Page images
PDF
EPUB

were appointed by the local boards. No regular method of recruiting the corps of officers existed.

This compromise was in itself a bad system. With the exception of the board of North Holland, which was supported by the wealth of Amsterdamn, the admiralties were commonly distressed for money. Unity of action was difficult to obtain. Much of the work of convoy which the state squadrons should have performed was thrown in the 17th century on directorates (Directiën) of merchants who fitted out privateers at their own expense. When there was no stadtholder, the local governing bodies trenched on the authority of the states-general, and indulged in a great deal of favouritism. In one respect the navy of the Dutch republic might have been taken as a model by its neighbours. The feeding of the crews was contracted for by the captains, who were required to enter into securities for the execution of the contract, and who had a reputation for probity. The Dutch crews, being better fed and looked after than the English, suffered less from disease. The clumsy organization of the Dutch navy put it at a disadvantage in its wars with England, but the seamanship of the crews, their good gunnery, and the great ability of many of their admirals made them at all times formidable enemies. No organic change was made till 1795, when the victories of the French revolutionary armies led to the formation of the Batavian republic. The five admiralties were then swept away and replaced by a committee for the direction of naval affairs, with a unified administration, organized by Pieter Paulus, a former official of the board of the Maas. As Holland was now swept into the general convulsion of the French Revolution, it followed the fortunes of France. Its navy, after belonging to the Batavian republic, passed to the ephemeral kingdom of Holland, created by Napoleon in favour of his brother Louis in 1806 and annexed to France in 1810. The Dutch navy then became absorbed in the French. After the fall of Napoleon a navy was created for the kingdom of the Netherlands out of the Dutch fragments of the Imperial force.

The United States.

the number of vessels was reduced one-half, and no additions were made until 1797, when the "Constitution," "United States" and "Constellation" were built. The navy was at first placed under the war department, but a navy department with a secretary of its own was created in 1798. From 1815 to 1842 the secretary was aided by a board of commissioners chosen from among the naval officers, but in the latter year the department was reorganized into five bureaus, which were increased to eight in 1862. Each has a naval officer at its head. They deal with navigation, ordnance, equipment, navy yards, medicines, provisions, steam engineering and construction. The excellent naval academy at Annapolis was founded in 1845 by the then secretary of the navy, G. Bancroft. The war college for officers at Coasters Harbor, Newport, R.I., dates from 1884. The Balance of Navies in History.

The five navies above discussed claim special notice on various grounds: the British, Dutch and French because they have been leaders and models; the Spanish because it has been closely associated with the others; the American because it was the first of the extra-European sea forces. But these great examples by no means exhaust the list of navies, old and new, which have played or now play a part. Every state which has a coast has also desired to possess forces on the sea. Even the papacy maintained a fighting force of galleys which took part in the naval transactions of the Mediterrancan for centuries. The Turkish sultans have fitted out fleets which once were a menace to southern Europe. But in a survey of general naval history it is not necessary to give all these navies special mention, even though some of them have a certain intrinsic interest. Some, the Scandinavian navies for instance, have been confined to narrow limits, and have had no influence either by their organization, nor, save locally, by action. Others again have been the purely artificial creation of governments. Instances of these on a small scale are the navies of the grand duchy of Tuscany, or of the Bourbon kings of Naples.

Russia.

A much greater instance is the navy of Russia. Founded by Peter the Great (1689-1725), it has been mainly organized and has been most successfully led by foreigners. When the Russian government has desired for political reasons to make a show of naval strength, it has been numerous. In 1770, during the reign of Catherine II. (1762-1796), a Russian fleet, nominally commanded by the empress's favourite Orloff, but in reality directed by two former officers of the British navy, John Elphinston (1722-1785) and Samuel Greig (17351788), gained some successes against the Turks in the Levant. But when opposed to formidable enemies, as in the Crimean War, it has either remained in port, or has, as in the case of the war with Japan (1904-1905), proved that its vitality was not in proportion to its size.

The innumerable navies of South American republics are small copies of older forces.

