch Paixhan guns on pivots-two forward and two aft-of the weight of those in the Mississippi, and ten eight-inch Paixhan guns on the sides; and this armament would not incommode the vessels, and the weight less than the ice, which is usually forty tons, and stowed away in one mass." "In the general operations of a maritime war, they could render good service, and especially would they be useful from their great speed as dispatch vessels, and for the transportation of troops, always capable of attack and defense, and of overhauling or escaping from an enemy. "The Atlantic, Pacific, Baltic, and Arctic have all been built, inspected, and received by the Navy Department." Commodore Perry, on his return from the Japan expedition, crossed the Atlantic ocean in the Baltic, one of the Collins steamers. From on board the Baltic he addressed a communication, on the subject of safety to steamers and passengers at sea, to Thomas B. Curtis, Esq., of Boston; from that communication permit me to read two or three extracts: U. S. M. STEAMSHIP BALTIC, MY DEAR SIR: A copy of your printed circular bearing date the 1st ultimo, has been placed in my hands, and as it is possible that my acquaintance with the construction and equipment of ocean steamers, and more particularly of those of the Navy, may enable me to offer some useful sugge-tions upon the points referred to in that communication, and being now a passenger in a sister ship of the unfortunate Arctic, I may venture the more confidently to express my opinions upon the subject, basing my remarks upon the character and qualities of this ship, and assuming that the Atlantic and Pacific are in all respects her equal. I may premise,then, by saying ibat, with respect to perfection of vessel and engines, and the attention and skill with which both are managed, the excellence of the arrangements for the convenience and comfort of the passengers, nothing more could reasonably be desired, and it only remains to inquire whether any further precautionary measures may be adopted to give greater security to the lives of the passengers and crews. The communication then contains the suggestions of the Commodore, as to the number and the manning of life-boats, and other means of safety, and concludes with the following notice of Collins himself: From my knowledge of the character and enterprising spirit of Mr. Collins and his associate directors, I fell well assured that everything will be cheerfully done to satisfy the reasonable wishes of the community; indeed, there is no one more competent than Mr. Collins himself to decide upon measures tending to the greater safety of the ships under his management; and I should not now put forth any suggestions of my own, did I not suppose they would be kindly received. The foregoing remarks, will, in all respects apply, and with greater force, to sail ships employed in carrying large numbers of passengers. I am, my dear, sir, with great regard, your friend and obedient servant, M. C. PERRY. THOMAS B. CURTIS, Esq., Boston. Sir, in addition to the above, permit me to say, that a friend, in whose statement I have the fullest confidence, informs me that, in a conversation, a few days since, with Commodore Perry, that gallant officer in speaking of the Collins steamer, the Baltic, remarked that, "with such alterations as he could make in that steamer, in order to fit her for war purposes, he would rather have her for his flag-ship than any other vessel that floats upon the ocean. HO. OF REPS. Perry, Mr. Collins has placed in my hands a letter received by him from Commodore Stewart. This letter from "Old Ironsides," so completely refutes the prejudiced opinions of the old fogies at the head of the naval bureaus, that I must have it read by the Clerk. The Clerk read as follows: PHILADELPHIA, January 18, 1855. DEAR SIR: In reply to your letter of the 16th instant, asking my opinion as regards the importance of great speed for vessels of war," I beg to state that, in my judgment, there is no point more essential to vessels designed for war purposes, and intended for cruises on the high seas. In my opinion, it is the most important quality a cruiser can possess a point so essential to her security from a superior force, or forces, of an enemy, that it cannot be too highly estimated. On the other hand, where a vessel of war possesses this advantage, it accords to her the ability of overtaking her enemies, and subduing those of such force as her speed and armament would warrant her in encountering. The war of 1812, declared by the United States against Great Britain, exhibited examples of these characteristics not to be underrated, or how could it be possible for us to look back at that period of our history with the national satisfaction which we now feel, at the recollection of the hair breadth escapes of our vessels of war