so intimately associated, and which it is now proposed to subject to a brief review. To develop and establish this Inductive method, was evidently the grand aim of Bacon's philosophical writings. In seeking to carry out this cherished aim, while he rendered signal services to the cause of philosophy, though incidentally, rather than directly, he was betrayed, by that overweening importance which men are so apt to attach to their own cherished ideas, into great errors-errors, which, had not the good sense of the age corrected, or refused to imitate them, would have led philosophy into almost as unprofitable a method of inquiry, though of an opposite character, as that from which it was his aim to divert it. In short, Bacon enjoined a far too rigid adherence to induction or experiment, and he vastly overestimated its efficacy, as a method of acquiring knowledge.

I. Bacon enjoined a too rigid adherence to induction and experiment. There is no necessity for dwelling so long on experiment, as he recommended, in order to arrive at new facts or principles. It is sufficient to withhold assent to any conclusion, or theory, until it has been verified by experiment. Had philosophers adhered strictly to the directions of Lord Bacon, as to the true method for seeking to obtain knowledge, the human mind would have continued, almost as entirely, to mark time merely, instead of making a foreward march, in modern, as in ancient times.

By shutting up the mind, as Bacon recommended, against all theory or generalization, until there has been a long series of experiments and subexperiments, we deprive ourselves of many rare and valuable opportunities for enlarging the boundaries of our knowledge. By so doing, we deprive ourselves of the advantages to be derived from those moments of sudden inspiration, of transient illumination, when, by an immediate revelation from the great source of intelligence, it is permitted us to see, or when, by a spontaneous flash of intelligence, the mind gives itself light to see, clearly, into the surrounding darkness of the unknown. It was precisely in one of those moments of sudden inspiration, or transient illumination, as common report informs us, that Newton discovered the great law of universal gravitation, which completed the grand and brilliant series of modern discoveries in Astronomy. It was not by following out the rigid and elaborate system of induction, recommended by Bacon, that he made the discovery; nor was it by such a tardy and awkward process that Copernicus, Kepler, and Gallileo made theirs. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, as Newton lay there, in the orchard, the revelation came upon him, the great thought flashed upon his mind, that the same law, which caused the apple to fall, extended throughout the universe, and sustains the planets in their spheres, and starting up, like Archimides of old, he mentally exclaimed, "eureka," and set himself at once to work, to ascertain whether the idea was sustained by the known facts of planetary motion, whether the revelation from above was in accordance with the revelation from below, the conception of reason with the perception of sense, the deduction with the induction. Had Newton acted strictly upon Baconian principles, he might be still experimenting upon the grand problems of Astronomy, (had life been permitted him so long,)

Brewster, in his Life of Newton, throws some doubt upon the apple story. There is little reason to doubt, however, that the story is substantially, if not literally, true.

with but little prospect, perhaps, of a solution; nor is it easy to say, at how tardy and snail-like a pace scientific discovery would have progressed, under a strict adherence, universally, to those principles.

Bacon has, indeed, furnished us with a practical illustration, how little fitted he was, with the aid of his cherished method of philosophizing, for the work of specifically advancing the sciences, and how, in his vast general plans for the "Advancement of Learning," he contributed, in some particulars, to its retardation. For in the very work of his, styled, "The Advancement of Learning," we find him, in allusion to the now familiar idea, which had been then but recently demonstrated by Gallileo, and defended by Gilbert, that the earth revolves on its axis, stigmatizing "the extravagant idea of the diurnal motion of the earth, an opinion which we can demonstrate to be most false."*

it as

This rejection of the truth, as to the diurnal motion of the earth, may be regarded as the legitimate fruit of rigid Baconianism. In short, Bacon dwelt altogether too much on outward observation. He did not duly consider that knowledge comes from above as well as from below, from within as well as from without, from the internal as well as the external world, and that the intuitions of reason, not less than the reports of the senses, often reveal to us important truths, which we may very safely accept, subject to revisal and correction by subsequent examination and experiment.

II. Bacon vastly overestimated the efficacy of Induction as a method of acquiring knowledge. He seems, indeed, vainly to have imagined, that, by the rigid system of experimenting in quest of knowledge, which he prescribed, in the second book of the Novum Organum, he had invented a sort of rule or compass, which would equalize all minds, in their capacities, to acquire new knowledge, and destroy those different degrees of sagacity, which nature, in her eternal constitution of things, has prescribed for different minds, and which make the philosopher differ from the dunce.t He does not seem to have duly considered, what we have before remarked, that there is a logic of induction, as well as of deduction, and that unless the process of this logic be rightly performed, nay, unless the fundamental propositions on which it is grounded be correct, it may lead us just as far from the truth as the logic of deduction, which he labored so habitually, in all his philosophical writings, to depreciate.