The American navy came into existence shortly after the Declaration of Independence. As early as October 1775 Congress authorized the construction of two national cruisers, and, at the same time, appointed a marine committee to administer naval affairs. The first force, consisting of purchased vessels, badly fitted and built, and insufficiently equipped and manned, embraced two ships of 24 guns each, six brigs carrying from 10 to 12 guns, two schooners each with 8 guns, and four sloops, three of 10 guns and one of 4 guns. On December 22nd a personnel of officers was selected, one of the lieutenants being the well-known Paul Jones. Esek Hopkins was made commander-in-chief, but, having incurred the censure of Congress, he was dismissed early in 1777, and since then the title has never been revived except in the person of the president. In November 1776 the grades of admiral, vice-admiral, rear-admiral and commodore were assimilated in rank and precedence to relative army titles, but they were never created by law until 1862. During the war a number of spirited engagements occurred, but there was a great lack of efficient material at home, and agents abroad were not able to enlist the active sympathies of nations or rulers. Benjamin Franklin did manage to equip one good squadron, but this was rendered almost useless by internal dissensions, and it required the victory of Paul Jones If we look at the relations which the navies of the modern in the "Bon Homme Richard" over the "Serapis " to bring world have had to one another, it will be seen that the great about any tangible result for the risk taken. During the war discoveries of the later 15th century shifted the seat 800 vessels of all classes were made prizes, but the navy lost of naval power to the ocean for two reasons. In the by capture 11 vessels of war and a little squadron of gunboats first place they imposed on all who wished to sail the on the lakes; and, with 13 ships destroyed to avoid capture wider seas opened to European enterprise by Vasco by the British, 5 condemned, and 3 wrecked at sea, the country de Gama and Columbus the obligation to use a vessel which was practically without a naval force between 1780 and 1785. could carry water and provisions sufficient for a large crew during Owing to the depredations upon commerce of the Barbary a long voyage. The Mediterranean states and their seamen powers, Congress in 1794 ordered the construction of six frigates, were not prepared by resources or habit to meet the call. But prescribing that four of them should be armed with 44 guns there was a second and equally effective reason. The powers and two with 36 guns; but, the Berbers having made peace. I which had an Atlantic coast were incomparably better placed

The 19th century did indeed see the rise of three navies, which are of a very different character-the Italian, which was the result of the unification of Italy, the German, which followed the creation of the German Empire, and the Japanese. Germany, Italy, But all three are contemporary in their origin, and Japan, have inevitably been modelled on older forces the Austria. British and the French. With them must go the Austrian navy, excellent but unavoidably small.

Influence of sea power.

than the Italian states, or the cities of the Baltic, to take | fleet at Sebastopol, and proving the weakness of the Baltic advantage of the maritime discoveries of the great epoch which stretches from 1492 to 1526. In the natural course the leadership fell to Portugal and Spain. Both owed much to Italian science and capital, but the profit fell inevitably to them. The reasons why Spain failed to found a permanent naval power have been given, and they apply equally to Portugal. Neither achieved the formation of a solid navy. The claim of both to retain a monopoly of the right to settle in, or trade with, the New World and Asia was in due course contested by neighbouring nations. France was torn by internal dissensions (the Wars of Religion and the Fronde) and could not compete except through a few private adventurers. England and Holland were able to prove the essential weakness of the Spaniards at sea before the end of the 16th century. In the 17th century the late allies against Spain now fought against one another. Her insular position, her security against having to bear the immense burden of a war on a land frontier, and the superiority of her naval organization over the divided administration of Holland, gave the victory to Great Britain. She was materially helped by the fact that the French monarch attacked Holland on land, and exhausted its resources. Great Britain and France now became the competitors for superiority at sea, and so remained from 1689 till the fall of Napoleon in 1815.

During this period of a century and a quarter Great Britain had again the most material advantage: that her enemy was not only contending with her at sea, but was engaged in endeavouring to establish and maintain a military preponderance over her neighbours on the continent of Europe. Hence the necessity for her to support great and costly armies, which led to the sacrifice of her fleet, and drove Holland into alliance with Great Britain (Wars of the League of Augsburg, of the Spanish Succession, of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War). During the War of American Independence France was in alliance with Spain and Holland, and at peace on land. She and her allies were able to impose terms of peace by which Great Britain surrendered positions gained in former wars. But the strength of the British navy was not broken, and in quality it was shown to be essentially superior.

The French Revolution undid all that the government of France had gained between 1778 and 1783 by attention to its navy and abstinence from wars on land. The result of the upheaval in France was to launch her into schemes of universal | conquest. Other nations were driven to fight for existence with the help of Great Britain. In that long struggle all the navies of Europe disappeared except the French, which was broken by defeat and rendered inept by inaction, and the victorious British navy. When Napoleon fell, the navy of Great Britain was not merely the first in the world; it was the only powerful navy in existence.

