received was that the high and official authority to whom I [he] alluded in my [his] letter of the 9th instant, as the source of my [his] information that the Vancouver's [or Rosario] Strait was the channel contemplated by the British Government, is Her Majesty's present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Earl of Clarendon, and I cannot presume that he would intimate to me in writing, as he has done, that such was the case, unless he had substantial grounds for doing so.'

“The ‘very peculiar wording of the treaty,' referred to by Captain Prevost as tending 'almost conclusively to prove the fact that the projet of the treaty was 'designedly altered,' is explained by him as follows:

"In support of my proposition that the Rosario Strait should be the channel of the treaty, I advance that it is the only channel that will admit of being considered the channel according to the treaty which "separates the continent from Vancouver's Island." You state that "while the other channels only separate the islands in the group from each other, the Canal de Haro for a considerable distance north of the Straits of Fuca, and where their waters unite, washes the shore of Vancouver's Island," and is, therefore, the only one which, according to the language of the treaty, "separates the continent from Vancouver's Island." Surely this would prove the converse of the proposition. It appears to me a direct proof that the Canal de Haro is the channel separating Vancouver's Island from the continent, and, therefore, so long as other channels exist more adjacent to the continent, cannot be the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island. I would ask your best attention to this most peculiar language of the treaty, in which the usual terms of expression appear to be designedly reversed, for the lesser is not separated from the greater, but the greater from the lesser-not the island from the continent, but the continent from the island, and therefore it would seem indisputable that where several channels exist between the two, that channel which is the most adjacent to the continent must be the channel which separates

the continent from any islands lying off its shores, however remote those islands may be.'

"From this extract it will be seen that Captain Prevost bases his claim to Rosaria Straits as the boundary channel solely on the ground that the words the continent' and 'Vancouver's Island,' appear to be designedly reversed' in the language of the treaty. Whilst it is scarcely credible that such a transposition of words could have been made with a view to alter the sense of the treaty, still the confidence with which Captain Prevost maintains this ground in the face of the most positive evidence to the contrary, in connection with the fact that the Earl of Clarendon also attaches some importance to it, is not without its influence in creating an impression upon the mind that such a construction of the language may (however unsuccessfully) have been designed for the purpose suggested, or at least with the view of eventually throwing an air of doubt over the real meaning of the treaty. That no one connected with the negociation of the treaty on the part of the United States was ever informed of such a design, or ever discovered of themselves this very peculiar wording' of the treaty, is conclusively proved by the contemporaneous evidence already referred to. On the contrary, Mr. Benton, who was scrupulously nice in the use of language, emphatically declares the language of the first article to be couched in the very words he himself would have used, if he had been called upon to draw it up, for the purpose of carrying the line through the Canal de Haro.

6

"The general object of the treaty, as declared in the preamble, is that the state of doubt and uncertainty which has hitherto prevailed respecting the sovereignty and government of the territory on the north-west coast of America, lying westward of the Rocky or Stony Mountains, should be finally terminated by an amicable compromise of the rights mutually asserted by the two parties over the said territory.' The 'amicable compromise,' so far as it relotes to a division of the territory in dispute, was an agreement to continue the boundary line along the forty-ninth parallel on the continent, and

then a water boundary so as to give the whole of Vancouver's Island to Great Britain. The correspondence of Mr. McLane and Mr. Buchanan shows that the southern end of Vancouver's Island was all that Great Britain refused to yield south of the forty-ninth parallel, and all that the United States were willing to concede. Mr. Benton, the leading senator in favour of the treaty, advocates its ratification with that understanding of its meaning. In his speech on that occasion, he says:

"The line established by that article [the 1st] the prolongation of the boundary on the east side of the Rocky Mountains, follows the parallel of forty-nine degrees to the sea, with a slight deflection through the Straits of Fuca to avoid cutting the south end of Vancouver's Island. When the line reaches the channel which separates Vancouver's Island from the continent (which it does within sight of the mouth of Fraser River), it proceeds to the middle of the channel, and thence turning south through the Channel de Haro (wrongly written Arro on the maps) to the Straits of Fuca; and then west through the middle of that strait to the sea. This is a fair partition of these waters, and gives us everything that we want—namely, all the waters of Puget Sound, Hood's Canal, Admiralty Inlet, Bellingham Bay, Birch Bay, and with them the cluster of islands, probably of no value, between De Haro's Channel and the continent.'

