THE CONFEDERACY.

REMARKS.

The following article from an able Southern pen, we give without commentary or curtailment, not because we mean to endorse its sentiments; but simply to give our Northern readers a true representation of the political philosophy and sentiment most prevalent in the South. The articles alluded and objected to by our correspondent are from the pen of an experienced lawyer and constitutionalist, who adds great practical experience

of the laws and political systems of the States. A comparison of the two articles in this number will be found highly instructive.-ED.

THOSE of your correspondents, Mr. Editor, who reside in remote parts of the Union, necessarily labor under the great disadvantage of often having their commumunications delayed until the subjects to which they refer have become somewhat passé, or have lost their novelty. The writer of the present essay, for instance, did not see your July number until the end of the month, and therefore could not sooner offer the remarks herewith sent, on the article entitled "The Republic," which appeared in that number. The writer of the above article wields an able pen, and has made the most of the argument in favor of the popular origin of the Constitution; though he advances his views with a confidence and dogmatism that must form an abatement with most readers from the general merits of the essay.

so in a republic the sovereign power of the people can rarely be confined within its prescribed and legitimate limits, but is sure ultimately to overleap, with the resistless force of a spring-flood, every landmark of the Constitution-which serves rather as a Nilometer to mark the steady and irresistible encroachments of the stream, than as a dyke to restrain it within its proper channel. This tendency to en

to profound learning the result of a life's study croachment, and necessary prepollency of the popular power in every government partaking of a free form, is but feebly counteracted under a federal system like that of this country, in which a representation of twenty-four independent, and so far disjoined states, is alone opposed to this concentrated, ever-increasing, and overwhelming power. The anti-federal influences, ever at work, to popularize and weaken the system, are yet further strengthened, and acquire daily force by the rapid augmentation and numerical magnitude of the general population; which being again spread over a wider extent of territory than was ever before subjected to the fasces of a republic, renders its claims to national attributes, or to the sovereignty, the more imposing and the more difficult to be resisted. It will thus be seen that under our complicated system, a variety of circumstances combine to give an undue influence to the democratic principle, and a mechanical momentum, if we may so phrase it, to the irregular and cometary movements of the popular mass, that occasions its encroachment on the starry system of the Union to be daily more felt and to be daily more formidable. To all these disturbing causes another has been added, which has had more influence than all the rest in deranging the action of the government and pushing from its stool the federal authority-already sufficiently "cribbed and confined" by the jealous and abundantly cautious provisions of the Con

The people, as being the acknowledged source of all power, not being responsible for their acts, excepting in so far as the evils by which they may be attended may tend to render them so, possess, even under ordinary circumstances, a political preponderance and sway adverse to the stability and duration of a system of so mixed a character and so artificially and delicately balanced as that of the United States. As in a constitutional monarchy | the influence of the crown, however jeal-stitution. We refer to the false and comously guarded against, ever proves too paratively new-fangled theory, advocated strong for the barriers set up to restrain it, ❘ by your correspondent, by which a nation

al origin is assigned to the Constitution; | in the language of this clause to coun

and the States which formed the Union, and on whose substantive and independent existence its duration depends, are quibbled down to mere municipal corporations, and considered as but twinkling satellites, revolving around the great central sun of the system, the General Government. Through the wide door thrown open by this theory, and the still further ingress afforded them by the large representation which they enjoy in the Congress of the United States, the people have rushed into the sanctuary and been enabled to surprise and overcome (if we may be allowed the metaphor,) the guards of the fair temple of Liberty, which, by its composite strength, and the exquisite skill with which the different orders of political architecture were blended in its structure into one harmonious and symmetrical whole, attracted the admiring gaze of the world, and seemed destined to endure forever. In this way an undue power and preponderance have been acquired by the people, as a mass, which they not only never enjoyed as colonies or under the old confederation, but which is wholly inconsistent with the character and incompatible with the existence of a federal form of yovernment, or one founded on a union of free and independent states. Apart from the evils which have resulted to the country from the adoption and prevalence of this mistaken theory-that it is mistaken is rendered sufficiently apparent from the circumstance that of the supposed people to whose action as a collective body the Constitution is assumed to have owed its origin, no trace is to be found, and no record remains except in the opening clause of the instrument, where, alone, the friends of this phantom nation have been enabled to discover any ground or authority for the hypothesis they support. Yet in this very clause the Constitution is declared to be the work of the people of the United States, and not of the united people of the States; and to have been adopted for the express purpose of rendering the union previously existing between them as separate sovereignties, more perfect; which could only be done by drawing still closer the ties which already thus bound them together as a confederacy of free and independent republics. There is surely nothing

