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make improvements essential to the successful execution of the trust.' He concedes, also, that "when the object of a given road, the clearing of a particular channel, or the construction of a particular harbor of refuge, is manifestly required by the exigencies of the naval or military service of the country, then it seems to me (the President) undeniable that it may be constitutionally comprehended in the powers to declare war, to provide and maintain a navy, and to raise and support armies."

It is further admitted, "if the particular improvement, whether by land or sea, be necessary to the execution of the enumerated powers, then, but not otherwise, it falls within the jurisdiction of Congress."

In referring to the act of 1789, extending "the jurisdiction of the United States to all waters which are navigable from the sea," and to the act of 1845, extending the same "to the lakes and rivers subject to the authority of the Federal Government." The President admits "these conditions include all waters, whether salt or fresh, and whether of sea, lake, or river, provided they be capable of navigation by vessels of a certain tonnage, and for commerce, either between the United States and foreign countries, or between any two or more of the States or Territories of the Union." Then comes the closing admission of the President, in regard to "the constitutionality of these provisions of statute," as to what are navigable waters. He says:

"Their constitutionality has been maintained, however, by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States; and they are, therefore, the law of the land, by the concurrent act of the legislative, the Executive, and the judicial departments of the Government."

So that no principle or rule of construction has been settled by the veto as a guide on this great constitutional question, as to whether Congress can improve the navigation of certain rivers, or construct certain harbors, with a view to render navigation "safe and easy." And, says the Executive, in his earnest endeavors to assign some limit to the power of Congress over this important subject:

"The conflicting sentiments of eminent statesmen, expressed in Congress, or in conventions called expressly to devise, if possible, some plan calculated to relieve the subject of the embarrassments with which it is environed, while they directed public attention strongly to the magnitue of the interests involved, have yet left unsettled the limits, not merely of expediency, but of constitutional power, in relation to works of this class by the General Government."

Army and the Navy; to meet the deficiency of the Post Office Department; to maintain our foreign relations; to support the judiciary of the United States, and the Executive and legislative departments of the Government; and, to provide all our resources of public defense in times of war, as well as in times of peace; also, to furnish the means with which to purchase or acquire foreign territory; and yet, when a small pittance of the national revenue is asked for, to benefit and protect this great national interest and render navigation upon our Atlantic, Pacific, and lake coasts, and their navigable rivers more "safe and easy,' we are gravely told by the Executive that doubts are entertained both as to the constitutionality and expediency of the appropriation of funds from the National Treasury to secure that object. While, at the same time, it is admitted that the concurrent acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the General Government, having declared all rivers susceptible of navigation with vessels of ten or twenty tons burden to be public highways; being therefore taken from the States or Territories in which, or through which, they may pass, these States and Territories, unless by permission by Congress, cannot adopt means to improve their navigability.

The tenth section of article first declares: "No State shall, without consent of Congress, lay any imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imports laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress."

"No State shall, without consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage," &c., &c. The General Government, therefore, have the power to declare what waters or rivers are public highways; and that no State shall, without consent of Congress, lay any duties of excise or on imports, exports, or tonnage. And when Congress shall have granted power to levy any of these duties to the States, the Constitution declares that even then Congress shall have power to "revise and con

trol" those State laws.

This shows that the power over this subject is vested in the General Government, and not in those of the States, as the States cannot exercise it without the consent of Congress. With the General Government, then, this power must rest, or be extinct. But it cannot be extinct so long as the States may exercise this power by the authority of Congress; and what Congress has the constitutional power to authorize the several States or Territories to do, shall we be told it cannot itself constitutionally do? But what says the President on this point?

"During that period of time in which the country had not come to look to Congress for appropriations of this nature, several of the States, whose productions or geographical position invited foreign commerce, had entered upon plans for the improvement of their harbors by themselves, and through means of support drawn directly from that commerce, in virtue of an express constitutional power, needing for its exercise only the permission of Congress."

Here, then, unintentionally, no doubt, but most explicitly the President admits the existence of the power to draw the means from commerce for these

So it has come to this at last, that so specious is the constitutional tenure of this power, and so ambiguous, yet favorable in signification are the terms of its grants that even those strict constructionists who deny its existence have not been thus far able to show clearly and indisputably that it does not exist. While they have admitted the power of Congress to build and maintain a Navy, not only for public defense, but for the purpose also, of protecting our foreign commerce, not only to construct dock-yards and magazines, but harbors and custom-houses, and to establish ports of entry and ports of delivery to accommodate the commerce of the country. But the power to do these is claimed as incidental to the power to col-improvements, in or upon those rivers wherever lect revenue. To levy this tax upon the commerce of the country for the maintenance of the Government, and then to deny to that great interest the fostering care of the Government cannot be a very direct mode of "providing for the general welfare" of the country. To gather from this source alone almost the entire support of the Government, and for the defense of the country and then deny to it a proper share of the protection of the Government could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, or they would have said so in unequivocal language and

terms.

