Whether the abstention of England from the later European interference between China and Japan was the result of a policy of abdication deliberately adopted by or forced upon us, or whether it was the mere negation of policy, makes little practical difference in the result. We have to bear the consequences of our own negative, as France has to do in the case of Egypt. Possibly the paralytic action of the British agents abroad may have resulted from their ignorance of the change that had come over the mind of the Home Government. Futile efforts to cover their limbs with the rags of the old worn-out policy may explain much of the shiftiness which superseded orthodox diplomacy during the eventful years 1894 and 1895. That the long course of antiEnglish measures which emanated from the Russian and French legations in China were largely prompted by personal antagonisms, has been avowed by the principals themselves. The personal factor undoubtedly had an important bearing on the negotiation for the first indemnity loan in China, which was snatched out of English hands because they were English, almost when the pen had been dipped to sign the contract. Yet not solely because they were English, but quasi-official English. For if the financiers had been independent they would not have aroused the open hostility of the Russo-French officials to the pitch it actually reached. It was the British official behind that constituted the red rag which drove those infuriated bulls into the China shop, and led to Russia's forcibly assuming the role of guarantor of China. In the face of this unedifying record it would be presumptuous to indicate any means of recovering our lost influence in the Far East;

for, with the best intentions in the world, we do not appear to possess agencies competent to cope with the political forces which are now arrayed against us. In view of the world-shaping transactions that are taking place under our eyes, there is something pathetic in the appeal that we hear made to China to assert her independence, to guard her neutrality, and so forth; and the exhaustion of British policy finds its appropriate expression in the comfort that is taken in the arrival of a Belgian jurisconsult as adviser to the Tsungli Yamên. As if advice were the desideratum! Did not Siam possess the luxury of a Belgian jurisconsult when France dismembered her in 1893, regardless of all other interests, claims, and obligations?

Our wisest course under these circumstances would obviously be to discard the effete policy frankly and fall back on our true base -commercial interests pure and simple. There we would at least be on familiar ground, engaged in an enterprise which could be made intelligible to the public, and where great national interests could not easily be jeopardised by personal idiosyncrasies or hidden away among the skeletons of Government offices. Properly considered, Commerce is all in all to this country, the very breath of our national life. The pomp and circumstance of empire, our army and navy, law and police, and the rest of our administrative paraphernalia, are but the protective covering to the true lifework of the country, the mere shell of the oyster. And although it be impossible in the present state of the world to dissociate trade altogether from politics, it is obvious that the more we do so the fewer will be the points of friction between our

With this mere hint at the way in which our British interests are touched by the new situation created by Japan and Russia, we may glance at the further question, How the circumstances may be modified to our advantage. The attempt to answer it would lead far afield into regions of hypothetical strategy, and into matters more suited to the deliberations of a conclave than for literary discussion. If the problem had been, how to make the worst of the situation, our proceedings during the past few years would supply a fairly good solution; and some negative wisdom at least may be derived from chewing the cud of even such comparatively ancient history as that. Time was when the game was in our hands, though not for long. We could not rise to the occasion because we had no man at home or abroad competent to deal with it. The judgment of events consequently went against us by default, as has happened more than once-in Damaraland, for instance. It is far from agreeable to rake over the rubbishheaps of failure; but if pearls of policy may perchance lie buried there the operation becomes justifiable. Moreover, no true appreciation of the actual position of affairs can be had that does not embrace to some extent the antecedent circumstances.

In June 1894 Japan betrayed hostile designs against China. There was no dispute between the two countries, and the most laboured ingenuity, not on the part of the Japanese, but of their paid and unpaid counsel, has never been able to formulate any ground for the war that would not equally have served Cetewayo in his prime. Russia was too gravely affected to miss the true meaning of the movement. The threatened up

heaval was going to upset the balance of power in Asia, and bring dangers to the front which, in the natural course of events, might have slumbered for a generation. Russia was, as a matter of fact, much concerned to prevent the war, and took unusual pains to dissuade the Government of the Mikado from the invasion. A special communication from St Petersburg, communicated to the Japanese Foreign Minister in June, left no shadow of doubt as to the direction in which the vital interests of Russia were threatened, or as to the necessity which events might impose on her to defend those interests. At that juncture Russia softened towards England, holding out the hand of fellowship, and inviting cooperation in the maintenance of peace. It was the psychological moment sometimes dreamed of by political seers, but seldom recognised till it is past. England was dull of hearing and egregiously misinformed. Though she did in a perfunctory way make an attempt subsequently on her own account to bring about an accommodation, in which she had the moral support of Russia and of other Powers as well, it was doomed to failure through the inadequacy of her tools. What actually happened was, that while the British representative in daily conference with the Japanese Minister was expressing his confidence in the peaceful issue of their deliberations, a Japanese admiral was actually torpedoing in cold blood an English steamer conveying Chinese troops to Korea. meek acceptance of this outrage by the British Government gave the coup de grâce to British influence in the Far East; and it is a debatable question whether the lost position can ever be regained.