The pre-eminent position which the disappearance of possible rivals had given to Great Britain lasted for several years unchallenged. But it was too much the consequence of a combination of circumstances which could neither recur nor endure. The French navy was vigorously revived under the Restoration and the government of Louis Philippe (the periods from 1815 to 1830 and 1830 to 1848). The emperor Nicholas I. of Russia (1825-1855) built ships in considerable numbers. As early as 1838 the fear that the naval superiority of Great Britain would be destroyed had already begun to agitate some observers. The "extremely reduced state" of the British navy, and the danger that an overwhelming force would be suddenly thrown on the English coast, were vehemently set forth by Commander W. H. Craufurd, and by an anonymous flag-officer. The peril to be feared, it was argued, was an alliance between France and Russia. In 1838 the British navy contained, built and building, 90 ships of the line, 93 frigates and 12 war steamers; the French, 49 of the line, 60 frigates and 37 war steamers, including armed packets; Russia, 50 of the line, 25 frigates and 8 steamers; the United States, 15 of the line, 35 frigates and 16 war steamers. The agitation of 1838 passed away, and the Crimean War, entailing as it did the destruction of a great part of the Russian

[ocr errors]

fleet; and having, moreover, been conducted by an alliance of
France and Great Britain against Russia, would seem to have
shown that the anxieties of 1838 were exaggerated. But the
rivalry which is inherent in the very position of states possessing
sea coasts and maritime interests could not cease. The French
imperial government was anxious to develop its navy. By the
construction of the armoured floating batteries employed in
bombardment of Kinburn in October 1855, and by the launch
of the first seagoing ironclad "La Gloire" in 1859, it began a
new race for superiority at sea, which has shown no sign of
slackening since. The launch of the "Gloire" was followed by
political events in Europe which brought forward new com-
petitors, while great navies were developed in America and Asia.
The year 1871 was the beginning of a vast growth of naval
armaments. It saw the completion of the unity of Italy and the
formation of the German empire, two powers which Growth of
could not dispense with strong fleets. But for some modera
years the Italian and German navies, though already rivalry la
in existence, were still in a youthful stage. The rapid arma
growth of the United States navy dates from about
1890, and the Japanese is a few years younger. France, Russia
and Great Britain, in answer to them, began the race in which
the efforts of each had a stimulating effect on the others. Though
the alliance between France and Russia was not formed till
later, their common interests had marked them out as allies
from the first, and it will be no less convenient than accurate to
treat Great Britain and the partners in the Dual Alliance as for
some time opposed to one another.

ments.

England
and the

Dual
Alliance.

"

In the general reorganization of her armaments undertaken by France after the war of 1870-71, her navy was not neglected. Large schemes of construction were taken in hand. The instability of French ministries, and the differences of principle which divided the authorities who favoured the construction of battleships from those who were partisans of cruisers and torpedo-vessels, militated against a coherent policy. Yet the French navy grew in strength, and Russia began to build strong vessels. As early as 1874 the approaching launch of a coast-defence ironclad at Kronstadt (the "Peter the Great" designed by the English constructor Sir E. J. Reed) caused one of the successive "naval scares which recurred frequently in the coming years. It was, however, largely fictitious, and passed away without producing much effect. In 1878 the prospect of a war arising out of the Russian and Turkish conflict of that year, again stirred doubts as to the sufficiency of her naval armaments in England. Yet it was not till about 1885 that an agitation for the increase of the British fleet was begun in a consistent and continuous way. The controversy of the succeeding years was boundless, and was perhaps the more heated because the controversialists were not controlled by the necessity for using terms of definite meaning, and because the lists published for the purpose of making comparisons were inevitably of doubtful value; when ships built, building and ordered to be built, but not begun, were counted togetheror as not infrequently happened, were all added on one side, but not on the other. The belief that the British navy was not so strong as it should be, in view of the dependence of the British empire on strength at sea, spread steadily. Measures were first taken to improve the opportunities for practice allowed to the fleet by the establishment of yearly naval manœuvres in 1885, and the lessons they afforded were utilized to enforce the necessity for an increase of the British fleet. In 1888 a committee of three admirals (Sir W. Dowell, Sir Vesey Hamilton and Sir R. Richards), appointed to report on the manœuvres of that year, gave it as their opinion that "no time should be lost in placing the British navy beyond comparison with that of any two powers." This verdict met a ready acceptance by the nation, and in 1889 Lord George Hamilton, then first lord of the admiralty, introduced the Naval Defence Act, which provided for the addition to the navy within four and a half years of 70 vessels of 318,000 tons at a cost of £21,500,000. The object was to obviate the risk of sudden reductions for reasons of economy in the building vote.