tenance the idea, that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, or of the co-parties to it, to dissolve the confederacy, and form a new government, founded on a popular, instead of a federal, basis. Where is there an instance in history of a general felo de se a simultaneous suicide of this kind-by whole States, enjoying independence, freedom, and sovereignty; and this for the mere purpose of making room for a new government, which it was quite as easy for them to have created by retaining, as by destroying, their political existence. What possible inducement had the people of the separate and sovereign States to abdicate their power and authority, and lay them at the feet of a government, or rather idol, set up by their own hands; when the object to be accomplished by this infatuated nullification of themselves, could be quite as well attained by the simple appointment of a common agent, or federal fiduciary, accredited to other governments for the purpose of attending to their foreign affairs, and such other concerns of the partnership, which it would be less troublesome to them to transact through subordinates, than to take under their own management. That the government is an union of some sort, will not be denied; and as an union of the people with themselves is a manifest absurdity, it is only in their State capacity, or as distinct and independent communities, that they could enter into political alliance of any kind, or give those mutual guaranties and pledges to each other which they have so deliberately and solemnly done in the Constitution. To speak then of a government thus constituted, as one of popular origin, in the sense in which those terms are generally used, is a mere uncandid quibble, or an attempt to evade the force of plain facts, and the testimony of contemporary history. The Constitution is, indeed, of popular, but not of national, origin; the whole system, both State and Federal, resting on the people-not as a collective body-but as free, sovereign, and neighboring communities, confederated for mutual and general benefit. The legislatures of the States could not have formed a federal government of this kind, as they could not transfer, or in any manner alienate, the powers or functions | place in the formation of what chemists

delegated to them by the people. This is the reason why the States, after having assisted to frame the Constitution, did not attempt to ratify the instrument, but submitted it to the people, whom they had severally represented in the Convention from whom it emanated. The clause, indeed, by which the powers not delegated to the government by the Constitution, "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people;" sufficiently indicates the federal origin of the instrument, as no such reservation would have been necessary, had it emanated from the people in their collective character.* The power or sovereignty of the people, being inherent and inalienable, requires not to be specially reserved, and hence no such saving clause is inserted, or to be found, in any part of the State constitutions. The dissolution of long existing governments, and the off-hand formation of a nation, are not quite such easy processes, Mr. Editor, as your correspondent supposes them to be, as the jealousy manifested by the States towards each other in the arrangements and compromises of the Constitution plainly show and convincingly prove. But while, as we have already said, a nation cannot unite with itself, an union of States may be readily formed; but it is obvious that it must be composed of distinct and sovereign communities, preserving each its separate attributes and independence; as otherwise, the so-called Union would prove a real dissolution of their political existence, or a coalescence of different and jarring elements into one civil body, hastily formed, incompact, and incapable of long duration. The process in such a case would be similar to that which takes

* This the author himself admits in the follow

ing passage: "It is true the power is not granted or retained by the people. And there needed no record of the fact to show it."

