renunciation by Ferdinand of his rights to Naples, in return for an indemnity to hasten the conclusion of peace between Naples and Great Britain, and to augment the Neapolitan kingdom by territory embracing 400,000 souls at the expense of the states of the Church.

his subordination to the emperor, and early began his pose as an | stipulated that Austria would use her good offices to secure the Italian king by demanding the withdrawal of the French troops from Naples and naturalization as Neapolitans of all Frenchmen in the service of the state (1811). Napoleon, of course, met this demand with a curt refusal. A breach between the brothersin-law was only averted by the Russian campaign of 1812 and Napoleon's invitation to Murat to take command of the cavalry in the Grand Army. This was a call which appealed to all his strongest military instincts, and he obeyed it. During the disastrous retreat he showed his usual headstrong courage; but in the middle of December he suddenly threw up his. command and returned to Naples. The reason of this was the suspicion, which had been growing on him for two years past, that Napoleon was preparing for him the fate of the king of Holland, and that his own wife, Queen Caroline, was plotting with the emperor for his dethronement. To Marshal Davout, who pointed out to him that he was only king of Naples "by grace of the emperor and the blood of Frenchmen," he replied that he was king of Naples as the emperor of Austria was emperor of Austria, and that he could do as he liked. He was, in fact, already dreaming of exchanging his position of a vassal king of the French Empire for that of a national Italian king. In the enthusiastic reception that awaited him on his return to Naples on the 4th of February there was nothing to dispel these illusions. All the Italian parties flocked round him, flattering and cajoling him: the patriots, because he seemed to them loyal and glorious enough to assume the task of Italian unification; the partisans of the dispossessed princes, because they looked upon him as a convenient instrument and as simple enough to be made an easy dupe.

From this moment dates the importance of Murat in the history of Europe during the next few years. He at once, without consulting his minister of foreign affairs, despatched Prince Cariati on a confidential mission to Vienna; if Austria would secure the renunciation of his rights by King Ferdinand and guarantee the possession of the kingdom of Naples to himself, he would place his army at her disposal and give up his claims to Sicily. Austria herself, however, had not as yet broken definitively with Napoleon, and before she openly joined the Grand Alliance, after the illusory congress of Prague, many things had happened to make Murat change his mind. He was offended by Napoleon's bitter letters and by tales of his slighting comments on himself; he was alarmed by the emperor's scarcely veiled threats; but after all he was a child of the Revolution and a born soldier, with all the soldier's instinct of loyalty to a great leader, and he grasped eagerly at any excuse for believing that Napoleon, in the event of victory, would maintain him on his throne. Then came the emperor's advance into Germany, supported as yet by his allies of the Rhenish Confederation. On the fatal field of Leipzig Murat once more fought on Napoleon's side, leading the French squadrons with all his old valour and dash. But this crowning catastrophe was too much for his wavering faith. On the evening of the 16th of October, the first day of the battle, Metternich found means to open a❘ separate negotiation with him: Great Britain and Austria would, in the event of Murat's withdrawal from Napoleon's army and refusal to send reinforcements to the viceroy of Italy, secure the cession to him of Naples by King Ferdinand, guarantee him in its possession, and obtain for him further advantages in Italy. To accept the Austrian advances seemed now his only chance of continuing to be a king. At Erfurt he asked and obtained the emperor's leave to return to Naples; "our adieux," he said, "were not over-cordial."

He reached Naples on the 4th of November and at once informed the Austrian envoy of his wish to join the Allies, suggesting that the Papal States, with the exception of Rome and the surrounding district, should be made over to him as his reward. On the 31st of December Count Neipperg, afterwards the lover of the empress Marie Louise, arrived at Naples with powers to treat. The result was the signature, on the 11th of January 1814, of a treaty by which Austria guaranteed to Murat the throne of Naples and promised her good offices to secure the assent of the other Allies. Secret additional articles

The project of the treaty having been communicated to Castlereagh, he replied by expressing the willingness of the British government to conclude an armistice with "the person exercising the government of Naples " (Jan. 22), and this was accordingly signed on the 3rd of February by Bentinck. It was clear that Great Britain had no intention of ultimately recognizing Murat's right to reign. As for Austria, she would be certain that Murat's own folly would, sooner or later, give her an opportunity for repudiating her engagements. For the present the Neapolitan alliance would be invaluable to the Allies for the purpose of putting an end to the French dominion in Italy. The plot was all but spoilt by the prince royal of Sicily, who in an order of the day announced to his soldiers that their legitimate sovereign had not renounced his rights to the throne of Naples (Feb. 20); from the Austrian point of view it was compromised by a proclamation issued by Bentinck at Leghorn on the 14th of March, in which he called on the Italians to rise in support of the " great cause of their fatherland." From Dijon Castlereagh promptly wrote to Bentinck (April 3) to say that the proclamation of the prince of Sicily must be disavowed, and that if King Ferdinand did not behave properly Great Britain would recognize Murat's title. A letter from Metternich to Marshal Bellegarde, of the same place and date, insisted that Bentinck's operations must be altered; the last thing that Austria desired was an Italian national rising.