Later experience proved that the practice of fixing the amount to be spent for a period of years operated to restrict the freedom of government to make additions, for which the necessity had not been foreseen when the money was voted. But the act of 1889 did effect an immediate addition to the British fleet, while as was inevitable it stimulated other powers to increased efforts.

The rivalry between Great Britain and the states composing the Dual Alliance may be said to have lasted till 1904, when the course of the war in the Far East removed Russia from the field. It must be borne in mind that during the latter part of these twenty years Russia was largely influenced by the desire to arm against the growing navy of Japan. Comparisons between the additions to the fleets made on either side, even when supported by a great display of figures, are of uncertain value. Number is no sufficient test of strength when taken apart from quality, distribution, the command of coaling stations-which are of extreme value to a modern fleet-and other considerations. But the respective lists of battleships supply a rough and ready standard, and when taken with the number of men employed and the size of the budgets (both subject to qualifications to be mentioned) does enable us to see with some approximation to accuracy how far the rivals have attained their desired aims. In 1889, before the passing of the Naval Defence Act, the British navy contained 32 battleships of 262,340 tons. The united French and Russian fleets had 22 of 150,653 tons: of these 17 were French, 7 being vessels of wood plated with iron and therefore of no value when exposed to the fire of modern explosives. This is but one of many examples which might be given of the fallacious character of mere lists of figures. In 1894, when the Naval Defence Act had produced its effect, the comparative figures were: for Great Britain, 46 ironclads (or battleships) of 441,640 tons, and for the Dual Alliance 35 of 270,953-in which, however, the seven wooden vessels were still included. France and Russia had then large schemes of new construction60,300 tons of ships over 10,000 tons for France, and 78,000 tons for Russia. The British figure was 70,000 tons. But the French and Russian list included mere names of vessels, of which the plans were not then drafted.

The rivalry in building went on as eagerly after 1894 as before. At the beginning of 1904 Great Britain had 67 battleships of 895,370 tons, as against 57 of 635,500 belonging to the powers of the Dual Alliance. The difference in favour of Great Britain was therefore 10 battleships, and 259,870 tons. Vessels not ready for service were included in the list, which therefore includes potential as well as actual strength. The balance in favour of Great Britain was less in 1904 than it had been in 1885 in mere numbers. During this period the naval budget of Great Britain had risen from £12,000,000 in 1885 to £34,457,500 in 1903-1904. The number of men employed had grown from 57,000 to 127,000. The figures for the Dual Alliance cannot be given with equal confidence. France had transferred the troupes de la marine or colonial troops from the navy to the army, which introduced a confusing element into the comparison, and the figures for Russian expenditure are very questionable. The total credit demanded for the French navy in 1890, the year after the passing of the British Naval Defence Act, was frs. 217,147,462. By 1903 the sum had risen to frs. 351,471,524. The Russian figures for 1890 are not attainable, but her budget for 1903 was £11,067,889 sterling. A comparison in numbers of men available is wholly misleading, since the British navy contains a large number of voluntarily enlisted men who serve for many years, and a small voluntary reserve, while France and Russia include all who are liable to be called out for compulsory service during a short period. There is no equality between them and the highly trained men of the British navy. The immense increase in its staff represents an addition to real power to which there is nothing to correspond in the case of continental states.

While this vast growth of naval power was going on in Great Britain, France and Russia, other rivals were entering into the lists with various fortunes. Italy may be said to have been the first comer. Her national navy, formed out of the existing squadrons of Sardinia, Tuscany and Naples, had stood the strain

Competi

tion of
Gew
Davies:
Italy.