The message concedes the impropriety of attempting to distinguish between domestic and foreign commerce, because the latter "has already penetrated thousands of miles into the interior of the continent by means of our great rivers;" and admits also, "that no rule is admissible which undertakes to discriminate, so far as regards river and harbor improvements, between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and the great lakes and rivers of the interior regions of North America." From commerce the revenue is gathered to maintain the

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demands its exercise. To say that Congress has power to authorize the States to levy duties and make these improvements, and that Congress has power to revise the laws of the States making the same, and then deny that it has constitutional power over this subject, is a self-evident absurdity needing no comment.

None deny the power of this Government to collect revenues by either of the modes provided for in the Constitution. And revenue is but the means by which to execute the purposes of the Government to carry into effect the grants of its powers, and Congress must be permitted to apply the revenues as it shall deem proper in executing this trust. If our Government shall derive its revenue from the commercial interests of the country, it must have power to protect those interests from which its revenues are derived.

If it shall become necessary to construct harbors, to build custom-houses, and to establish ports of entry for the successful execution of this trust, it must be equally competent for the Government to improve the navigation of the rivers as a means of increasing the resources of the Government in the productiveness of its revenue. To declare that the power or protective policy of our Government terminates as soon as the imports are landed upon our Lake, Pacific, or Atlantic shores, is to assign a limit to it unknown to our Constitution and contrary to the established practice of this Government. If, in time of peace, we may maintain a navy in foreign ports, at an annual expense of millions of dollars, to protect our ships of commerce, and if we may build custom-houses at our ports of delivery far in the interior of our country, up the sources of our rivers, for the benefit of our importing interests, without assigning constitutional limits to the demands of trade, where, then, do we find constitutional restrictions to the improvement of the navigation of these rivers, which, by this commerce, is equally demanded from the hands of the Government as protecting the source of its revenues?

Is it not as important that our imports should be able to penetrate into the interior States of this Union, as that they shall be able to reach the shores of its coasts? Is not our domestic commerce as extensive and important to the welfare of the States of this Union, as is that of our imports, the productions of foreign countries? Can we pay for the one unless we can dispose of the other? Shall we make a watch dog of our protective policy, confining its cares to the outside of our gates and not permitting it to come within? The Constitution does not define what are navigable waters or what rivers are public highways, consequently it does not define what waters or navigable rivers are within the jurisdiction of the States or Territories, or of the General Government. They are designated only by acts of Congress in assigning limits to the maritime jurisdiction of the General Government; and the only characteristic adopted for distinguishing those which are, from those which are not public highways, is their capacity for tonnage, and not as the President assumes whether they "pass through or into two or more States or Territories of this Union." The President seems to have two principal ob

If Congress may authorize the levying of these duties to the States-which is a direct tax upon commerce for the purpose of clearing the channel of a navigable river, or to construct a harbor-it must possess the constitutional power to appropriate a portion of those revenues collected from customs for river and harbor improvements without transcending the limits of its powers. If the General Government has supreme power over all enumerated modes of collecting duties, and to declare what rivers shall be deemed public highways, why has it not the same authority over their incidents as it has over those of any other grants of power? Or, in the language of the President, "why does not this power also carry with it the right to make improvements essential to the execution of the trust. To pass laws necessary to carry into execution these powers, implies the discretion of Congress both as to the expediency or constitutionality of the means, time, or mode of executing its trusts as well as to whether the public defense or general welfare of the country

really the only tangible objections to the bill. First, it does not "make appropriation for every work in a separate bill, so that each one shall stand on its own independent merits." So far as this objection implies a system of log-rolling, as it has been termed, or a banding together of the several local interests, whereby an appropriation can be got through Congress which in itself has no merits of a national or proper commercial character, I conceive the objection has no valid force. The community of interests would be the same were each bill to be separately presented. Besides, he does not attempt to point out one feature even which he thinks not to be national in its character. And I doubt much whether, upon a review of the subject, he can designate one of these river appropriations which do not come within the limits of his conceded constitutional and commercial character, benefiting sections of the States "whose productions or geographical position invited foreign commerce." He has drawn no line of distinction between the power of the Government to make appropriations out of

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and prostrate the interests of its citizens. Nor is the Constitution a dead letter, to be used only as a text against the power and right of this Government to carry out its solemn guarantees to the American people. Its power should be exercised for the purposes granted, or be at once restored to the people of the several States.