† As appears in the following passage: "The powers of this government were chiefly of the kind called national; and the Constitution was, in that respect, a consolidated union of the particular States." Quite an off-hand and easy operation this, by which thirteen States were consolidated into one; and communities of people removed a thousand miles from each other, and differing in

origin, religion, and habits, were summarily amalgamated and fused into a nation, one and

term a neutral mixture, which acquires and exhibits qualities wholly different from those of the original ingredients of which it is composed. The Union, then, which it was the object of the Constitution to render "more perfect," would have been dissolved the instant that the States either lost or parted with any of the high and essential attributes, by virtue of which they were enabled to enter into those engagements, and afford those firm guaranties and pledges to each other which render the compact mutually advantageous and reciprocally binding upon them. The Constitution does not comprise a surrender of these attributes, but a delegation of powers, revocable, limited, and stipulative, as they are deprived of all sanction, and cease to be available to the general government, the instant that the latter either wilfully transcends, or ignorantly misuses them. As the people, in forming their State constitutions, did not part with any portion of their inherent sovereignty, or original rights and attributes; neither did they do so in framing that greater federal charter, in which they have delegated the exercise of the same high powers to their common agent, the general government. The people of the States, acting in their separate and independent capacity, have in this way created two distinct and equally accredited agents. First, the local governments, who form a species of ministers of the interior, amenable to them respectively, and acting under their immediate supervision and control; and secondly, the federal government - their joint and general agent, appointed to manage the foreign affairs, and responsible to them only in their federative character. The communities, therefore, of which the States are composed, form, under this view, a confederated people, and not a collective body or nation, as is contended by your correspondent, and as was maintained by Mr. Webster, in the celebrated "encounter of wits" between that great senator and the illustrious Hayne, whose eloquence in that debate still shows, like the after-glow of the descended sun, the place where a luminary has left the sky. Your correspondent maintains that "there are some truths which no man is at liberty to ques

tion, or to claim charitable construction of his conduct in the matter, if he does. "The federal system," he tells us, " is a government, and not a confederacy, or league of friendship." This is one of those truths. It is a government established by the people, as its own caption declares, and as the historical fact of its ultimate adoption shows conclusively. This is another. Hayne, however, and Calhoun, and others of our great statesmen, have felt themselves at liberty to question these alleged truths; and for ourselves, humble as we are, we claim a "charitable construction of our conduct," in venturing to follow their example.

he is something more, or properly, the President of the People, and not a mere representative, or the single executive officer of the government, charged with the plain and limited duty, of carrying into effect, the measures of Congress. Those who support these innovatory doctrines; do not see very clearly, we think, where they are carrying them, and to what they will lead. In changing the federal mode of electing the President, by electors chosen by the legislatures of the States, and giving it to the people; (as if it was in the power of the demagogues who have promoted this innovation to give the people anything) -a stride was made towards consolida

Your correspondent first assumes, that ❘tion, which will soon be followed by the

the federal system, is not a confederacy; which is pretty much like saying, that a monarchical government, is not a monarchy.* A confederacy, he will probably admit, is a system; but a federal system he tells us, is not a confederacy. Be it so, we will not stop to chop logic with your correspondent on this point; but will proceed to notice his next position, or the second inexpugnable truth which he thinks no man is at liberty to questionwhich is, that the government was established by the people. Now, though according to our casuist, "a federal system is not a confederacy;" we think he will admit, that a popular, is not necessarily a national government. We then fully agree with him, that the Constitution was established by the people; but must be permitted to add the qualification, that it was by the people of the different States, acting in federal conventions, and not as a national body. Among the other results of the popular theory, we now find the President claiming to be the Representative of the People-a pretension, under color of which, a Jackson and a Polk, arrogated to themselves, legislative functions, and unceremoniously used the Veto power, as a casting vote on every measure of Congress, that came in conflict with their party views, or that interfered with any of the pledges which they had chosen to give their partisans before coming into office. This, however, was a modest pretension, for according to your correspondent,

* A monarchy so called is not always a monarchy proper, nor a federal government a confeder

acy proper.-Ed.

VOL. IV. NO. III. NEW SERIES.

heaping of further tribute upon the altar of this false god, or national idol, who has already drawn off so many worshippers from that sacred Federal Shrine, at which the patriots and sages of the Revolution knelt, and on which they swore to devote their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, to the cause of Independence, Liberty, and the Union.