of war in 1866 very ill. The conditions in which the unity of the country had been achieved during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, together with the obvious need for a navy in the case of a nation with a very extended sea coast, animated the Italians to great and even excessive efforts. Their policy was controlled by the knowledge that they could not hope to rival France in numbers, and they therefore aimed at obtaining individual vessels of a high level of strength. Italy may be said to have set the example of building monster ships, armed with monster guns. But she was unable to maintain her position in the race. The too hopeful finance in which she had indulged in the first enthusiasm of complete political unification led to serious embarrassment in 1894. Her naval budget sank from £4,960,000 in 1891 to £3,776,845 in 1897-1898, and only rose slowly to £5,037,642 in 1905-1906. As a candidate in the race for naval strength she necessarily held a subordinate place, though always to be ranked among the important sea powers. In 1903, when the rivalry of Great Britain and the Dual Alliance was at its height, her strength in battleships was 18, of 226,630 tons. In number, therefore, they did more than cover the balance in favour of Great Britain as against the Dual Alliance, but not in tonnage, in which the difference in favour of Great Britain was 259,870. The history of the German navy is one of foresight, calculation, consistency and therefore steady growth. The small naval force maintained by Prussia became the navy of the North Germany. German Federation after the war of 1866, and the Imperial navy after 1871. Until 1853 it had been wholly dependent on the war office. In that year an admiralty was created in favour of Prince Albrecht, but this office was abolished in 1861, and the navy was again placed under the war office. The first ministers of the navy under the North German Federation were generals; so was the first imperial minister, General Stosch (1871). Admiral Tirpitz, appointed in 1897, was the first minister who was bred a seaman. His predecessor, General Stosch, had been an excellent organizer and had done much for the efficiency of the service. It has been the rule of the German government, both before and since the foundation of the empire, to advance by carefully framed plans, without adhering to them pedantically when circumstances called for a modification of their lines. As early as 1867 a scheme had been formed for the construction of a navy of 16 ironclads and 50 smaller vessels, at a cost of £5,395,833. It was not sufficiently advanced in execution to allow Germany to make any efforts at sea in the war of 1870–71. In 1872 a supplementary grant of £3,791,666 was made for construction in view of the increased cost of armour and armaments. In 1882 a revised scheme was made which contemplated the construction of 100 vessels, and it was completed in 1888 by another which provided for the construction of 28 vessels, of which 4 should be battleships of the largest size, within the next six years. In 1894 and for some years afterwards the Reichstag showed itself hostile to a heavy expenditure on the navy, and refused many votes asked for by the government. Under the pressure of ambition and of the real needs of a nation with an extensive and growing maritime commerce, the expenditure grew in spite of the opposition of the Reichstag. Between 1874 and 1889 it rose from £1,950,000 to £2,750,000, and was increased in the following year to £3,600,000, from which figure it advanced by 1898 to £5,756,135. Another building scheme was framed in that year, but it was swept aside in 1900, under the combined influence of the exhortations of the emperor William II., and of the anger caused in Germany through the arrest by a British cruiser of a German steamer (the " Bundesrath ") on the coast of Africa on a charge of carrying contraband of war to the Boers. The emperor was now able to obtain the consent of the Reichstag to an extended Naval Defence Act. By the terms of this measure it was proposed to spend £74,000,000 on construction, and £20,000,000 on the dockyards. With this money, by the year 1917 Germany was to be provided with a fleet of 38 battleships, together with a proportionate number of cruisers and other smaller vessels. Rapid progress was made not only with the programme itself but with the equipment of German dockyards

and other establishments for providing the malèriel of a great | ships of the line; France 49; Russia 50; the United States navy. In the spring of 1909 the serious menace to British supremacy at sea, represented by the growth of the new German fleet of battleships, led in England to a "scare" which recalled that of 1888, and to an energetic campaign for additional expenditure on the British navy.

United
States.

fact, the eve of the war with China. As an insular

15. In 1903 the number of vessels recognized as battleships, possessed by the great powers, was for Great Britain 67; for France 39; for Russia 18; for the United States 27; for Germany 27; for Italy 18; for Japan 5. At the first date the British fleet was among great powers as 90 to 114. At the latter it was as 67 to 134.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

