"It is not in my especial province.

"But I neither seek to evade or assume responsibility."

With a combination of meekness and firmness of which history probably does not offer another equally striking example in any powerful ruler, Lincoln replied on the same day in one of his masterpieces. To Seward's first proposition he said:

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'At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said, 'The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts!' This had your distinct approval at the time; and, taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.

"Again, I do not perceive how the reënforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.

"The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy."

To the later and more insulting propositions, Lincoln replied merely, after repeating Seward's language:

"I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the cabinet."

To Seward's credit, it should be admitted that when a few such experiences as this taught him who was master, he nobly obeyed. When Henry Clay said, "Mr. Seward is a man of no convictions," he certainly wronged an erratic but generous and enthusiastic nature. The very ardor with which Seward lent himself to the work in hand, guided by his superior, led to the later attempt to assassinate him also. He and his friends had been disappointed that Lincoln would not give them a Seward cabinet; they were disappointed that he would not delegate his responsibilities; but, while some of them sulked on, the Secretary of State turned in for work.

A cartoon published on March 23 by Vanity Fair, called "Professor Lincoln in his Great Feat of Balancing," represents a feeling that was growing. Although there was more stolidity

than the retrospective observer might expect, there was also grumbling. The Confederates thought Jefferson Davis ought to take sharper measures, and public opinion was now less divided in the South than it was in the North, where any estimate of the respective numbers really favoring aggressive action, concession, and balancing was impossible. The pressure of public sentiment at the South, however, combined with action by the administration, was soon to bring on the crisis before which both sides showed some hesitation. The expedition for the relief of Fort Pickens sailed April 6, that for Sumter April 9, both having been prepared with the greatest possible secrecy. The Southern spies in Washington were unable to tell the Confederates the destination of the expedition. The President's first bad mistake was made in these preparations. The frigate Powhatan had been assigned by Secretary Welles for the Sumter expedition. On the advice of Seward, Lincoln signed a paper ordering it to Fort Pickens, which was done so secretly that when the conflict was discovered at the last moment it was too late. When the President's attention was called to the fact that he had ordered away from the Sumter expedition a ship vitally essential to it, he said he had confused the names of Pocahontas and Pow

hatan. Seward had intended just what had been done, and he now tried to persuade Lincoln that the Powhatan ought to go to Fort Pickens. The President, however, definitely ordered Seward to telegraph an order giving up the Powhatan to the Sumter expedition. This despatch was received at the Brooklyn navy-yard a few hours after the ship had sailed, and was sent off in a tug which overtook the Powhatan. The commander, however, seeing it signed only "Seward" sailed on under the former order signed by Lincoln.

On April 11 the Confederate General Beauregard, having been notified by President Lincoln that provisions were to be put if possible into Fort Sumter, sent to the commander, Major Anderson, a request for surrender. Anderson refused, and said incidentally that his provisions would last but a few days. The next day the Confederates opened fire, and after a slight defence by the small Federal force, the fort became so injured that it had to be surrendered by the unprovisioned garrison on the evening of the 13th. The relief expedition, meantime, was lying outside the bar, waiting for the Powhatan, as nothing was known about the change of plan. Thus the strongest fortress on the South Atlantic coast was lost to the Union through one of the few blunders

universally admitted as having been made by the President. Of course Seward and others shared the error, and it is remarkable enough that, furnished so liberally with bad advice, Lincoln's course should have been so clear that this is one of few examples of undoubted errors in judgment.

The capture of Sumter began actual war, and filled both divisions of the country with excitement and determination. North and South alike were consolidated by actual combat, the minority growing smaller and quieter, so that only the voice of the secessionists was heard in their states and the voice of loyalty throughout most of the North. Most of the hesitating Southern states seceded rapidly, and the blaze of fury that passed over the North made it seem a different country from the one in which but a few weeks before even New York had seemed in danger of secession. Lincoln knew his people. Had he not been content to wait for Southern aggression, at whatever military cost, the people would not have stood so stanchly. He had to deal with a peaceable populace, of industrial habits, while the Southerners had the warlike spirit of a sporting aristocracy. The regular Federal army was much less than 20,000 men badly scattered, and there was not enough of a navy to make