"In your speech against the ratification, on the same day, and apparently in reply to Mr. Benton, you say:

"We have ceded to England the southern cape of Vancouver's Island, an important position which has been heretofore a subject of discussion between the two Governments. Judging from the imperfect map I have examined, it cannot be much less than one hundred miles. Upon what principle of right or compromise this cession is to be made I have not heard explained. For myself I know of none but the old rule of might. England demands it, and we yield, and that tells the whole story.'

"In commenting upon the first article of the treaty, you thus describe the water boundary :

:

"Vancouver's Island is separated from the continent by an arm of the sea, and about 250 miles in extent, different portions of which are known by different names. One part is called the Straits of Fuca; another the Canal de Haro, another the Gulf of Georgia, and the fourth Queen Charlotte's Sound.' Although differing with Mr. Benton upon the construction that may be placed by Great Britain upon the second, third, and fourth articles, and the proviso to the first article of the treaty (to which, in your opinion, the vagueness of their terms will render them liable when they come to be carried into effect), there is no disagreement between you as to the meaning of the language of the important article defining the boundary line. Nor does it seem ever to have been considered susceptible of more than one meaning by any person connected with the negociation and ratification of the treaty on the part of the United States.

"The wording of the treaty is the work of the British Government. It was in their power to frame the language defining the boundary line so as to have precluded the ‘state of doubt and uncertainty' in which they have ever since its ratification so zealously laboured to involve it; and if Captain Prevost has any foundation for the strong conviction he expresses that the Canal de Haro was originally in the projet of the treaty, and that by a designed alteration it was subsequently left out and the present language substituted to change its meaning, and that the words 'the continent' and 'Vancouver's Is'and' were designedly reversed,' with a view to make Rosario Straits the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island,' he places his Government in no enviable position.

6

6

"Considering that Captain Prevost was officially informed' by the Earl of Clarendon (the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from whom he received his instructions) that Rosario Straits was the channel contemplated by the British Government as the channel of the treaty, I thought it not improbable that the instructions of Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Pakenham might have furnished some foundation for the

assertion. Captain Prevost designates the Earl of Clarendon as high and competent authority' in regard to the treaty channel. The highest authority in Great Britain on the treaty of 1846 must be the head of the department for foreign affairs who conducted the negociation of the treaty, and who authorised the proposition which brought it to a conclusion. Before the treaty was accepted and ratified by the United States and returned to London for the exchange of ratifications, a change of ministry had taken place, and Lord Palmerston, who succeeded Lord Aberdeen as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, exchanged the ratifications with Mr. McLane, July 17, 1846, within two months from the date of Lord Aberdeen's instructions to Mr. Pakenham. Lord Palmerston must, therefore, also be regarded as high and competent authority as to the intentions of his Government in regard to the boundary channel. His views on that subject have already been fully set forth, and certainly do not sustain the intimations of the Earl of Clarendon to Captain Prevost any more than does the proposition of Lord Aberdeen in his instructions to Mr. Pakenham. I have not at hand the means of ascertaining the official position held by the Earl of Clarendon in the British Ministry during the negociation and conclusion of the treaty of 1846, or whether, indeed, he occupied any position under the British Government during that period. But it can hardly be supposed that, under any circumstances, he had better means of information than Lord Aberdeen or Lord Palmerston in regard to the details of the treaty. And their views, as hereinbefore set forth, certainly do not sustain Captain Prevost's presumption that the Earl of Clarendon had substantial grounds' for intimating to him in writing, as he had done, that Vancouver (or Rosario) Straits was the channel contemplated by his Government.

"Although the instructions of Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Pakenham could not possibly be construed into evidence in favour of Rosario Straits, the peculiar wording' of his description of the water boundary line might very naturally suggest to the Earl of Clarendon the idea of the San Juan Channel as a