It was, indeed, by this time clear to the allied powers that Murat's ambition had o'erleaped the bounds set for them. "Murat, a true son of the Revolution," wrote Metternich, in the same letter, "did not hesitate to form projects of conquest when all his care should have been limited to simple calculations as to how to preserve his throne. . . . He dreamed of a partition of Italy between him and us.... When we refused to annex all Italy north of the Po, he saw that his calculations were wrong, but refused to abandon his ambitions. His attitude is most suspicious." "Press the restoration of the grand-duke in Tuscany," wrote Castlereagh to Bentinck; "this is the true touchstone of Murat's intentions. We must not suffer him to carry out his plan of extended dominion; but neither must we break with him and so abandon Austria to his augmented intrigues."

Meanwhile, Murat had formally broken with Napoleon, and on the 16th of January the French envoy quitted Naples. But the treason by which he hoped to save his throne was to make its loss inevitable. He had betrayed Napoleon, only to be made. the cat's-paw of the Allies. Great Britain, even when condescending to negotiate with him, had never recognized his title; she could afford to humour Austria by holding out hopes of ultimate recognition, in order to detach him from Napoleon; for Austria alone of the Allies was committed to him, and Castlereagh well knew that, when occasion should arise, her obligations would not be suffered to hamper her interests. With the downfall of Napoleon Murat's defection had served its turn; moreover, his equivocal conduct during the campaign in Italy had blunted the edge of whatever gratitude the powers may have been disposed to feel; his ambition to unite all Italy south of the Po under his crown was manifest, and the statesmen responsible for the re-establishment of European order were little likely to do violence to their legitimist principles in order to maintain on his throne a revolutionary sovereign who was proving himself so potent a centre of national unrest.

At the very opening of the congress of Vienna Talleyrand, with astounding effrontery, affected not to know "the man

'He had contributed to the defeats of the viceroy Prince Eugène in January and February 1814, but did not show any eagerness to press his victories to the advantage of the Allies, contenting himself with occupying the principality of Benevento.

king.

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who had been casually referred to as "the king of Naples "; | from the peninsula, and establishing himself as a national and he made it the prime object of his policy in the weeks that followed to secure the repudiation by the powers of Murat's title, and the restoration of the Bourbon king. The powers, indeed, were very ready to accept at least the principle of this policy. "Great Britain," wrote Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool on the 3rd of September from Geneva, "has no objection, but the reverse, to the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples." Prussia saw in Murat the protector of the malcontents in Italy.2 Alexander I. of Russia had no sympathy for any champion of Liberalism in Italy save himself. Austria confessed "sub sigillo" that she shared "His Most Christian Majesty's views as to the restoration of ancient dynasties." 193 ties in the way were Austria's treaty obligations and the means The main difficulby which the desired result was to be obtained.

Talleyrand knew well that Austria, in the long run, would break faith with Murat and prefer a docile Bourbon on the throne of Naples to this incalculable child of the Revolution; but he had his private reasons for desiring to "score off" Metternich, the continuance of whose quasidiplomatic liaison with Caroline Murat he rightly suspected.. He proposed boldly that, since Austria, in view of the treaty of Jan. 11, 1814, was naturally reluctant to undertake the task, the restored Bourbon king of France should be empowered to restore the Bourbon king of Naples by French arms, thus reviving once more the ancient Habsburg-Bourbon rivalry for dominion in Italy." Metternich, with characteristic skill, took advantage of this situation at once to checkmate France and to disembarrass Austria of its obligations to Murat. Louis XVIII., through his confidant Blacas, that Austria was While secretly assuring in favour of a Bourbon restoration in Naples, he formally intimated to Talleyrand that a French invasion of Italian soil would mean war with Austria. To Murat, who had appealed to the treaty of 1814, and demanded a passage northward for the troops destined to oppose those of Louis XVIII., he explained that Austria, by her ultimatum to France, had already done all that was necessary, that any movement of the Neapolitan troops outside Naples would be a useless breach of the peace of Italy, and that it would be regarded as an attack on Austria and a rupture of the alliance. Murat's suspicions of Austrian sincerity were now confirmed; he realized that there was no question now of his obtaining any extension of territory at the expense of the states of the Church, and that in the Italy as reconstructed at Vienna his own position would be intolerable. Thus the very motives which had led him to betray Napoleon now led him to break with Austria. He would secure his throne by proclaiming the cause of united Italy, chasing the Austrians

1 F.O. Vienna Congress, vii.

2 Mem. of Hardenberg, F.O. Cong. Pruss. Arch. 20. Aug. 14 June 15.

Metternich to Bombelles. Jan. 13, 1815, enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool of Jan. 25. F.O. Congr. Vienna, xi.