With all due deference for the high position of the Chief Magistrate of this Republic, taking his Cape Fear message as the key to his sentiments and opinions on the constitutionality, and expediency of works for river and harbor improvements, are we not fully borne out in the conclusion, and justified in the belief that his excuses given in his veto message were designed but to amuse those of his partisan friends who supported that bill, or might favor improvements of this character, to disarm them of open hostility? if, indeed, they were not disposed to declare him obnoxious to the charge of insincerity. The President has no where said in his messages he was in favor of any river or harbor improvement, except the instance which I have given. And in this case his language utterly precludes the idea that he favors such improvements, except the "obstructions" occur" by acts of the Government." But on the contrary, the entire scope and tenor of his language is, that our Government is sovereign to hold, but powerless to act, which is a political dogma having no parallel in ancient or modern history, either in the science of government, ethics, or political economy, outside of the President's veto message.

But, Mr. Chairman, by the language of the veto it would seem the President would have the river separated from the harbor improvements, so that those States in which the latter were to be made should first cede to the General Government the jurisdiction thereof, and the whole in separate bills, so that each one should be made to "stand upon its own merits." By the indirection of this language, so fair upon its face, the country are led to believe the President to be sincerely desirous to separate those which were from those which were not constitutional; those which were from those which were not national; those which had merits from those which had not, to enable him to sign those which he should approve, and return, with his objection, those which he should disapprove. But, Mr. Chairman, I must believe this a mere pretext, or dodge, which serves but to cover or mask the real ground of his objections to the bill, as a whole, and in each particular. I must believe this from his own official declaration, heretofore made, on another similar occasion, which stands recorded before Congress and the country. It will be recollected by this committee, sir, that, on the 22d day of July last, the President communicated a message to the Senate; which being short, and containing the evidence of my inference, as above alluded, I take the liberty of giving it in On the President's Message vetoing the French full:

To the Senate of the United States:

I have this day given my signature to the act "making further appropriations for the improvement of the Cape Fear river, in North Carolina."

The occasion seems to render it proper for me to deviate from the ordinary course of announcing the approval of bills by an oral statement only; and, for the purpose of preventing any misapprehension which might otherwise arise from the phraseology of this act, to communicate in writing, that my approval is given to it on the ground that the obstructions which the proposed appropriation is intended to remove are the result of acts of the General Government.

FRANKLIN PIERCE.

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1854. This was an act simply for the improvement of the Cape Fear river, to remove an obstruction from the channel of it, by an appropriation from the Treasury of the United States. This was upon our Atlantic coast. Above this obstruction

our Government had erected a fort, and a customhouse, and had made it a port of entry. The Government had also built a wall out into the current of that river, above this fortress, to protect its foundation from being washed away by the current of its waters. It was this wall to protect the fort which had occasioned the deposit constituting this obstruction in the channel of that river. It was also a separate bill, and stood upon its own merits. Its waters emptied into the Atlantic ocean. It was navigable only in a single State, and did not pass "through two or more States or Territories." The President made this act the special occasion" to avoid "any misapprehension" which might otherwise arise from the phraseology of the act, to communicate in writing his "approval," it being on the ground that the obstructions "are the results of acts of the General Government."

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Mr. Chairman, "improvement" simply was proposed by the "appropriation" for the removal of the "obstructions" in the Cape Fear river, which the President feared would lead to "misapprehension." From this, can it be doubted but that the President desired and meant to be understood that had these obstructions been natural, or of providential occurrence, the circumstances, otherwise being the same, he should not have given his signature to the bill. What otherwise could "occasion" fear of "misapprehension?" If this improvement, excepting the mode or manner of the occurrence, be not constitutional in its character, and national in its object in the opinion of the President, then his objections to the river and harbor bill of the last session of Congress, must be mere evasions, or as may, with propriety, be more properly termed, are but his excuses, and not his reasons for withholding his signature from those appropriations.

FRENCH SPOLIATIONS-VETO MESSAGE.

SPEECH OF HON. I. WASHBURN, JR.,
OF MAINE,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
February 26, 1855,

Spoliation Bill.

The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union

Mr. WASHBURN, of Maine, said: Mr. CHAIRMAN: I had hoped that the health of the able gentleman who presides over the Committee on Foreign Affairs [Mr. BAYLY] would have permitted him to enter at once upon a review of the most extraordinary message communicated to the House on Saturday week by the President of the United States; and that a general discussion of the doctrines and arguments therein advanced might have taken place at the earliest moment. The assumptions in that paper as to the occasions when the Executive may properly exercise the veto power, were so novel, so startling, and so dangerous, if acquiesced in, and the reasons for which the President attempted to justify its application to the bill which he has returned were so remarkable, so inconsistent with the truth of history, and yet so calculated to mislead, if not answered, that an instant, earnest, and indignant protest should have been made to the former, and the latter subjected to that early and searching examination which would have exposed and refuted them at once, and forever. But, sir, as soon as the message had been read, motions were made for postponing its consideration to a day certain, on which motions no general debate was in order, and pending which the House adjourned. On Monday, while these motions were yet undisposed of, a friend of the Administration, and opponent of this bill, [Mr. ORR,] demanded the previous question. It was seconded, and the main question was ordered; thus cutting off the motions to consider on a future day, and bringing the House to a direct vote upon the question, "Shall the bill, upon reconsideration, pass, notwithstanding the objections of the President?"