Nay, Bacon does not seem to have discerned, what should have been apparent to an intellect so gifted as his, that the inductive method had not been neglected by philosophers before his time, so much because they did not recognize its value, as because their attention was mainly direeted to pursuits to which the deductive method of reasoning was better adapted to abstract speculation rather than to practical inquiry; a fact, which Macaulay, in his criticism on the life and character of Lord Bacon, has not failed to point out with his usual felicity and force §

Having said this much, as to what it was that Bacon aimed to accomplish, and the errors into which he was led in the prosecution of that

See Advancement of Learning, enlarged edition, book iii., ch. iv. It is a little singular, that Macaulay, in his somewhat searching and severe review of Bacon's life and character, does not notice this great mistake of his lordship. But Macaulay, though very severe upon Bacon, as a politician and man of integrity, was rather too deferential to him, as a philosopher-possibly because Macaulay was better qualified to judge of Bacon the politician, than of Bacon the philosopher. + See Novum Organum, book i., aphorism 122; also preface to same work. See ante, page 285, of this article.

§ See Macaulay's Essays, article on Bacon-also Edinburg Review for 1887.

aim-errors which consisted mainly in the exaggerated and too exclusive importance which he attached to intrinsically valuable ideas-it remains that we should notice, somewhat more particularly than we have as yet done, what it was that he really accomplished for philosophy.

In addition to what we have already said on this point,* or as amendatory thereto, it may be said, that while Bacon failed to accomplish the specific end at which he aimed, of furnishing a new method for acquiring knowledge, of special and extraordinary virtues, he effected a general end, of vast importance to Philosophy, by calling attention, generally, to a hitherto too much neglected method of inquiry-the Inductive method. It is not any specific work that Bacon achieved for science, or philosophy, that merits commendation, but rather a general influence which he exerted on the spirit of philosophy-a new general habit of philosophical inquiry, which he promoted and encouraged, and which he may be said to have permanently established. While he did not invent the Inductive method, he developed it into a prominence which it had never before attained. He fixed and established it so firmly in philosophical regard, that there is no danger that it will ever again be generally or extensively disregarded. In short, in the fashionable parlance of the day, Bacon may be said to have crystalized the Inductive method. As the previously unfixed and floating carbon of the mineral kingdom was, during the carboniferous period of geological history, crystalized and condensed into the vast coal deposits, which have remained ever since, and will remain for ages yet, to warm and vivify the inhabitants of earth, so the great mind of Bacon crystalized and condensed the previously floating and unsettled ideas of the intellectual kingdom, respecting the Inductive method of acquiring knowledge, into that great depository of his largest thoughts, the Novum Organum, where they will remain, for ages to come, a vast mine of thought and suggestion to subsequent philosophers.

Nor is it so much in exhibiting the specific utility of the Inductive method that the great merit of Bacon's greatest work, the Novum Organum, is conspicuous, as in exhibiting the importance, in general, of disabusing the mind of hastily formed notions, or idols, as he (or rather his translator into English) has styled them, and submitting it patiently to observation, with a view to its taking in the real form of things. In other words, the most distinguishing merit of the work consists in its injunctions as to the importance of striving patiently and laboriously to interpret nature, rather than, by anticipation, to guess at her meaning. His remarks on the various species of idols, or false appearances, by which the human mind is infested, and which he fantastically enough, though not inaptly, styles Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Den, Idols of the Market, and Idols of the Theater, are among the most valuable to be found in the compass of human language. As intimately related to

See ante, pages 285 and 286 of this article.

+ The term used by Bacon, in his Latin text, is idola, the plural of idolum, which comes from the Greek eidolon, which signified, with the Greeks, simply an illusion, or false appearance, and not an image worshiped with religious reverence. It is doubtless in the former sense that idola was intended by Bacon, and that the English word idol, as translated from it, should be understood in the Novum Organum. So also argued Hallam, but others have thought otherwise.

See Novum Organum, book 1., aphorisms 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45. By Idols of the Tribe, Bacon means those false notions that are common to mankind in general; by Idols of the Den, those that are peculiar to particular individuals; by Idols of the Market, those which are formed from reciprocal intercourse; by Idols of the Theater, he means those false notions or dogmas which have been authoritatively promulgated by particular systems of philosophy.

these, and in the same connection, are thrown out certain guards or cautions to the human mind, against too hasty conclusions, and with special reference to some of its peculiar predispositions to error, and liabilities to be deceived, which are deserving of the highest consideration. These are the really valuable ideas-the truly grand features of the Novum Organum.