from superior forces, owing entirely to the possession of this superiority, so skillfully seconded by the seamanship of those who controlled and conducted them, and who subsequently were crowned with victories over the vessels of their enemies through this advantageous quality in their ships, supported by their batteries, and the bravery of their officers and men. If a property so essential for enabling vessels, depending upon the elements for their powers of locomotion, and also to be successful in retreat from and victory over an enemy, does not constitute a consideration of the greatest importance, I should feel myself at a loss to imagine what other point could compensate for its absence, or render it one of secondary importance! Under this view of the subject, with regard to sailing vessels of war, its application to steamers seems quite as necessary to render them available and effective for similar purposes. Indeed it is of infinitely more importance that they should possess it, as they are wholly independent of the winds as a motive power, and through the possession of this quality, would become so much more nearly on a par with one another. Your second question asks my views in "regard to the steamers constituting the Collins line, so far as knowledge will warrant an expression with regard to their build and sufficiency for carrying an armament for war purposes." On this score I cannot but admit that they are so; and I think that their performance in so frequently crossing the Atlantic without any complaining, or the occurrence of any accident which could have been foreseen, or anticipated, and guarded against in their construction, will fully justify this admission. With regard to your third and last question, relative to alterations, I will observe that, under my inexperienced views of war steamers, I should think not much ought to be required; the principal alterations deemed necessary by others which has been suggested, refers to the removal of the upper deck by razeing. As regards this alteration, it would, with me, depend entirely on the fact whether she was to be a light armed vessel, with a few heavy guns judiciously mounted, or a heavily-armed battering ship, with an open waist; this would much diminish her strength and accommodations, as well as to some risk to her safety, dryness, and speed. This will be an important point for consideration of those who may make the decision. The qualities which these steamers now possess, are so clearly and ably set forth in Captain McKennon's letter, who speaks so confidently to the point, as to leave no room for canil or contradiction. All that he said has been confirmed by others who are competent judges, and who, like him, speak from actual observation made during passages to or from Europe, in one or the other of the steamers composing the Collins line. In so far as I feel authorized to speak, from experience afforded me by holding a commission in the Navy of the United States for fifty-eight years, and from having commanded in that time every species of vessels of war in our Navy, (steamers excepted,) I ought not to hesitate in saying, from this long intimacy with nautical affairs, that too much care cannot be observed under all or any circumstances, in the adaptation of maritime preparations to maritime ends. I would here also state that, from the acquired experience in the adaptation of propellers to vessels of war, since you contracted with the Government of the United States for the services of your line of steamers, for postal purposes, that such motive power may be better calculated for heavy armed battering steamers; they will, however, lose, in that case, some important advantages which the side paddle wheels will accord to lighter armed vessels; these latter will have greater speed, better accommodations, and be safer and dryer vessels. I remain respectfully, dear sir, your obedient servant, CHARLES STEWART. E. K. COLLINS, Esq. Such, Mr. Chairman, is the testimony of these old commodores, who have spent their lives in the naval service of their country. Truly may it be said of them, that theirs has been "A life upon the ocean's wave, A home upon the rolling deep." They speak from experience; and, to my mind, completely upset the opinions of men who for twenty years, perhaps, have not been upon the ocean, but at the head of naval bureaus, cooped up 33D CONG....2D SESS. in an office sixteen feet square, in Washington city. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the letter of "Old Ironsides,"I must be permitted to call the attention of the committee to the testimony of Captain McKennon, of the British navy, of whom the commodore makes such honorable mention. The article referred to by Commodore Stewart is in an English work, written by Captain McKennon, entitled "The Resources and Settlement of America." Captain McKennon was a passenger on board the Baltic, on her passage from New York to Liverpool, during the fall of 1852. In speaking of the Collins steamers, Captain McKennon said: "I am only doing justice to these magnificent vessels in stating that they are, beyond any competition, the finest, the fastest, and the best sea boats in the world. I am sorry to be obliged to say this; but, as a naval officer, I feel bound in candor to admit their great superiority. Their extraordinary easiness in a sea cannot fail to excite the admiration of a sailor; and I never beheld anything like it. There was none of that violent plunging, that sudden check usually attending a large ship in a heavy head sea. The elongated bow dipped gently in when a vast, wall-sided and threatening swell appeared ovewhelmingly to rush upon her. The whole forelength of the vessel appeared to sink gently down until almost level with the water, and as gradually to rise again after passing. Most wondrous of all, no sea ever came on board, and the foaming and angry waters appeared to glide harinlessly past her peak and narrow bows. The extraordinary difference in this respect to the America was most marked, as a very ordinary head sea would dash angrily, and with huge volumes, over her bows. I attribute these admirable qualities to two reasons: first, the long and gently graduated bow; and secondly, the lightness and buoyancy of the fore part of the vessel, when relieved from the bowsprit. This bowsprit, in the Cunard line, projects considerably from the bow, and its weight is greatly aggravated by the leverage caused by its projection. I am not aware of its exact weight, but it must be enormous, particularly at the extremity. most experienced sailor would be very much deceived in forming a judgment of the sea-going qualities of the Cunard and Collins steamships from a mere, outside inspection; and I acknowledge that, at first, I could not conceive the Collins line to be so safe and easy in a sea as the Cunard line. From a considerable experience in all classes of steam vessels, besides the Cunard America, I advisedly assert that the Baltic is out and out, by long odds, the very best and easiest steamship I ever sailed in. The "I cannot refrain from calling the attention of steamship builders of England to the uselessness, and even absurdity of a heavy bowsprit upon a vessel that mainly depends upon her steam. It would be considered an absolute absurdity for either of these vessels to attempt to beat to windward. Before the wind, there is little doubt that the Collins would run the Cunard out of sight in a dozen hours. The vast and heavy bowsprit of the Cunard line is therefore an absolute excrescence; a bow-plunging, speed. stopping, money spending, and absurd acquiescence in old fashioned prejudices about appearance, and what the old school attempt to swamp all argument by condemning as not ship-shape. Pshaw! what confounded stuff! This is the sort of feeling that prevents improvements, and allows Brother Jonathan to build the finest sea-going steamers in the world, which the Collins liners undoubtedly are." Captain McKennon thus describes, as witnessed by himself, the admirable performance of the Baltic during a most violent storm which she encountered during her outward trip: "Let us ascend the bridge, between the paddle-boxes, and try to describe this sublime scene. A furious gale was raging, and wind and waves combined were hurled with gigantic force against the poor Baltic. To avoid rushing madly against the fierce watery barriers, the engines were slacked to nine revolutions, and the brave vessel still held her course at the rate of eight knots. Although the beavy spoondrift in a moment drenched everything exposed, still the ship held on with the most extraordinary ease. At intervals a mountain would appear approaching, giving the idea (often felt by the most experienced) of a gathering power in advance, that nothing could withstand. Onward it rolls, so high that, from your elevated position, the horizon is concealed; it is upon us with a crash-nothing can avoid the avalanche of water-the decks will be inundated fore and aft. "Not at all, the noble ship rises gently, just sufficient to clear the crest of the surge; her bulwarks are even with the surface of rolling water, but not a drop comes in. Again and again did this happen; and although we were drenched to the skin by the spoondrift, we were fascinated by the wonderful triumph of the ship's course over the madly vexed waters, and remained in our exposed situation spellbound at her easy performance over such rough and formidable obstacles. Place a Cunard liner, or any vessel, in this position with the present lines of English ocean steamers, and they would ship tons and tons of water. The heavy bows, bowsprit and all, would plunge into