The Constitution says, if the President approve the bill," he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it;" or, in other words, to consider it again. What kind of consideration was allowed here? Not a word of discussion was permitted, either upon the bill or the message, not a remonstrance suffered to be made to the strange doctrines of the President, nor a single answer to the manifold errors of statement, and faults of logic and reasoning, of which the paper is full. But, under the gag of the previous question, every man's mouth was shut, and the bill brought to that reconsideration (?) for which the Constitution proIvides. Sir, was this well or worthily done? What

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if our time was short, and what if many important measures were yet pending before Congress? Did gentlemen seriously fear that any of them which are really necessary would fail? I think not. But, sir, were there not questions involved in this veto message infinitely transcending in importance any, or all, of the questions in the bills before us?— questions reaching to the foundations, the elementary principles, of the Government; striking at the very vitals of constitutional liberty and representative republicanism. Did the House well to submit to these fetters, to be “trusted with a muzzle, and enfranchised with a clog?"

"I forbid," says the President, to an act of Congress making provision for the payment of claims against the United States for indemnity for spoliations made upon her citizens, more than fifty-five years ago, by France; claims which, notwithstanding what has been said by the President, this Government appropriated to its own uses, and for which it received a full equivalent at the commencement of the present century; claims recognized by it as just and true at the time of their origin, and which never have been, and never will be, repudiated. When truth, justice, and good faith, are deliberately repudiated by a Government, that moment the Government ceases to exist; it may keep up the name and the forms of Government for a while after, but its life is gone, and forever. "The blasted leaves of autumn may be renewed by the returning spring; the cerements of the grave shall burst, and earth give up her dead, but political degeneracy has no restoring power; national death is followed by no resurrection."

These claims have always been affirmed, and never denied by the country-they never will be denied. They will be paid-they must be paidbecause they are just, and because this people is just. Presidents may postpone, but they cannot prevent their payment. Presidents will be what they are, and the people what they are. The obligation of the Government to make indemnity for these French spoliations has been affirmed by such men as Marshall, Madison, Giles, General Marion, (the partisan hero of South Carolina,) George Clinton, the two Livingstons, Everett, Chambers, Preston, Wilkins, Webster, and, I believe I may add, by Jefferson; by more than thirty committees of Congress; by the Legislatures of many, if not, indeed, a majority of the States; by the repeatedly favorable action of one or the other of the Houses of Congress; for similar bills to this have passed the Senate nine times, and twice have they passed by the concurrent action of both Houses, and never have they been voted down in either. Such bills have received the support of men of all parties and all shades of political opinion; of Whigs, Democrats, Southern Rights men, and Free-Soilers; of southern as well as northern, of western as well as eastern members. Can it be possible that all these men, and bodies of men, in all this time, and with all the investigation which, through so long a period, they have been able to make, have been in error, have not ascertained or understood the grounds upon which these claims must stand or fall? True, sir, a bill for the same object as this was vetoed in 1846 by the late President Polk; but that veto was for special reasons not applicable to this act and to these times. While it is due to candor and to truth to say that Mr. Polk doubted the liability of the Government to make indemnity as the bill provided, he did not place his disapproval upon the ground that he could, under ordinary circumstances, properly revise the action of Congress in this regard; but he arrested the passage of the bill for the following reasons, as a reference to his message will show:

1. The country was engaged in a war with Mexico; the Treasury was empty; a debt of sev eral millions had been recently created, and which the necessities of the country might require to be largely increased. Whether these claims were just or not, it was, in his judgment, quite certain that was not the time to pay them;

2. The amount due should be paid in money, and not in land, as the bill provided. There were, in his opinion, serious objections to paying so large a sum in the public lands. They might, and very probably would, come to be owned in large quantities by individuals or associations, who would hold them at exorbitant prices, and so

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retard the growth and prosperity of the new States;

3. Another reason, apparently not much relied upon, though not identical with, was similar to, one of the objections in this message. It was this: While the bill appropriated but $5,000,000, it was generally believed that the claims in all greatly exceeded that sum; yet the persons interested were required to execute releases in full; and

4. The bill was passed near the close of the session, while important measures were crowding upon Congress, without that full and elabo. rate consideration which the amount involved, and the state of the Treasury, would demand.

No man, I venture to say, can read Mr. Polk's message and deny, or even doubt, that he would have felt bound to approve the bill but for the reasons which have been stated, and excluding the third.

Now, sir, it is manifest that none of the reasons or objections upon which Mr. Polk relied apply in the present case. The country is at peace with all the world; the Treasury is full; and not only so, but the Administration is seriously inquiring how the revenues may be reduced.