During the years following on the American Civil War (186266) the United States paid small attention to the navy. In Such comparisons, however, as these become much more 1881 a board was appointed to advise on the needs complicated in later years, when the importance of the preponderof the navy, and in 1890, the board recommended ance of "Dreadnoughts "-the new type of battleship (see the formation of a fleet of 100 vessels of which 20 SHIP and SHIPBUILDING)-was realized. By the invention should be battleships of the largest class. The reviving interest of this type Great Britain appeared to obtain a new lead; and in the navy was greatly stimulated by the diplomatic difference in 1907, when it was calculated that by 1910 there would be with Great Britain which arose over the frontier question between ten British "Dreadnoughts" actually in commission while her and the republic of Venezuela in 1896. Resolutions were neither in Europe nor America would a single similar ship have passed in congress approving of an increase of the navy. The been completed by any foreign power, the situation seemed war with Spain in 1898 completed the revival of American to be entirely in favour of complete supremacy at sea for the interest in the navy. The acquisition of Porto Rico, and the British fleet. But the progress of German and American conprotectorate of Cuba in the West Indies, together with the annexa-struction, and particularly the experience gained of German tion of the Philippines, and the visible approach of the time ability to build and equip much more rapidly than had been when the relations of the powers interested in the Pacific would supposed, showed by 1909 that, so far as Dreadnoughts' call for regulation, confirmed the conviction that a powerful were concerned at all events, the lead of Great Britain could only fleet must be maintained. In 1889 the United States possessed be maintained by exceptional effort and exceptional expenditure. no modern battleship. In 1899 there were 4 built and 8 building. It was admitted in parliament by the prime minister, first lord At the close of 1903 there were built and building 27 of 353,260 of the admiralty and foreign secretary-themselves Liberals tons, only two of them being of less than 10,000 tons. From who had flirted with proposals for disarmament, and who de£5,119,850 in 1890 the expenditure grew to £16,355,380 in 1903. pended for office on the support of more extreme "pacifists" who The navy of Japan, the last comer among the great naval objected on principle to heavy military and naval expenditure— forces of the world, may be said to date from 1895, from, in that, while for the moment the British "two-power standard" was still in existence, the revelations as to German shipbuilding Japan. power with a large seafaring population, Japan is showed that it could only be maintained in the future by the called upon to possess a fleet. Even in the days of its voluntary creation of a new fleet on a scale previously not contemplated. isolation it had a known capacity for maritime warfare. Its The supremacy of Great Britain in ships of the older types capacity for assimilating the ideas and mastering the mechanical would be of no avail as years went by and other powers were skill of Europe have been in no respect better shown than in equalling her in the output of ships of the new type, and a new naval matters. From the moment it was compelled to open race thus began, of which it is impossible here to indicate more its ports it began not only to acquire steamers but to apply than the start. It was no longer a question of completed ships, itself under European guidance to learning how to make and but one still more of programmes for building and of the rate use them. A navy on the western model was already organized at which these programmes could be accomplished. At the by 1895, but it was still of trifling proportions. In 1896 the beginning of 1910, while Great Britain had her ten "DreadJapanese navy had become an object of serious attention to noughts," it was not the case that other powers had none: the world. A plan was drafted in that year, and confirmed Germany already had four and the United States two; and in the next, by which Japan arranged to supply itself, mainly a knowledge of the naval programmes of both these countries, by purchase in Europe, with a fleet containing 4 of the most to speak of no others, showed that, unless either their policy powerful battleships. The scheme was modified in detail in changed or the British shipbuilding programme was modified 1898, when the decision was taken to increase the tonnage of the so as to keep up with their progress, it would not take many vessels. A little later additions were arranged for, and vessels years before the theory of the equality of the British flect in building for South America states in English ports were purchased. capital ships" to those of the next two naval powers would The British model was carefully followed in naval organization, have to be abandoned. In England this situation created a prothe alliance with England giving special facilities for this. And found sensation in 1909, since it was common ground that her by 1904, when the war with Russia began, the unknown Japanese fleet was her all in all, on which her empire depended; and the fleet proved its competence by victories at sea which put the result was seen, not only in a considerable increase in the Naval seal on her position as a naval power. Estimates of 1910-1911, but also in the beginning of a serious attempt to organize their fleets on the part of the British colonial dominions, which should co-operate with the mother country.

Conclusion. When we look over the whole period from the end of the Napoleonic wars, one great fact is patent to our view. It is that this was an epoch of revival or development in the naval power of the whole world, in the course of which the position held by Great Britain in 1816 was partially lost simply by the growth of other powers. The situation in that year was by its very nature temporary, and a quotation of the respective numbers of warships then possessed by the world would have no value. An instructive comparison can, however, be made between the year 1838, when Great Britain began to be seriously concerned with the rise of possible enemies at sea, and the eve of the war between Russia and Japan. Battleships may again be taken as the test of strength, since nothing happened in the Russo-Japanese War to show that they do not still form the most vital element of naval power. We may also leave aside the many small fleets which cannot act collectively, and which individually do not weigh in the balance. The figures for 1838 are given above, but may be repeated for comparison. In that year Great Britain possessed, built and building, 90

[ocr errors]
[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]
[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