the sea with a crash and bang that would shake and strain a ship to her center. On raising her forefoot from her watery bath, the bowsprit, enveloped with gear, would visibly bind with the jerk. This is the main difference between the ocean steamers of England and America, and we strongly advise the builders in England to wake up from their lethargy, half composed of prejudice. I tell them again plainly, however unpleasant to myself, that there are no ocean steamers in England comparable with the Baltic." Collins Steamers-Mr. Olds. "They cannot be rivaled by any English vessel at pres- Sir, the contest between the Collins line and the Such, Mr. Chairman, is the testimony of naval Mr. Grice, a scientific and well know naval constructor, of Philadelphia, during the discussion upon this extra pay question, in 1852, in reply to a letter from an honorable Senator, says: UNITED STATES NAVY-YARD, PHILADELPHIA, April 14, 1852. } SIR: In answer to yours of the 13th,.I have to state, as chief naval constructor, the specifications for building the Collins line of steamers were submitted to me, and approved, as in accordance with the act of March 3, 1847. They can be converted into war steamers to carry a bat- 1 am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant, To the Hon. WILLIAM M. GWIN, United States Senate. Mr. Oliver Byrne, of Philadelphia, a civil, military, and mechanical engineer, of acknowledged ability, in a communication to the New York Courier and Enquirer, most unfeignedly expresses his astonishment at the report of the Secretary of the Navy. He rightly attributes the opinion of the honorable Secretary to the "Old Fogies" at the head of naval bureaus. He handles, without gloves, the letter of Mr. Lenthall to the Secretary of the Navy. I very much regret that my time will not permit me to read at length the communication of Mr. Byrne. I must content myself with a few lengthy extracts: Mr. Byrne says: "What experience Mr. Lenthall has had in ship-building, I know not, but take this opportunity to make known to the Government, that of all the improvements that are being made, there is none more essential than to have our naval vessels to keep pace with the great improvements daily being made in naval architecture. And I here assert that war steamers without great speed are worse than useless lumber. "But I will not indulge in further remarks, which may be said to be mere opinions, but refer particularly to Mr. Lenthall's objections to the Collins steamers. "Although Mr. Lenthall does not name them, yet his description is so marked in his report, that I have no doubt that he means them. "It is true that the Collins are side-wheel steamers, and up to this time side wheel steamers, far inferior to the Col lins steamers, have proved themselves not only efficient vessels of war at sea, but have in many instances proved themselves very efficient in bombardments. For their last Captain McKennon, in speaking of the perform- performance, see the bombardment of Odessa. ance of the Collins steamers, says: "As the Susquehanna and Arctic are the vessels herein Ho. OF REPS. alluded to, I shall endeavor to show the great superiority of the latter over the former. "The United States mail steamship Arctic combines all the essential elements heretofore mentioned for an efficient war steamer, viz: great speed, great strength, great buoyancy and stability, and ample accommodations for officers and crew; in the latter of which every United States war steamer is sadly deficient. "First.-Great speed. By the logs published in Stuart's work, the relative speed of the Arctic to that of the Susquehanna is as three to two. "Second.-Great strength. Independently of a stouter frame, heavier planking and ceiling, heavy bilge streaks, (the Susquehanna has no bilge streaks, nor any ceiling below her lower deck clamps, except three streaks, six inches thick over her first and second futtock heads, and but half her square fastenings go through,) the Arctic is more than six hundred per centum stronger, taking into account the power of endurance and permanence of shape, by the form of hull and the peculiar arrangement of her iron diagonal braces and her arching. "Third.-Stability. The flat floors of the Collins steamers enable them to place their engines and boilers lower than those of the Susquehanna, counteracting more effectually the weight of top-hamper, (a superiority acknowledged by the late Lord John Hay over steamers with great dead rise ;) the great sharpness at the ends adds also much to the stability, and at the same time gives great speed at moderate cost, (for were it possible for the Susquehanna to bear the power necessary to drive her at the highest rate of the Arctic's speed, she would burn four times the fuel that she now does,) avoiding any stress of the ship going against a head sea, and being almost impregnable to direct shot. Fourth.