The bill of the present Congress has been placed, and may be successfully defended, upon grounds consistent with and even involving the idea of complete and final indemnity, at least so far as the obligations of this Government are concerned. The Government pays the amount of the consideration it received from France. That consideration it estimates at $5,000,000. Does the President, or any opponent of the bill, question the principle upon which the payment is proposed to be made? and who shall say that the amount adjudged by Congress to be what the Government received, is essentially out of the way? But, in addition to this, did not the President know that the claimants asked for this amount, that they desire to obtain it, and pray for it, as such full indemnity, and that every one of them will so receive it with joy and thankfulness?

It provides for payment in money, and not in

land.

It was not passed at the heel of the session, nor without full and elaborate discussion.

entire revolution in our Government, a fundamental change in its theory and practice. Sir, we niust "resist beginnings." The doctrines of the President on this point are such as have never been advanced by any of his predecessors, and such as the framers of the Constitution could not have been made to believe would ever be held by any man whom the American people could, in any hour of fatuity or madness, elevate to the high position of President. Look at their debates, and learn how jealous they were of this power, how they believed it to be impossible that it should ever be exercised in a case of simple expediency like this. Sir, these doctrines are alarming on account of the place from which, if not the person from whom, they emanate. Fifty years hence they may be referred to as the opinions of the President, and not of General Pierce. The office will remain, though its present incumbent may be forgotten.

To show that I have not overstated the monstrous claims of the President-they cannot be overstated-I quote a portion of what he says on this subject:

"The President's responsibility is to the whole people of the United States, as that of a Senator is to the people of a particular State, that of a Representative to the people of a State or district; and it may be safely assumed that he will not resort to the clearly defined and limited power of arresting legislation, and calling for reconsideration of any measure, except in obedience to requirements of duty. When, however, be extertains a decisive and fixed conclusion, not merely of the unconstitutionality, but of the impropriety, or injustice in other respects, of any measure, if he declares that he approves it, he is false to his oath, and he deliberately disregards his constitutional obligations."

"If there be anything of sceming invidiousness in the official right thus conferred on the President, it is in appearance only, for the same right of approving or disapproving a bill, according to each one's own judgment, is conferred on every member of the Senate and of the House of RepTesentatives."

Passing the statement that the responsibility of Senators and Representatives is limited to their respective States and districts, which may be true in one sense, but is utterly unfounded to the exI

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I now come to notice some of the President's objections to the bill. The claims, he says, if just, should have been paid half a century ago. By providing for their payment now we cast reproach upon the Government which, for so long a time, has neglected or refused to discharge them. The force of this objection may be seen in this form of statement: A has been indebted for ten, or twenty, or thirty years to his neighbor B; for some reason he has neglected to pay the debt, and still hesi. tates; he begins, however, to have some compunctions about it, but finally satisfies his by saying, "If I pay it now I shall acknowledge my delinquency in the past; I will save my honor, and let the debt go."

And not only would the passage of this bill, in the President's judgment, be an imputation on the public honor, but it would also imply a sentence of condemnation upon the sagacious and patriotic men who participated in the transactions out of which these claims are supposed to have arisen, and who never acknowledged the obligation of the Government to make indemnity. Here, sir, I take issue with the President, and allege that those men, without exception, recognized the validity of these claims, and the obligation of the Government to discharge them; and I submit that the highest respect we can pay to their memory is to provide, without further delay, for the payment of what they acknowledged to be justly due, by reason of those transactions, from the Government to its citizens.

Among the distinguished men who participated in the transactions connected with these claims, I may mention the names of Jefferson, Marshall, Madison, and Robert R. Livingston, "great and celebrated names-names which," to borrow from Mr. Burke, "have kept their country's name respectable in every other on the globe." pose to ascertain what they said, and must have thought, concerning the obligations of the Government in this regard. I quote, in the first place, from a speech of the Hon. Mr. BRADBURY, of Maine, made in the Senate of the United States, in April, 1852:

I pro

would call your particular attention to what he asserts in reference to his duty under the veto. When he entertains a "decisive and fixed" opinion of the "impropriety" of a measure, he cannot

It was not, then, for the objections made by Mr. Polk that the present Executive has seen fit to strike down this bill, the passage of which by the two Houses had carried so much of hope and glad-approve it (as President in the technical sense, in ness to so many hearts and homes. God help the widow and the fatherless, who have waited so long and borne themselves so patiently and so bravely, until the era of little men in high places shall have passed away, and statesmen, rather than partisans, shall be the stuff of which Presidents are made!

