Count de Bismarck to Mr. E. B. Washburne. VERSAILLES, January 28, 1871. SIR: I had the honor of receiving your answer, dated the 19th instant, to my two letters of 15th, relating to your correspondence with the United States legation in London. I should very much regret if you should have construed anything in these two letters so as to convey the indication of any complaint against you. Nothing, indeed, could be further from my thought, and I take pleasure in renewing the expression how deeply sensible I am of all the trouble you have in carrying on your correspondence with the authorities in Paris, and in taking care of our countrymen there. But the balloon letters having been brought officially under my notice by the military authorities, I thought it my duty to inform you of the reference made in those letters to your legation, and to that in London. The delay occurred now and then in the transmission of your dispatch-bags, is not occasioned by any doubt as to the right of your Government to correspond with you, but by obstacles it was out of my power to remove. I hope that for the future there will not be any more delay of that kind. I avail myself, &c., &c., V. BISMARCK. No. 355.] No. 102. Mr. Washburne to Mr. Fish. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris, January 30, 1871. (Received February 18.) SIR: The crisis has at last been reached. In my dispatch of a week ago, No. 351, I spoke of the discouraging state of things in Paris, but of the still resolute determination of the people not to surrender. I added, however, that the city might fall suddenly, and the siege be ended before my dispatch should reach you. The disturbances of Sunday, the 22d instant, and the additional news which the government received on Monday, of the substantial defeat of åll the outside armies, taken in connection with the utter impossibility to feed Paris but a few days longer-all taken together imperatively demanded immediate action on the part of the French authorities. Paris had held out beyond every reasonable calculation, and the population had suffered all the horrors of famine, cold, and bombardment. From the 27th of this month only seven days of provisions remained, limiting to each one only the small possible amount necessary to sustain human life. On Monday evening, a week ago, negotiations were commenced at Versailles between Mr. Jules Favre and the Count de Bismarck. Of course the greatest anxiety has existed in Paris as to what would be the result of those negotiations. The general idea has been that Paris, resisting to the end, would have to capitulate unconditionally. Such a thing as a general armistice was not contemplated, and while Paris should fall into the hands of the Prussians, it was supposed that the government of the national defense would still hold its existence in the provinces and continue the war à outrance. I was myself inclined to take the same opinion, and in view of the probable fact that in case of a surrender there would be no shadow of a government of France at Paris, I wrote to you in my No. 338, asking for instructions as to the course I should pursue in such an emergency. I thought that it would be necessary in such case to leave Paris and repair to the seat of the French government. Instead of the absolute surrender of the city and the military possession of it by the Prussians, we have the armistice, a copy of which, from the official journal, I have the honor to send you herewith. I do not see anything in the present situation which will necessitate my leav ing Paris to repair to Bordeaux, for the seat of government will remain here until such a time at least as the armistice shall expire and peace fail to be made. I also send you the decree of the government of the national defense convoking the national assembly at Bordeaux on the 12th proximo, and also fixing the number of delegates to the assembly. You will see that the number of delegates to the assembly is seven hundred and fiftythree, which I think is quite too large, particularly when it is considered that the assembly would have but one week in which to conclude the important work for which it has been convoked. We are now entering on a new and interesting phase of the events which have been convulsing, not only the belligerent powers, but the whole civilized world, for the last six months. It is to be seen whether a peace can be made on terms which will be acceptable by the French nation, or whether the war is to be indefinitely continued. You will be likely to receive full information by telegraph of the action growing out of this armistice and of the national assembly before this dispatch shall reach you, and I will not, therefore, indulge in any speculations as to the probable shape which things will take. I have, &c., [Inclosures not transmitted herewith.] E. B. WASHBURNE. No. 356.] No. 103. • Mr. Washburne to Mr. Fish. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris, January 30, 1871. (Received February 18.) SIR: I have the honor to send you herewith a copy of the reply of Count de Bismarck to the diplomatic corps in relation to the bombardment of Paris, without previous notice, together with a copy of the rejoinder of Mr. Kern. I have, &c., [Translation.] E. B. WASHIBURNE. VERSAILLES, January 17, 1871. Count de Bismarck-Schoenhausen, chancellor of the North German Confederation at Versailles, to Mr. Kern, minister of the Swiss Confederation at Paris. SIR: I have had the honor to receive the letter of the 13th of this month, signed by you and by the minister of the United States, as well as by several diplomatic agents formerly accredited to Paris, in which, invoking the principles of the law of nations, you request me to use my influence with the military authorities in order that such measures may be taken as will enable the fellow-countrymen of the signers of the letter to protect themselves and their property during the siege of Paris. I regret that it is impossible for me to admit that the reclamations which the signers of the letter have done me the honor to address to me, find in the principles of international law the authority necessary to justify them. It is undeniable that the determination, standing alone in modern history, to transform the capital of a great country into a fortress, and to make a vast fortified camp of its environs, inclosing nearly three millions of inhabitants, has created for those inhabitants a distressing state of things which is much to be regretted. The responsibility falls exclusively upon those who have chosen to make of this capital a fortress and a battle-field. Under all circumstances, those persons who have chosen their residence in a fortress, and continued of their own accord to reside there during the war, should have been prepared for the inconveniences which have ensued. Paris being the most important fortress in France, in which