The

Whether the abstention of England from the later European interference between China and Japan was the result of a policy of abdication deliberately adopted by or forced upon us, or whether it was the mere negation of policy, makes little practical difference in the result. We have to bear the consequences of our own negative, as France has to do in the case of Egypt. Possibly the paralytic action of the British agents abroad may have resulted from their ignorance of the change that had come over the mind of the Home Government. Futile efforts to cover their limbs with the rags of the old worn-out policy may explain much of the shiftiness which superseded orthodox diplomacy during the eventful years 1894 and 1895. That the long course of antiEnglish measures which emanated from the Russian and French legations in China were largely prompted by personal antagonisms, has been avowed by the principals themselves. The personal factor undoubtedly had an important bearing on the negotiation for the first indemnity loan in China, which was snatched out of English hands because they were English, almost when the pen had been dipped to sign the contract. Yet not solely because they were English, but quasi-official English. For if the financiers had been independent they would not have aroused the open hostility of the Russo-French officials to the pitch it actually reached. It was the British official behind that constituted the red rag which drove those infuriated bulls into the China shop, and led to Russia's forcibly assuming the role of guarantor of China. In the face of this unedifying record it would be presumptuous to indicate any means of recovering our lost influence in the Far East;

for, with the best intentions in the world, we do not appear to possess agencies competent to cope with the political forces which are now arrayed against us. In view of the world-shaping transactions that are taking place under our eyes, there is something pathetic in the appeal that we hear made to China to assert her independence, to guard her neutrality, and so forth; and the exhaustion of British policy finds its appropriate expression in the comfort that is taken in the arrival of a Belgian jurisconsult as adviser to the Tsungli Yamên. As if advice were the desideratum ! Did not Siam possess the luxury of a Belgian jurisconsult when France dismembered her in 1893, regardless of all other interests, claims, and obligations?

Our wisest course under these circumstances would obviously be to discard the effete policy frankly and fall back on our true base -commercial interests pure and simple. There we would at least be on familiar ground, engaged in an enterprise which could be made intelligible to the public, and where great national interests could not easily be jeopardised by personal idiosyncrasies or hidden away among the skeletons of Government offices. Properly considered, Commerce is all in all to this country, the very breath of our national life. The pomp and circumstance of empire, our army and navy, law and police, and the rest of our administrative paraphernalia, are but the protective covering to the true lifework of the country, the mere shell of the oyster. And although it be impossible in the present state of the world to dissociate trade altogether from politics, it is obvious that the more we do so the fewer will be the points of friction between our

compensate us for the loss of the trade we may do with these three hundred millions of people, without charge or responsibility or any overtaxing of our imperial forces.

China has been obscured by distance, and the absence of romantic stimuli. A tithe of the energy expended on explorations among savages would have brought China near to our hearths and homes; a percentage of the good seed scat tered in the howling wilderness would, if sown in the arable land, have yielded rich harvests to our workers. Not that there has been any opening in China for capital on the grand scale, or any field, as yet, for the financial alchemy which converts the savings of the many into the fortunes of the few. But a more generally diffused interest in the country could hardly have failed to lead to the discovery of openings for the bond fide employment of capital in various channels which in the aggregate would have influenced the sentiment of the country. Can it be believed that if the British public had understood the importance of their Far Eastern relations, the Governments of 1885 and 1894 would have been so easily bluffed by the diplomats of China and Japan in the terms of the conventions concluded with, in one case at least, surreptitious haste and secrecy with those two countries respectively; or, if the same public had realised in 1894 how valuable was its inheritance in China, the Government of the day would have been allowed to throw up its hands and surrender those most precious interests to the keeping of our rivals?

As a general proposition, the advancement of trade depends on the enterprise of the traders, who are the best judges of the ways and means for promoting their

own interests. Where the intelligence or zeal of the commercial community fails, it is hardly possible for any auxiliary agency to supply what is lacking. Outside observers, who think they see where, and why, inroads are being made in the pre-eminent position long held by British merchants and manufacturers, speak to deaf ears when they propound their views to the parties primarily concerned. While always ready to listen to strictures on Government action, to denunciation of foreign bounties, invasion of patents and trade-marks, protective tariffs and adverse legislation generally, the industrial and commercial community does not take to heart reflections on its own shortcomings, which count for more than all the rest put together.

But while in the main successful trading is in the hands of the individual traders, there is also a full margin left where private initiative may be materially aided by Government and collective action. This happens to be specially the case with our trade with China, where Government regulation and commercial enterprise have gone hand in hand throughout, the one breaking down barriers, and the other following up the openings so made. The present circumstances of China demand the continuance of the combined action; indeed the need of it is now felt quite as much as when the Chinese wall of exclusion was battered down fifty years ago.

And the time is opportune for a new departure in the development of Chinese trade; for the events of the past two years have brought the true condition of the country into focus in the eye of the world, and forced the Government to lower its pretensions and submit itself to the exigencies of