Was it for want of authority, of constitutional power in Congress, that the veto has been sent here? That is not even pretended. Because the bill was the result of hasty or inconsiderate legislation? No. Because it encroaches upon the proper functions, the rights or privileges of the Executive? Certainly not. These are the reasons for which it has been supposed heretofore, by those who have given the more liberal construction in regard to the veto power, that a President might justify a resort to this method of arresting the execution of the people's will, as expressed by their Representatives. It has never been understood that the power of the President legitimately extends to cases of mere propriety and expediency, to questions of appropriations where no power is usurped and no rights are invaded; that he could make himself, to all practical intents, a third branch of the Legislature, and set his will, his individual judgment, against the opinions and judgment of the Senate and House of Representatives, and the people, who they, in matters of legislation, immediately and peculiarly represent. The veto has been generally regarded as an extraordinary power, a power not for every day use,

or for common cases; but rather as an instrument of defense and protection, to be employed only in cases of great and manifest wrong, on occasions of solemn, urgent, and palpable necessity. It is like the sword of the giant, which was kept in the temple, to be used only on great occasions. Sir, we are receiving new readings in reference to the extent and proper uses of this power, which, if not stayed and rebuked, will work a complete and il

which, under the Constitution, he makes use of the word "approved" in signing bills) without being false to his oath and constitutional obligations. Was ever anything more puerile than this? Was it ever understood, by any of his predecessors, that the signing of a bill imported that it had the President's approbation, as a thing of expediency; or that it implied more than thisthat, by a true construction of his power and duty under the Constitution, he felt bound to give it dent's position is its sufficient refutation. But his official sanction? The statement of the Presi

that there should be no doubt as to the extent of his claims, he makes use of this remarkable language:

"If there be anything of seeming invidiousness in the official right thus conferred on the President, it is in appearance only, for the SAME right of approving a bill according to each one's own judgment, is conferred on every member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.”

So that whenever, as a member of Congress, he would not vote for a bill, as President, he would veto it! In the first session of the present Congress the President affixed his signature to between three and four hundred bills and joint resolutions. Had he read them all, and did he fully understand them? Did they really receive his approbation in the sense in which he says he is held to approve by signing them? As a member of Congress would he have voted for all these bills? No single member of either branch, I venture to affirm, voted for two thirds of them. Yet we are bound to believe

"I leave it to the Senate to determine the weight that Comment can add nothing where their knowledge of the subject, their capacity to investigate, their judgment and integrity, are known and appreciated.

"It has been intimated that, at the period of which I have been speaking, our commerce being exceedingly profitable, our merchants assumed the risk incident to the troubled state of affairs, without expecting any indemnity from the Government in case of loss. It is the duty of a Government to protect at all times, in their lawful pursuits, the citizens who render it allegiance and give it support. But the claimants are not left to stand on that ground alone. They were specially invited to send out their ships upon the ocean, under assurance of protection, by the President of the United States. The Secretary of State, in a circular issued August 27, 1793, says:

"I have it in charge from the President to assure the merchants of the United States concerned in foreign commerce or navigation, that due attention will be paid to any injuries they may suffer on the high seas, or in foreign countries, contrary to the law of nations, or to existing treaties; and that, on their forwarding hither well-authenticated evidence of the same, proper proceedings will be adopted for their relief.""-Senate Doc., 1st sess. 19th Cong., vol. 5, p. 217.

"We here have the fact that the Government was so anxious to encourage a commerce that was filling the Treasury with the means to discharge the debt of revolution, that it stimulated our merchants to prosecute their adventurous business by a special assurance of prompt protection. Is it, then, anything less than a mockery of their wrongs to tell them now they are entitled to no relief, as they could never have expected that measure of redress which Government ordinarily afforded?"

This was during the administration of General Washington, and the Secretary of State who issued the circular was Thomas Jefferson. Does he perform an act of kindness to the memory of Washington and Jefferson who asserts that they did, or would do, if living, anything that might be construed as a denial of the right of these claimants to relief-claimants who suffered by confid

During the administration of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, as Secretary of State, writing to Mr. Charles Pinckney, our Minister to Spain, on the 6th of February, 1804, says:

"The plea on which it seems the Spanish Government now principally relies, is the erasure of the second article of our late convention with France, by which France was released from the indemnities due for spoliations committed under their immediate responsibility to the United States." "We claim against her, not against France. In releasing France, therefore, we have not released her. The claims,

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again, from which France was released, WERE ADMITTED BY FRANCE, and the release was for A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, IN A CORRESPONDENT RELEASE OF THE UNITED STATES FROM CERTAIN CLAIMS ON THEM."-Doc. 102, p. 795.

Can anything be more distinct and unequivocal than this admission of Mr. Madison; and of Mr. Jefferson, under whose authority it was made? The late Chief Justice Marshall, whose name as acting Secretary of State, is affixed to the convention of 1800, says:

"I would positively oppose any admission of the claims of any French citizen if not accompanied with the admission of the claims of American citizens for property captured and condemned for want of a role d'equipage. My reason for conceiving that this ought to be stipulated expressly, was a conviction that, if it was referred to commissioners, it would be committing absolutely to chance as complete a right as any individual ever possessed.-Journal, p. 471, No. 316.