Sorel, viii. 411 seq.,

Cf. a" most secret" communication to be made to M. de Blacas (in Metternich to Bombelles, Vienna, Jan. 13, 1815). Murat's aggressive attitude, and the unrest in Italy, are largely due to the threatening attitude of France.... H.I.M. is not prepared to risk a rising of Italy under "the national flag." How will France coerce Naples? By sending an army into Italy across our states, which would thus become infected with revolutionary views? The emperor could not allow such an expedition. When Italy is settled and we will not allow Murat to keep the Marches he will lose prestige, and then... will be the time for Austria to give effect to the views which, all the time, she shares with His Most Christian Majesty." (In Castlereagh to Liverpool," private," Jan. 25, 1815. F.O. Vienna Congr. xi.)

..

That they were fully justified is clear from the following extract from a letter of Metternich to Bombelles at Paris (dated Vienna, Jan. 13, 1815). at Naples is for us a very subordinate question. "Whether Joachim or a Bourbon reigns is established on solid foundations the fate of Joachim will no longer When Europe be problematical, but do not let us risk destroying Austria and France and Europe, in order to solve this question at the worst moment it would be put on the tapis.... This is no business of the Congress, but let the Bourbon Powers declare that they maintain their claims.' (In Castlereagh's private letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 15, 1815, F.O. Vienna Congr. xi.)

the enterprise seemed by no means hopeless. Lord William To contemporary observers in the best position to judge Bentinck, the commander of the English forces in Italy, wrote to Castlereagh that, "having seen more of Italy," he doubted whether the whole force of Austria would be able to expel Murat; "he has said clearly that he will raise the whole of Italy; and there is not a doubt that under the standard of Italian independence the whole of Italy will rally." This feeling, continued Bentinck, was due to the foolish and illiberal conduct of the restored sovereigns; the inhabitants of the states occupied by cany "the same feeling and desire" universally prevailed. All the Austrian troops were "discontented to a man "; even in Tussoldiers who, in spite of Murat's treason, would rally to his the provinces, moreover, were full of unemployed officers and standard, especially as he would certainly first put himself into communication with Napoleon in Elba; while, so far as Bentinck could hear of the disposition of the French army, it would be urgency of the danger was, then, fully realized by the powers "dangerous to assemble it anywhere or for any purpose." The even before Napoleon's return from Elba; for they were well aware of Murat's correspondence with him. On the first news of Napoleon's landing in France, the British government wrote to Wellington that this event together with "the proofs of their part, and that they were now Murat's treachery " had removed "all remaining scruples concert for his removal," adding that Murat should, in the event prepared to enter into a of his resigning peaceably, receive "a pension and all consideratone. tion." The rapid triumph of Napoleon, however, altered this Castlereagh to Wellington on the 24th, adding that Great Britain would enter into a treaty with Murat, if he would give guarantees Bonaparte's successes have altered the situation," wrote that in spite of Napoleon's success he would be "true to Europe." "by a certain redistribution of his forces" and the like, and In a private letter enclosed Castlereagh suggested that Murat might send an auxiliary force to France, where "his personal presence would be unseemly."9

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game in his hands. But it was not in his nature to play them Clearly, had King Joachim played his cards well he had the of the Allies, either to secure favourable terms from them, or well. He should have made the most of the chastened temper But his head had been turned by the flatteries of the "patriots"; to hold them in play until Napoleon was ready to take the field. he believed that all Italy would rally to his cause, and that alone he would be able to drive the "Germans" over the Alps, and thus, as king of united Italy, be in a position to treat on equal reached Metternich at Vienna that the Neapolitan troops were terms with Napoleon, should he prove victorious; and he determined to strike without delay. On the 23rd the news on the march to the frontier. The Allies at once decided to defeat, Ferdinand IV. was to be restored to Naples, on promising commission Austria to deal with Murat; in the event of whose system of government.10 a general amnesty and giving guarantees for a

reasonable"

Murat's popularity had disappeared. In Calabria the indiscrimiMeanwhile, in Naples itself there were signs enough that made the government hated; in the capital the general disnate severity of General Manhès in suppressing brigandage had affection had led to rigorous policing, while conscripts had to stances an outburst of national enthusiasm for King Joachim be dragged in chains to join their regiments." In these circumcomplete fiasco. Rome and Bologna were, indeed, occupied withwas hardly to be expected; and the campaign in effect proved a out serious opposition; but on the 12th of April Murat's forces on the 2nd of May were completely routed at Tolentino. The received a check from the advancing Austrians at Ferrara and

? Letter dated Florence, Jan. 7, 1815. F.O. Vienna Congr. xi.
F.O. Vienna Congr. xii., Draft to Wellington dated March 12.
F.O. Vienna Congr. xii.