-Capacity. The Susquehanna can carry eight hundred tons of coal, enough for twenty-two days' steaming at her best speed, with a complement of two hundred and twenty-five men, and stores for four months. The Arctic carries ordinarily twelve hundred tons of coal enough for thirty-three days' steaming at the Susquehanna's best speed, one thousand tons of cargo, and space enough allotted for passengers for the accommodation of a man of war's crew of five hundred men, and stores necessary for them for four months, drawing less water than the Susquehanna. "Fifth. The sharpness of the decks forward-by a drawing in my possession, does not interfere with the range of the bow gun, and in fact, the Collins steamers having no bowsprits, gives them an advantage not possessed by any other steamers, of training their bow guns to advantage, by bringing them in a direct line with the keel. "Sixth.-The height of the shafts of the Coliins steamers does not interfere with the shifting of guns; as sidewheel steamers must be relied upon to attack single ships, and capture the enemy's commerce, there will always be guns enough forward and abaft the shaft that can be shifted from side to side, to supply the place of any gun that may be disabled. Line of battle ships or frigates, in the present mode of warfare, (see Paixhan's report,) except in fleet engagements, do not prove as efficient as fast steamers carrying heavier guns of greater range. "Seventh. The location of the shafts and boilers of the Collins steamers does not prevent the use of the usual deck beams; and in fact, these steamers have their boilers all below the main deck, and have the advantage of all the deck beams of any war steamer. "Eighth. The upper deck of the Collins steamers is not too slight for an armament, and the additional weight necessary to strengthen them to carry the heaviest, pivot guns, would not exceed ten tons, which is not as heavy as the extra ice-house that is necessary to be carried in the summer time; the usual quantity of ice on this deck alone weighing fifty tons, more than double the weight of four of the largest guns now in use. "Ninth. The number of beams used in the Collins steamers is one entire set more than there is in the Susquehanna, and the mode of putting them in gives the sides additional strength, and gives the ship the ability to stand the continued action of the beaviest armament. The top sides are built as strong as any part of the hull; and steamers in England, (see Engledue's report,) with but ordinary bulwarks above the main deck, one thousand tons less than the Collins steamers, have been strengthened sufficiently, at a cost not exceeding £500, ($2,500,) to carry the heaviest guns used in the English navy. As regards the arrangement of the guns on the main deck, the frames have been so arranged with the spirketings that in twenty-four hours the ports could be pierced to receive any armament that has yet been carried by any side-wheel war steamer; from which it will be inferred that the Collins steamers were constructed for guns as well as passengers. "Tenth.-With respect to masts and sails, if the Susquehanna's mainmast is placed similar to the Mississippi's, her mainmast, under steam, is of but little use, and as to the utility of sparring war steamers heavily, call your attention particularly to the report (see Stuart's work) of Mr. Jesse Gay, chief engineer of the Mississippi, who condemns, unquestionably, loading a side-wheel steamer with heavy spars, anchors, &c. All that he has said, was predicted before her sister ship, the Missouri, had her engines half in, and we see, on reference to Stuart's work, that the best speed of the Susquehanna, under canvass only, did not equal that of the Atlantic when she returned to England without using her machinery. "Eleventh. The weight of armament, stores, &c., would not amount to the weight of the thousand tons of cargo of the Arctic; therefore they would not be so deep as ordinarily, nor would their speed be decreased. "Twelfth.-The cost of converting the Collins steamers into war steamers would not exceed $10,000 each, and, in fact, the money must be very extravagantly disbursed to amount to half that sum. "With respect to the general principles combined in the construction of the Collins steamers, I bave no doubt that the Government would be greatly benefited by following, more closely, the superior manner in whieh the Colijns steamers are constructed, and particularly since the San 33D CONG....2D Sess. Jacinto was calked after a single passage from New York The increased quantity of timber and scantling used in By coaging frames of the Arctic.. and The double diagonal iron braces, riveted into each other, and secured to the framing of the Arctic.... ..3.68 times. The increased depth of