"He (Chief Justice Marshall) stated that, having been connected with the events of that period, and conversant with the circumstances under which the claims arose, he was, from his own knowledge, satisfied that there was the strongest obligation on the Government to compensate the sufferers by the French spoliations.-Letter from Hon. W. C. Preston, United States Senate, South Carolina.

The conversation to which Mr. Preston refers, took place but a few years prior to the date of his letter, which was January 29, 1844.

Mr. Robert R. Livingston, one of the ministers who concluded the treaty and conventions with France, in 1803, in a letter to M. Talleyrand, on the 17th of April, 1802, makes use of this language:

"The payment for illegal captures, with damages and indemnities, was demanded on one side, and the renewal of the treaty of 1788, on the other; they were considered as of equal value, and they only formed the subject of the 2d article."-Doc. 102, p. 717.

To these authorities I may add that of Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State in 1800, who, in a letter dated November 19, 1824, says:

"If the relinquishment of these claims had not been made, the present French Government (1824) would be responsible; consequently the relinquishment by our own Government having been made in consideration that the French Government relinquished its demand for a renewal of the old treaties, then it seems clear that, as our Government applied the merchants' property to buy off those old treaties, the sums so applied should be reimbursed."

Mr. Chairman, I beg to ask with what show of reason or authority the President can declare that these men "never recognized the alleged obligation on the part of the Government" to make indemnity for the spoliations in question? The temerity of the President, in hazarding the observations he has made on this point is most wonderful, and to be accounted for only by the desperate character of the task which he had assumed.

Again, the President objects to the bill because it "proposes not to pay them, (the debts,) but to compound with the public creditors, by providing that, whether the claims shall be presented or not, whether the sum appropriated shall pay much or little of what shall be found due, the law itself shall constitute a perpetual bar to all future de. mands."

Sir, what kind of a reason is this? Is it more wrong to pay a part than to pay nothing? But the bill is founded upon the principle that the Government pays all that it received in fact from France, and all that it justly owes to the creditors. This is its judgment; and to prevent future demands for claims which it does not admit, and to make an end of the thing, it provides for full and final releases. Is there anything dishonorable in this? Is it not the course which honorable and careful men pursue every day in their own affairs? Besides, what is this to the President? If the creditors ask for the passage of this bill, and nothing more, what right has he to step in, and, as their self-appointed agent and representative, defeat the very thing which they desire to have done?

The objection, so much relied upon by the late Mr. Wright, of New York, and upon which the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. ORR] laid such stress-that war existed prior to 1800 between the United States and France, does not seem to have made a very strong impression upon the President; as I understand his message, he has virtually abandoned it. By the public law there must be actual, positive war, war in the strictest sense and in fact, to extinguish the ordinary obligations subsisting between nations. War, in this sense, had never existed between these countries; there had been hostilities and disturbances, but

not war. If war, when was it declared, and by whom? and by what treaty was it ended? The treaty of 1800 declares, in the preamble, that it was made, not to establish peace, but to "terminate differences." John Adams was President of the United States, and Napoleon Bonaparte First Consul of France in 1800. Mr. Adams said in 1823:

"To explain all the mysteries of that period never was and never will be in my power. It would require volumes to give a simple history of it. All that I can say of it is, there was war between St. Dennis and St. George. Each had an army in America, constantly skirmishing with each other, and both of them constantly stabbing me with lancets, spikes, and spears. My sOLE OBJECT WAS TO PRESERVE THE PEACE AND NEUTRALITY OF THE COUNTRY; AND THAT, I THANK GOD, I OBTAINED, at the loss of my power and fame with both sides."

And the First Consul declared at another time, speaking of the convention of 1800, that:

"The suppression of this article at once put an end to the privileges which France had by the treaties of 1778, and annulled the just claims which America might have made for injuries done IN TIME OF PEACE."— Gourgaud's Memoirs vol. ii. p. 95.

I submit it is hardly probable that war existed at this period without the knowledge of either of these magistrates.

And, in passing, I would thank you to notice what Bonaparte alleged to be the consideration paid by France for the release of these claims for spoliations.

