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ours is, of all forms of government, the very one which is the most unfitted for such a labor." Chase thought possible dissolution was better than a conflict. Welles was a rather watery character, Smith and Bates were old, Cameron and Blair were ordinary politicians. The Senate that met in executive session on the day of inauguration counted twenty-nine Republicans, some disaffected, thirty-two Democrats, one American hostile to the administration, with five vacancies from Southern states that were not filled during the war. It was only the later retirement of senators from seceding states that gave the administration a majority in both branches of Congress. More important, however, than soldiers or politicians, were the mass of the people, and what they felt it was Lincoln's intention to learn by experience. "Step by step he walked before them, slow with their slowness, quickening his march by theirs." He felt that he could master all the rest, however big in name, if he could only keep the resources of the Northern people just behind him. Wendell Phillips declared in New Bedford, on April 9, that the Southern states had a right to secede, and added, “You cannot go through Massachusetts and recruit men to bombard Charleston or New Orleans." If the leading abolition orator was right, then the new President was going to be in a hopeless

position when the tocsin sounded; but it was the President and not the orator who understood the people.

General Scott after full deliberation advocated the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Lincoln refused to accept his decision, for reasons which he himself stated in his message to Congress on the following 4th of July: “It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed." When Lincoln consulted his cabinet, March 15, he found only Blair really in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter, all the rest being squarely against it, except Chase, who said he would oppose it if it meant war, but he thought it need not mean that. By March 28, Scott had advised the evacuation of Fort Pickens as well as of Fort Sumter. Soon after this Seward expressed to Judge Campbell, who was helping the Confederate commissioners in Washington in their persistent attempt to win recognition and concession, the belief that

Sumter would be abandoned within five days. By this time, however, Seward and Smith stood alone in favor of evacuation, the rest of the cabinet having moved toward what was the President's position also, although he kept quiet about it in order to make preparations as advantageously as possible. On March 29, after a cabinet meeting, he ordered the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to be ready for an expedition by sea not later than April 6. An order for the reënforcement of Fort Pickens had been sent two weeks before.

On April i, Lincoln received from his Secretary of State a paper which perhaps gives better than any other document on record an idea of the sea of troubles which met the untried President. Here was his principal adviser not only suggesting the virtual abdication of the President and the dictatorship of the Secretary of State, but coupling this arrogant superiority with some of the most insane propositions which emerged from any brain during the war. In this insinuation that he should be the head of affairs, Seward but acted on the ideas which he shared with such men as Adams, Scott, and the other officials who felt that the raw Westerner must, by a process of natural selection, step aside for the experienced party leader and polished statesman. This marvellous document was as follows:

SOME THOUGHTS for the President's CONSIDERATION.

April 1, 1861.

"FIRST. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

"SECOND. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

"THIRD. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policy for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country.

"FOURTH. To do this we must dismiss the applicant for office. But how? I suggest that we make a local appointment forthwith leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

"FIFTH. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must

"CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, FOR A QUESTION UPON UNION OR DISUNION.

"In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of Patriotism or Union.

"The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free states and even by the Union men in the South.

"I would, therefore, terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the necessity.

"For the rest I would simultaneously defend and reenforce all the forts in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law. This will raise distinctly the question of Union or Disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.

FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.

"I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.

"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

“And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,

"Would convene Congress and declare war against

them.

"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

"Devolve it on some member of his cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.

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