Your correspondent, (we wish he had adopted a signature,) uses somewhat strange language in the following passage, which is indeed the commencement of a strain of unintelligible reasoning, and metaphysical refinements, in which the writer seems as much lost, as every reader must find himself to be, who attempts to follow him.

"The States," he maintains, "are in no respect the constituents of federal senators, much less of other functionaries in the federal system, whose election is by other agencies, or by the people directly." On this strange position, we have only to remark, that such at least is not the account given of the Constitution and purposes of the Senate, by the writers of the "Federalist;" and we may safely leave the author of the above paradox, "to battle the watch" with Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, with whom he is at open war, in many other parts of his essay; as we might easily show, if we had time for the purpose. In the ensuing extract, we have an attempt to explain this new reading of the Constitution; which, however, we think, rather serves to "darken council," than to enlighten the reader, or extricate the writer from the labyrinth of his constitutional

20

metaphysics. "It is true, our federal senators have their appointments from the State legislatures. But they are not the servants of those legislatures, any more than members of the lower house of Congress are servants of the particular local districts that elect them. The rule of service and of representation is not settled by forms of constituency; it has absolutely nothing to do with them. Members of Congress have as broad a field of duty as the chief magistrate himself; their representative character is as large as his. How belittling to hold them up as tools of the particular district electors. On that principle, the federal judges would be tools of the President and Senate; federal senators tools, not of the States, but of their respective legislative houses, &c. &c." All this appears to us, is a deliberate mistification of a plain subject; it being sufficiently obvious that the people of the States, have through the Constitution, delegated to the President and Senate, or rather imposes on them the duty of appointing the federal judges; who, therefore, as your correspondent very truly observes, with out apparently understanding "the reason why," are not the tools of those from whom they received their appointment. The writer being a consolidationist, is of course, also latitudinarian in his mode of construing the Constitution, or in his views as to the rules which should govern its interpretation. "A good deal," he observes, "depends upon the rule of construction, to be applied to the special grants of power, by which the officers of the federal economy have been endowed. Some will have it that they must be taken strictly. This, however, is a comparatively modern notion, and of party origin.

**

Why are these, (the actual grants of power,) to be narrowed down to limits less than a fair and liberal criticism would have assigned them? Is it because the people are the grantors? Nay, but for whose ben- | efit? Admit the people have raised the trusts of all federal officers; have they not done it for their own advantage exclusively? And so to every beneficial purpose, they are grantees also. And then the

terpreting their grants with rigor, is counterbalanced by a reason of equal force on the other, for a liberal and generous construction of them, to the end that the people's settlement thus made on themselves, (the language is professional, but descriptive and true,) may not be disappointed." Thus, the only rule of legislation that need be observed by the member, is, that his measures should be professedly designed to promote the good of the people; a sufficiently liberal rule certainly, and one that has the advantage of rendering constitutional provisions, and even any legal restraints upon those in power, wholly unnecessary, or mere inconvenient obstacles in their way, that hamper their actions, and prevent them from benefiting the nation and advancing its interests as effectual as they might otherwise do. Ulysses had the comfort of being assured by the Cyclops, (who would thus seem to have had some touch of kindness about them;) that he should be the last he would devour intending, no doubt, thereby, to leave him the choice of being the first, if this alternative should happen to have his preference. The people of this country, may perhaps, in the end, have something of a similar choice left them, between disunion and consolidationthough we trust that matters have not come to that pass; and, as according to an old adage, the feeling of despair should never be encouraged by the friends of the Republic, we shall be the last to express any views calculated to dishearten the patriot, or give confidence to the enemies of our freedom and Union. It is to be hoped, however, that the people will reflect with fear and awe, that the stream of liberty, which bears on its bosom the ark of their safety and happiness; if not carefully confined within its proper channel-ever ends, whatever course it may deviously take-in the Dead Sea of Despotism-on whose shore no flower blooms, and whose waters spread over the ruins of many an engulfed empire; or of those nations whose crimes and follies have provoked the wrath, and called down on their heads

: supposed reason, on the one hand, for in- | the avenging judgment of Heaven.

ATHENION.