The President further objects to the payment of these claims, that by the treaty of 1800 France released nothing to the United States, not even our obligation to her under the treaties of 1778 and 1788, and that as this Government received no consideration from France by that transaction, it, therefore, assumed no liability to its injured citizens-especially, as it had used proper diligence to recover what was due them. The President endeavors to maintain this proposition, by showing that on the 7th of July, 1798, Congress passed an act abrogating those treaties. Who ever understood before, by what school of publicists was it ever taught, that treaties, which are contracts between nations, could be annulled at pleasure by either party, simply upon its alleging a failure on the part of the other to keep its provisions? How easy after this, it will be for any nation with whom we may have a treaty, to avoid its obligations to us. It has only to resolve that a breach of the compact has been made by the United States, and then proceed, by its own legislation, to declare the treaty null and void. This act of 1798, was an act of retaliation, excused by the exigencies of the times, intended to advise France of our understanding of her acts of hostility, and to lead the way to an amicable adjustment of the matters in difference between the two nations. But, that the act of 1798 did ipso facto relieve us from all liability to France, under those treaties, was an idea which never entered into the head of any man. France denied that the treaties had been annulled, or made void, by any act of hers, or of the United States. And we find, that in 1800, when the convention was entered into, the parties at once proceeded upon the fact, that the treaties of 1778 and 1788, were set up by her as still subsisting. So it was understood by all the negotiators, and by both Governments, and hence provision was made therein for their abrogation. The quotations which I have made, and shall make, abundantly prove this, and stamp this specification as a piece of petty fogging, unworthy the Chief Magistrate of a great and honorable people.

Whether France had done enough to authorize the United States to annul the treaties, is not the question, but whether she admitted that she had. If not, she would, as she did, insist that they were in force, and demand our faithful observance of them. To put an end to this troublesome demand, we first offered to pay money. This was refused; and then we agreed to a release of the claims for indemnity.

There is another reason assigned why this bill ought not to pass, more extraordinary, if possible, than the one which I have just considered. The treaty (or convention, as it was called) of 1800 contained, among other articles, the following:

"ART. II. The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties not being able to agree at present respecting the treaty

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of alliance of 6th February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the convention of the 14th November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time; and, until they may have agreed upon these points, the said treaties and convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two countries shall be regulated as follows."

When the convention was presented to the Senate of the United States, that body agreed to it with this proviso:

"Provided, That the second article be expunged, and that the following article be added or inserted: It is agreed that the present convention shall be in force for the term of eight years from the time of the exchange of ratifications."

So that the clause which I have just read was, in effect, substituted for the second article as the convention was originally drawn. This alteration rendered it necessary to return the convention to the First Consul, by whom it was ratified, as amended, upon the condition contained in the following declaratory note:

"The Government of the United States having added in its ratification that the convention should be in force for the space of eight years, and having omitted the second article, the Government of the French Republic consents to accept, ratify, and confirm the above convention, with the addition importing that the convention shall be in force for the space of eight years, and with the retrenchment of the second article: Provided, That by this retrenchment the two States renounce the respective pretensions which are the object of the said article."

The history of the transaction is continued by the President in these words:

"The convention as thus ratified by the First Consul, having been again submitted to the Senate of the United States, that body resolved that they considered the convention as fully ratified,' and returned the same to the President for promulgation, and it was accordingly promulgated in the usual form by President Jefferson."

And upon this history the President makes the observations which I am about to read, and which I could devoutly wish for the honor of the American name, had never proceeded from her highest public functionary:

"Now, it is clear, that in simply resolving that they considered the convention as fully ratified,' the Senate did in fact abstain from any express declaration of dissent or assent to the construction put by the First Consul on the rethis, can be drawn from their resolution, it is, that they retrenchment of the second article. If any inference, beyond garded the proviso annexed by the First Consul to his declaration of acceptance as foreign to the subject, as nugatory, or as without consequence or effect. Notwithstanding this proviso, they considered the raufication as full. If the new proviso made any change in the previous import of the convention, then it was not full. And in considering it a full ratification they, in substance, deny that the proviso did, in any respect, change the tenor of the convention."

Then, sir, the American Senate, at that time the most august body upon earth, ratified a solemn treaty between this Government and France, in one sense-and meaning to be bound by it in that sense only-when they knew that it was understood by the other party in another and entirely different sense. A party, says Pothier, is bound by a contract in the sense in which he knew it was intended, and understood by the other. Such is the law of nations and of common honesty; and to suggest that such men as were in the Senate in 1800, were capable of the duplicity and bad faith involved in the President's construction of their action, is a gross and inexcusable libel, not only upon them, but upon the country. The President has affected great solicitude for the honor of our early statesmen; but, if they were capable of such conduct as he charges them with, they are beyond the reach of harm from this Congress or any other. They covered themselves with a degree of infamy from which no lustration in which ordiinary political sinners bleach like linen, can cleanse

them and invoked a condemnation

"Black as the damning drop let fall
From the denouncing angel's pen,
Ere Mercy weeps it out again."

Well could these men, if living, exclaim save us from such a defender! Sir, I hope I may not be deemed disrespectful in suggesting in this connection that the President should not allow an ex

ceeding jealousy for the honor of others to interfere with the taking care of his own. But, Mr. Chairman, thank God there is not the slightest foundation for the implied charge of duplicity and swindling on the part of the American Senate, and the Administration of Mr. Jefferson. The Senate and the Administration understood the convention as Bonaparte did-that the second article was retrenched, and the respective pretensions, which were the objects of that article thereby