23 Number uncertain.

2

10

1343

3

BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Ancient and General:-Accounts of the naval organizations of the ancient world, and of the sea fighting of the time are to be found in the historians of Greece and Rome: Signor G. Corazzini has written a Storia della marina militare antica (Livorno, 1882). Valuable details of the Imperial Roman navy and of the Byzantine navy will be found in Professor Bury's appendices to his edition of Gibbon's Decline and Fall, vol. i. apx. 5, and vol. vi. apx. 5. General histories of the navies of the world have been written, but they are inevitably apt to be little more than jejune reviews of the dates, and results of battles. This is certainly the case with the great folio of the English writer Josiah Burchett, A Complete History of the most remarkable transactions at Sea, from the earliest accounts of time to the conclusion of the last war with France, wherein is given an account of the most considerable Naval Expeditions, Sea Fights, Stratagems, Discoveries and other Maritime Occurrences that have happened among all nations that have flourished at Sea; and in a more particular manner of Great Britain from the time of the Revolution in 1688 to the aforesaid period (1720). The later part is however valuable, for Burchett, who was secretary to the admiralty, had access to good authorities for his own time, and had served at sea as secretary to Russell, Lord Orford. There is an Histoire de la marine de tous les peuples, by M. A. du Sein (Paris, 1879) which is of no great value. Medieval-As regards the medieval navies the first place may be allowed to the Italians. A general bibliography of Italian nautical literature, Saggio de una bibliografia marittima italiana, occupying fifty-eight pages, drawn up by Signor Enrico Celani, will be found in the Revista maritima, supplement for 1894 (Rome). The histories of the different Republics of the middle ages record their maritime enterprises. An excellent book, which gives far more than its title promises, is the Storia della marina pontificia of A. Guglielmotti, O.P., in 10 volumes published at different times, and in two editions, at Florence 1856, &c. The general maritime history of the Mediterranean in the middle ages is well illustrated in the Memorias sobre la marina comercio y artes de Barcelona (1779-1792) by Don A. Capmany. The naval enterprises of the Norsemen are dealt with in a scholarly fashion by M. G. B. Depping, Histoire des expéditions maritimes des Normands (1826); and with newer knowledge by Mr C. F. Keary, The Vikings of Western Christendom (1891). The medieval periods of Western navies are treated in their respective naval histories.

Great Britain:-The History of the Royal Navy to the French Revolution, by Sir N. Harris Nicolas (1847), is unfortunately incomplete. It ends at the year 1422, but is the work of a most laborious and exact antiquary, who had been a naval officer in his youth. The administrative history of the British navy until 1660 is the subject of the History of the Administration of the Navy and of Merchant Shipping in relation to the Navy (1896) by Mr M. Oppenheim -a most valuable collection of materials. The campaigns and battles of the navy are told, generally from the public letters of the admirals, and with no great measure of criticism in several compilations. The Naval History of England (1735) by Mr T. Lediard, is copious and useful. The Naval Chronology, or an Historical Summary of Naval and Maritime Events from the Time of the Romans to the Treaty of Peace 1802, by Captain Isaac Schomberg (1802), contains a mass of valuable information, lists of ships, dates of construction, &c., and some administrative details. Less comprehensive, but still useful, is such a compilation as The General History of the Late War (that is, the Seven Years' War), by Dr John Entick and other gentlemen (1763). A much better book is The Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain 1727 to 1783 (1804) by Mr R. Beatson, a very careful and well-informed writer who had seen some service as a marine officer. The Lives of the British Admirals, containing a new and accurate Naval History from the earliest periods, by Dr J. Campbell (1779), may be profitably consulted, with caution, for it by no means justifies its claim to novelty and accuracy in all parts. The Naval History of Great Britain, from 1793 to the accession of George IV., by Mr W. James (1827), republished with a continuation by Captain Chamier in 1837, is a standard authority. A far less useful work, which, however, is in parts written from first-hand knowledge, is The Naval History of Great Britain by Captain W. P. Brenton, first published in 1823, and republished in 1836. The Field of Mars, a compilation in dictionary form published in 1781, with an enormous title-page, is not without value for some of the naval transactions of the 18th century. The History of the British Navy from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (1863) by Dr C. D. Yonge, contains some original matter for the naval transactions of the 19th century. The Royal Navy, in 7 large volumes (1897-1903), edited and partly written by Sir W. L. Clowes, is a compilation of unequal value. Some of