the Arctic, with the ad- By the form and strength of the arc in every po- "This increase of strength, no doubt, will astonish many; yet any person, however skeptical, can be convinced if he will, with me, go through the calculations. "Calling your attention particularly to the armament that can be carried and effectually used by any one of the Collins steamers as vessels of war, viz: On the spar deck two Collins Steamers-Mr. Olds. --and build these seven sloops of war, at an ex- But, sir, in addition to this, it should be borne "The Cunard's line has seven steamers, with an aggre- "Collins's line has four steamers, with an aggregate ton- This statement of the honorable gentleman froin eighty-four pounders, on the main deck thirty-two sixty- by the adding of the steamer Arabia to the eight pounders, I am, sir, yours, &c., &c., OLIVER BYRNE, Civil, Military, and Mechanical Engineer. PHILADELPHIA, June, 1854." Mr. Chairman, as an American, justly proud of the achievements of our commercial marine, and especially so of those noble steamers, which took and have maintained such marked preeminence in the maritime world-steamers which have by their admirable performance, compelled even British naval officers, with all their national prejudices, to pronounce superior to anything of the kind in the British navy, I feel myself much indebted to Mr. Byrne, who, by his calm and purely rational demonstration, has convinced me that we have in those steamers, not only an unequaled commercial fleet, but the means of adding to our naval strength in a time of war, vessels which would be unapproached in general efficiency by any other now in our naval service, and which the whole world acknowledges, are unsurpassed by those of any other nation. Cunard line, which has somewhat increased its Now, then, let it be borne in mind, Mr. Chair- I trust, sir, that with such an array of testimony as 1 have here presented, the testimony of the best naval officers of both Great Britain and the Uni-speed, the later Cunarders. ted States, the unprejudiced testimony of our very best naval constructors, and most scientific engineers, we shall hear no more about the impracticability of converting those noble steamers into vessels of war. The Government desired the establishment of the line. The Washington and the Hermann, the two American-built steamers in the Havre and Bremen line, although the best specimens of sea steamers our constructors and engineers had proof the English line, and far behind, in point of duced, proved entirely unequal to the early vessels Mr. Stuart, in his history of the naval and mail steamers of the United States, says: Sir, at the last session of this Congress, we passed a law authorizing the building of six steam frigates, and we have now upon the Clerk's table, partly acted upon, a bill to authorize the building of seven steam sloops of war. We are told by the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, that we must have these steam sloops, because we must have vessels drawing less water than will the steam frigates, in order that they can enter our southern harbors. Sir, in the Collina line, we have just such vessels as the honorable chairman of Naval Affairs says we must have. These steamers draw only eighteen feet of water on entering port on returning from a cruise. That is just the draft proposed for the seven steam sloops of war. Why, then, I ask, shall we strike down the Collins steamers-steamers which, at a moment's warning, can be placed in the Government service "Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that American capitalists, constructors, and engineers should hesitate to compete with the enlarged experience of the English nation, sustained by the immense capital of that country, and fostered by the aid of the Government. "To enter the contest with England for the supremacy of ocean steam navigation required capital, talent, energy, and faith of the highest order known to our countrymen; for to fail, would involve a loss not only of the vast sums necessary to make the effort, but, what is of far more value national disappointment, more deep-felt from the fact that to every lover of his country's reputation, it would insure England had already been vanquished by our sailing ships, and gracefully yielded to us the palin of victory; since more brilliantly illuminated by the yacht America and the clipper ship Witch-of-the-Wave. At this time, too, as already seen, the entire postal service between Great Britain and America, and the transportation of passengers (except emigrants) and costly light freights, was under the control of the Cunard line, which involved not only the reputation and pride of the country, but also its commercial prosperity. Who was there, among all the wealthy and enterprising merchants or ship builders of our metropolis of genius, able