In short, the real and essential tendency of Bacon's philosophy, especially as developed in its great culminating effort, the Novum Organum, is towards skepticism, doubt, and the suspension of judgment; and its true motto is well expressed, in the words of the illustrious sage himself, to be found in the Advancement of Learning, "If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties."*

By guarding the mind so rigidly against false impressions, his philosophy inevitably has this tendency, to skepticism, which is undoubtedly the right tendency, since every true philosopher is skeptical, if he be not a positive skeptic, and the beginning of wisdom is to doubt. For the evils of positive error are really greater than those of a mere negation of knowledge; and it is far better to have no notions at all than to have false ones, for these false notions stand in the way of receiving true ones. Finally, and still more in brief, the essential work of Bacon as a philosopher, consisted mainly in guarding the mind against false notions, rather than in aiding it (as he erroneously supposed be was doing upon a grand scale) to acquire true ones. It was to that extent, at least, a grand preparatory to a true and complete system of philosophy, since nothing better prepares the mind to receive truth than to clear it of error, and guard it against the intrusion of error. Moreover, his efforts have, indirectly rather than directly, contributed in no inconsiderable degree, doubtless, to the positive advancement of knowledge; for the good sense of the age has rejected his counsel to discard altogether the deductive or dogmatical method of inquiry, while it has accepted his instructions, to the extent of recognizing the importance of bestowing more attention on the inductive or empirical.

After this somewhat severe criticism on the philosophy of Bacon, it should be superfluous to remark, that the distinguished achievements of modern science are attributable, only in a very partial degree, to his exertions that he serves rather to mark the character of the philosophy of the age than to have determined it-that he embodied, in an extraordinary degree, its leading characteristics, (as did Aristotle those of his age,) rather than moulded the age into an embodiment of his characteristics that he was, in short, the outgrowth of his age, rather than his age the outgrowth of him.

That such was the true relation of Bacon to his age is abundantly proved by the fact, already adverted to, of the distinguished discoveries. that had been already made before the publication of his philosophical works; and by the further fact, that many of the most distinguished contributors to science subsequently thereto, have not testified to any important suggestion that they derived from him, and do not appear to have been at all indebted to him for their ideas. For, as Brewster, in his recent Memoirs of Sir Isaac Newton, tells us, that truly great discov

*See Advancement of Learning, book i., p. 88, of original work, and London edition of 1824.

erer in science did not, in his philosophical writings, once allude to the Novum Organum, nor to Lord Bacon.* All that was really valuable in the Novum Organum, or in the Inductive method, however, Newton attended to, most probably without having read that renowned work, or being aware what it contained, and he would no doubt have done so, just as much, had his own Principia Mathematica been written before as after the publication of the Novum Organum.

In view of these significant facts, it would surely be preposterous to assert that the present age is indebted to the philosophy of Lord Bacon for its most distinguished achievements, or its most distinguishing ideas -that Descartes or Leibnitz was the outcome of Bacon, or that the Principia of Newton was attributable to the Novum Organum.

But while Bacon is to be regarded rather as the outgrowth of his age than as the moulder of its character, it is to be borne in mind that, like other outgrowths, he reacted on the soil from which he sprang, and imparted to it no inconsiderable fertility. For, as Guizot has justly said of governments, that "they are, saving a powerful reaction, what the people make them," so it may be said of Bacon, that, saving a powerful reaction, he was what his age made him, or, to speak with more scientific precision, what the race from which he sprang, and the circumstances of the age, made him. And as the reaction of government on the society from which it springs is powerful, so was the reaction of Bacon on his age; and his influence has rather grown than diminished with time, having been greater, probably, during the 18th and 19th centuries than during the 17th, when it was first communicated.

By having embodied to so great an extent, and with such extraordinary power, many of the great characteristic ideas of his age, Bacon seems destined to exert an influence somewhat similar to that exerted by Aristotle, who so long reigned over the intellectual kingdom of man, though not by any means so great as that exerted by the philosopher of antiquity. A striking resemblance may indeed be detected between these two distinguished characters, in the parts which they have played in the intellectual history of mankind, and in the position which they occupy in the geographical profile, so to speak, of humanity-looming up into lofty prominence, the one near the close of the ancient, and the other near the commencement of the modern age, and both serving as conspicuous landmarks to indicate the progress of the race, and by which they have, to a great extent, shaped their course.

No two minds, perhaps, scarcely excepting that of Confucius, have ever exerted a greater or more lasting influence on the direction and character of human thought than Aristotle and Bacon. From the time of Aristotle to that of Bacon, human activity, in matters of philosophical speculation, as well as of scientific endeavor, with some partial exceptions, took its direction from the former, scarcely ever venturing out of the track which he pointed out, as, since the time of Bacon, it seems destined, although to a far less extent, to take the direction mapped out by him.

Indeed, it may be said, without any very great or questionable stretch

See Brewster's Memoirs of Newton, chap. 27, of vol. ii., pp. 403-4, of Boston edition of 1855. In this connection, the biographer of Newton makes some very just observations on the futility of Bacon's philosophy, as to its specific virtues as a method of acquiring knowledge, which fully sustain the ideas of our text. On this point, see particularly page 405 of vol ii. of the Memoirs.