the enemy has concentrated his principal forces, which, from their fortified positions in the midst of the population, constantly attack the German armies by their sorties and by the fire of their artillery, no good reason can be alleged why the German generals should give up the attack upon this fortified position, or conduct their military operations in a manner which would be in contradiction with the object they have in view. I take the liberty to recall to you, in this place, that on our side nothing has been neglected to preserve the peaceful portion of the population belonging to neutral countries from the inconveniences and the dangers inseparable from a siege. On the 26th of September last, the secretary of state, M. de Thiele, addressed a circular upon this subject to the ministers accredited to Berlin, and I stated for my part, in a letter bearing date October 10th last, addressed to his excellency the Papal nuncio, and other diplomatic agents still residing at Paris, that the inhabitants would henceforth have to bear the effects of military operations. A second circular, dated October 4th last, attempted to show the consequences which must result to the civil population of Paris from a resistance prolonged to extremities. On the 29th of the same month the contents of this circular were communicated by me to the minister of the United States of America, whom I begged at the same time to communicate it to the members of the diplomatic corps. It results, from what precedes, that warnings and recommendations to leave the besieged city have not been wanting to the subjects of the neutral powers, although these warnings, inspired by a sentiment of humanity and by the consideration which we desire to show toward citizens belonging to friendly nations, are as little prescribed by the principles of international law as the permissions which were granted to pass our lines. The recognized usages and principles of the law of nations require still less that the besieger should notify the besieged of the military operations which he thinks it necessary to undertake in the course of the siege, as I have already had the honor to state as regards the bombardment, in a letter addressed to Mr. Jules Favre on the 26th of September last. It was evident that the bombardment of Paris must take place if resistance was prolonged, and it was therefore to be looked for. Although an example of a fortified city of such importance, and inclosing within its walls armies and material of war so numerous and abundant, was unknown to Vattel, he says upon this subject: “To destroy a city by shells and hot shot is an extremity which must not be resorted to without very strong reasons. But it is authorized, however, by the laws of war, when it is impossible to reduce otherwise an important place, upon which may depend the success of the war, or which may serve to inflict dangerous blows." In the present case, it would be the more unjustifiable to raise an objection against the siege of Paris, inasmuch as our intention is not at all to destroy the city, (which would, however, be permissible, according to the principle laid down by Vattel,) but to render untenable the central and fortified position where the French army prepares its attacks upon the German troops, and which serves them for a place of refuge after such attacks. I take the liberty finally to remind you, sir, as well as the other signers of the letter of the 13th instant, that after the warnings had been given, which I have recalled to your recollection, it was nevertheless permitted during whole months to those neutrals who made the request, to pass our lines without other restriction than their identity and their nationality should be certified, and that to this day our avantpostes place at the disposition of the members of the corps diplomatic, and of those persons whose presence is required by their governments or by their diplomatic agents, the safe conduct necessary for them to pursue their journey. Many of the signers of the letter of January 13th instant were notified some months since that they could pass our lines, and they have for a long time had the authorization of their respective governments to leave Paris. Hundreds of subjects of the neutral powers, whose representatives have addressed to us the same requests in their favor, are in a similar position. We have no authentic knowledge of the reasons which have prevented them from availing themselves of a permission which they have had for a long time; but if private communications are to be believed, it is the French authorities who have opposed their departure, and even that of the diplomatic representatives. If this information is correct, we can only recommend to those who are compelled against their will to remain in Paris to address their complaints and their protestations to the representatives of the existing power. Under all circumstances, I feel authorized, after what I have stated, not to admit, as far as the German authorities are concerned, th assertion contained in the letter of January 13th instant, that the countrymen of the signers have been prevented from withdrawing themselves from danger by the "difficulties opposed to their departure by the belligerents." We will even maintain, at this day, the permission accorded to the members of the diplomatic corps to pass our lines, considering this to be a duty of international courtesy, however difficult and injurious it may be to our military operations in the present state of the siege. As regards their numerons countrymen, I regret that I can not, at the present day, see any mode, other than the surrender of Paris, for them to withdraw themselves from the dangers inseparable from the siege of a fortress. If it were admissible in a military point of view to organize the departure from Paris of a portion of the population, which may readily be estimated at 50,000 men, with their families and their property, we should not have the supplies to feed them, or be able to provide for their transportation the means which would be necessary to enable them to cross the zone which the French authorities caused to be abandoned and stripped of all its resources before the investment of the city. We find ourselves in the sad condition of entire inability to subordinate military operations to the sympathies with which the sufferings of the civil population of Paris inspire us. Our line of conduct is rigorously prescribed by the necessities of war, and by the duty of guarding our troops against new attacks by the enemy's army. After our conscientious observance of the convention of Geneva, which we have given proof of under the most difficult circumstances, it would be superfluous to give the assurance that the German artillery does not direct its fire intentionally upon buildings occupied by women, children, and sick persons. In consequence of