Sir W. L. Clowes's coadjutors, notably Captain Mahan and Sir C. R. Markham, are of high standing and authority. The book is copiously illustrated. The Naval Chronicle, 1799-1818, a magazine, contains masses of useful matter, for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The Royal Naval Biography of Captain John Marshall, giving the lives of all officers on the list in 1823 or promoted later (1823-1835), with a supplement (1827-1830), may be consulted, but is too uncritical and too uniformly laudatory. The Naval Biographical Dictionary: life and services of every living officer (1846), by Lieutenant W. R. O'Bryne, is a solid book of reference. The publications of the Navy Record Society (1894 and subsequent years) contain large and valuable publications of original matter, with some reprints of old authorities, such as Sir W. Monson's Tracts, which were difficult of access. See also A Short History of the Royal Navy, by David Hannay.

France: The naval history of France has been much written about since 1840. Not many of the books published have been of considerable value. The Histoire maritime de la France of M. Léon Guérin (1844), was meant to meet a popular demand and satisfy national vanity. The Histoire de la marine française of M. Eugène Sue (1845-1846) is mainly a romance, but it contains some useful evidence. The Histoire de la marine française of Le Comte de Bonfils Lablénie (1845), a naval officer, is of more value, but is somewhat wanting in criticism. The Précis historique de la marine française of M. Chasseriau (1845); the Histoire générale de la marine (1853); the Histoire de la marine française of M. le Saint (1877); and the Histoire nationale de la marine française depuis Jean Bart (1878) of M. Trousset are compilations. La Marine de guerre, ses institu tions militaires depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours, by Cape Gougeard (1877); the Essai sur l'histoire de l'administration de la marine française of M. Lambert de Sainte Croix (1892); and the excellent little book of M. Loir on La Marine royale, 1789 (n.d.), may be consulted with pleasure and profit. The three books of M. Jal, Archéologie navale (1840), Glossaire nautique (1848) and Abraham du Quesne et la marine de son temps (1872) are all of high value. Les Batailles navales de la France of Capne Troude (1867), is a carefully written account of naval actions. The Histoire de la marine française, pendant la guerre de l'indépendence américaine (1877); Sous la première république (1886); Sous le consulat et l'empire (1886); De 1815 à 1870 (1900); and La Marine française et la marine allemande, 1870-1871 (1873) of Cape Chevalier, are thorough and critical. M. G. Lacour-Gayet, Professor at L'Ecole supérieure de la Marine, has published two books of serious research, but marked by some national prejudice, La Marine militaire de la France sous le règne de Louis XV. (1902), and La Marine militaire de la France sous le règne de Louis XVI. (1905). The Recherches sur l'ancien clos des galées de Rouen (1864) of M. C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire, and the life of Jean de Vienne by the Marquis Terrier de Loray (1878), are valuable monographs on passages of early French naval history. The Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux lles britanniques by Capas Desbrière (1900 seq.) is a most valuable authority. A very scholarly Histoire de la marine française was begun in 1899 by M. C. de la Roncière.

Miscellaneous-The standard authorities for Spanish naval history are, La Marina de Castilla (1892), and La Armada Española desde la union de Castilla y Aragon (1895-1901), of Captain Cesareo Fernandez Duro. The Geschienes van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen of Mr J. C. de Jonghe (1858), is an admirable and exhaustive history of the Dutch navy. The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, by Haji Khalfa (or Hugji Chalifa), translated by Mr J. Mitchell for the Oriental Translation Fund (1831). may be read with curiosity and United States by Fenimore Cooper (1839), and by Mr E. S. Maclay some profit. There are two general histories of the navy of the (1894); the second is the fuller, and the more critical. Captain Mahan's Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783 (1890), and his Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 17931812 (1892), must be classed apart as studies of the general interaction of navies on one another and on international relations. The long series of readable monographs by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, covering the whole field of naval warfare from the Peloponnesian War to his own time, contain much information and sound criticism. (D. H.)

NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Historical Evolution.-That the methods of conducting war at sea have been conditioned by the capacity of the ships and their armament, and that capacity and armament have interacted upon one another, may appear to be platitudes. But they are none the less truths which must always be borne in mind when we are considering the history of naval strategy, that is, of the large movements by which a commander secures the advantage of fighting at a place convenient to himself, or of tactics-which are the movements he makes in battle. Throughout antiquity and the middle ages till the 16th century, the weapons relied

on were (1) the ship itself, used as a ram, (2) the swords of the crew, (3) such missile weapons as bolts from heavy crossbows

« ՆախորդըՇարունակել »