to cope with the mistress of the seas, and character ample to gain the confidence and aid of cautious capitalists, that at this critical time offered to step forth, take up the challenge repeated every Ho. OF REPS. month by the arrival of an English steamer in less than two weeks from Liverpool, and embark his fortune and reputation in starting the enterprise. "History will record the name of E. K. Collins, who, in my humble judgment, has, under Providence, done more to advance the name and interests of his country than any American since the immortal Fulton-for the one proved the possibility of applying the steam-engine to the useful navigation of our rivers and lakes, which has caused, in a great degree, the unprecedented growth of our inland and western States; the other the scarcely less important praetical lesson of narrowing the broad and boisterous Atlantic to a pleasure trip of ten days. To those who, from study or experience, know the vast difference there is in constructing a steamer capable of crossing the ocean, at all seasons of the year, not only with safety and wonderful regularity, but to do so in ten days, instead of twelve or fourteen, this encomium will, it is believed, be deemed just and deserved. A reference to the steam logs, given herein, will fully illustrate the labor and cost necessary to accomplish the quickest passages on record' across the Atlantic." Under such circumstances, we induced Mr. Collins to build steamers of great size and power, not because such vessels were demanded by the mail service, but because we designed them for national war vessels, whenever and wherever the interests of the Government might require them. Mr. Collins, without regard to his own interest, embarked his all in the enterprise; and has produced a class of steamers highly satisfactory to the Government, and reflecting the highest credit upon the country But the undertaking, which has been so glorious to the country, was ruinous to the private interest of Mr. Collins and his associates. Upon a careful investigation by both Houses of Congress, in 1852, it was found that Collins could not sustain the service he had engaged to perform, without increased compensation. The Finance Committee of the Senate, and the Ways and Means Committee of the House, found it necessary to increase the compensation to $33,000 on the round trip. Both Houses concurred in the finding of these committees; and Mr. Collins's compensation was increased accordingly. Let it be borne in mind, sir, that this increase in compensation was not for one year, nor for two years, but during the contract of Mr. Collins, unless terminated by Congress. Now, I ask, in all candor, was not the faith of the nation tacitly pledged, that this extra compensation should be continued until such time, during the continuance of the contract, as Collins & Co., without loss or detriment, could perform the required service, without the extra pay? The power which you have reserved, "to give the notice," does not in the least change the pledge of faith, unless you can show that Collins, without embarrassment and bankruptcy, can continue the line without the extra pay. Before Congress, in good faith, can give the notice, it must be satisfied that the line, at the old price, will remunerate the owners. No man, Mr. Chairman, who has listened to my argument, can fail in being convinced that, without this extra allowance, the line must be hopelessly and utterly ruined. I do not hesitate to say, Mr. Chairman, that so long as the Government continues the contract, and so long as Mr. Collins would lose money in the performance of this service without the extra pay, the faith of the nation is just as much pledged to continue the extra compensation, as it is to give any compengation whatever. Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to notice another objection which is urged against my amendment, and then I will conclude. It is urged that the extra compensation should be withheld from Mr. Collins, from the fact that we have offers before the Post Office Committee, and upon our tables, to perform this mail service, for one half the sum now paid Mr. Collins. Sir, before we do injustice to Mr. Collins, we should remember that, when the Post Office Department first advertised for proposals for this service, so discouraging were the prospects, that no offers were made to the Department. The Postmaster General then sent for Mr. Collins to come to Washington city in order to induce him to undertake the service. Mr. Collins hesitated-went home to consult New York capitalists-Mr. Vanderbilt, one of the present bidders, was one of the gentlemen consulted by Mr. Collins. He utterly refused to engage in the enterprise, alleging that it would prove ruinous to those who embarked in it. And, sir, when two years ago, the Postmaster |