the very nature of the fortifications of Paris, and of the distance at which our batteries are still placed, it is as difficult for us to prevent damage by accident to buildings which we would desire to spare as to prevent wounds from being inflicted upon the civil population, which are to be deplored in every siege. If these painful accidents, which we sincerely regret, occur in Paris on a larger scale than in other besieged fortresses, we must conclude that either it should not have been converted into a fortress, or that it should not have prolonged its defense beyond a certain period. In no case can it be permitted to any people, after having declared war against its neighbors, to preserve its principal fortress from surrender by invoking the kind consideration of the enemy for the inoffensive population, for the foreigners who dwell in the fortress, or for the hospitals which may be there, in the midst of which its troops seek shelter, and where, after each of their attacks, they are enabled to prepare others under the shelter of these hospitals. I beg you, sir, to have the kindness to bring my reply to the knowledge of the signers of the letter of January 13th instant, and to receive the renewed assurance of my high consideration. V. BISMARCK. The minister of the Swiss Confederation at Paris to Count de Bismarck-Schoenhausen, chancellor of the North German Confederation at Versailles. PARIS, January 23, 1871. SIR: I had the honor to receive the reply addressed by your excellency, the 17th instant, to the note signed on the 13th of the same month by the members of the diplomatic corps at Paris, as well as by a certain number of members of the consular corps, in the absence of their respective embassies and legations. In accordance with the wish expressed by your excellency, I immediately communicated this reply to the signers of the note of January 13. I have been charged by their unanimous resolution to call your excellency's attention to certain errors contained in your reply. Your excellency informs the signers that by a circular, bearing date October 4, you endeavored to show the consequences which must ensue to the civil population of Paris from a resistance prolonged to its extreme limit, and you add, "On the 29th of the same month this circular was communicated by me to the minister of the United States of America, whom I begged at the same time to communicate it to the members of the diplomatic corps." After having made the necessary examination, Mr. Washburne declares that no communication expressing a wish of the kind has been received by him, and that this statement is erroneous. In another passage of your reply, your excellency expresses yourself as follows: "I believe myself authorized, in accordance with what I have just stated, not to admit (as far as the German authorities are concerned) the assertion contained in the letter of January 13, that the countrymen of the signers were prevented from withdrawing themselves from danger by the difficulties opposed to their departure by the belligerents." While acknowledging the readiness with which your excellency placed at the beginning of the siege "sauf conduits" at the disposal of persons belonging to neutral states, and not denying the fact that the French military authorities thought proper to revoke at the commencement of November permission before granted, it nevertheless results from the declaration of several members of the diplomatic and consular corps, that in the course of the same month your excellency informed them that the German military authorities had "resolved to grant to no one permission to cross the lines of the besieging troops." The signers of the note were therefore correct in declaring that "difficulties had been put in the way of the departure of the belligerents." Your excellency adds that, in accordance with private communications which you have received, the French authorities opposed the departure of the diplomatic representatives of neutral states. This fact not having been brought within the knowledge of any one of the chiefs of the diplomatie corps present at Paris, it may be assumed that these private communications were founded upon erroneous information. On submittting to a fresh examination the correspondence upon this subject, you will easily convince yourself, sir, of the accuracy of the corrections which I have had the honor to submit to you. As regards the substance of their request, it appears to the signers of the "note" of January 13 that the point of view in which the German military authorities have placed themselves is too widely different from their own, and that the refusal is conceived in too positive terms to permit that any further argument upon the principles and usages of the law of nations, should reach the desired conclusion. They cannot, however, omit to observe that your excellency principally endeavors to show, invoking the authority of Vattel, that the laws of war authorize, as a last extremity, the bombardment of a fortified city. The intention of the signers of the "note" of January 13 was not to contest this extreme right. They confine themselves to affirming, and they believe that they can maintain, in accord with the best authorities on modern international law, and with the precedents of the different periods, the rule that the bombardment of a fortified city should be preceded by notice. There remains, therefore, only to the diplomatic and consular representatives of the neutral states, in consequence of the duties which are imposed upon them by the gravity of the situation, and of the importance of the interests at stake-the duty to communicate to their respective governments the correspondence exchanged with your excellency, while always insisting upon the substantial foundation of their request. It may be permitted me, in conclusion, to express, in the name of the signers of the "note" of January 13, as well as in my own, my lively and sincere regret that the German military authorities could not resolve to reconcile the necessities of war with the wish to diminish the sufferings of the civil population of every nationality residing in Paris. I take this occasion to beg you to receive, sir, &c. KERN. No. 358.] No. 104. Mr. Washburne to Mr. Fish. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris, February 4, 1871. (Received February 23.) SIR: In transmitting my correspondence with Count Bismarck in relation to the dispatch-bag to you, one letter from me to him was omitted, and I have the honor to inclose you herewith a copy thereof, to be placed with the correspondence. I have, &c., E. B. WASHBURNE. Mr. E. B. Washburne to Count de Bismarck. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I beg leave to thank you for sending my dispatch-bag at an earlier period than heretofore. I am enabled thus to answer the dispatches of my Government to go out |