10 Ibid. Wellington to Castlereagh, Vienna, March 25.
"F.O. Cong. xi.; Munster to Castlereagh, Naples, Jan. 22.

Austrians advanced on Naples, when Ferdinand IV. was duly | son, Joachim (b. 1856), who succeeded him as head of the family, restored, while Queen Caroline and her children were deported to Trieste.

Murat himself escaped to France, where his offer of service was contemptuously refused by Napoleon. He hid for a while near Toulon, with a price upon his head; then, after Waterloo, refusing an asylum in England, he set out for Corsica (August). Here he was joined by a few rash spirits who urged him to attempt to recover his kingdom. Though Metternich offered to allow him to join his wife at Trieste and to secure him a dignified position and a pension, he preferred to risk AUTHORITIES.-See A. Sorel L'Europe et la révolution française all on a final throw for power. On the 28th of September he (8 vols., 1885-1892) passim, but especially vol. viii. for Murat's sailed for Calabria with a flotilla of six vessels carrying some policy after the 1812; Helfert, Joachim Murat, seine letzten Kämpfe und sein Ende (Vienna, 1878); G. Romano, Ricordi muraliani 250 armed men. Four of his ships were scattered by a storm; (Pavia, 1890); Correspondance de Joachim Murat, Juillet 1791one deserted him at the last moment, and on the 8th of October Juillet 1808, ed A. Lumbroso (Milan, 1899); Count Murat, Murat, he landed at Pizzo with only 30 companions. Of the popular lieutenant de l'empereur en Espagne (Paris, 1897); Guardione, enthusiasm for his cause which he had been led to expect there | Gioacchino Murat in Italia (Palermo, 1899); M. H. Weil, Prince Eugène et Murat (5 vols., Paris, 1901-1904); Chavenon and Saintwas less than no sign, and after a short and unequal contest he Yves, Joachim Murat (Paris, 1905); Lumbroso, L'Agonia di un was taken prisoner by a captain named Trenta-Capilli, whose regno; Gioacchino Murat al Pisso (Milan, 1904). See also the brother had been executed by General Manhes. He was im- bibliography to NAPOLEON I. (W. A. P.) prisoned in the fort of Pizzo, and on the 13th of October 1815 was tried by court-martial, under a law of his own, for disturbing the public peace, and was sentenced to be shot in half an hour. After writing a touching letter of farewell to his wife and children, he bravely met his fate, and was buried at Pizzo.

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(2 vols. fol., Modena, 1717); Vila e rime di F. Petrarca (1711), | by Queen Olga of Württemberg. After the war he was succesand Vita ed opere di L. Castelvetro (1727).

In biblical scholarship Muratori is chiefly known as the aiscoverer of the so-called Muratorian Canon, the name given to a fragment (85 lines) of early Christian literature, which he found in 1740, embedded in an 8th-century codex which forms a compendium of theological tracts followed by the five early Christian creeds. The document contains a list of the books of the New Testament, a similar list concerning the Old Testament having apparently preceded it. It is in barbarous Latin which has probably been translated from original Greek-the language prevailing in Christian Rome until c. 200. There is little doubt that it was composed in Rome and we may date it about the year 190. Lightfoot inclined to Hippolytus as its author. is the earliest document known which enumerates the books in It order.

The first line of the fragment is broken and speaks of the Gospel of St Mark, but there is no doubt that its compiler knew also of St Matthew. Acts is ascribed to St Luke. He names thirteen letters of St Paul but says nothing of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The alleged letters of Paul to the Laodiceans and Alexandrians he rejects, "for gall must not be mixed with honey." The two Epistles of Peter and the Epistle of James are not referred to, but that of Jude and two of John are accepted. He includes the Apocalypse of John and also the Apocalypse of Peter. The Shepherd of Hermas he rejects as not of apostolic origin, but this test of canonicity is not consistently applied for he allows the "Wisdom written by the friends of Solomon in his honour." He rejects the writings of the Gnostics Valentinus and Basilides, and of Montanus.

The list is not an authoritative decree, but a private register of what the author considers the prevailing Christian sentiment in his neighbourhood. He notes certain differences among the Gospels, because not all the evangelists were eye-witnesses of the life of Jesus; yet Mark and Luke respectively have behind them the authority of Peter and of Paul, who is thus regarded as on a footing with the Twelve. The Fourth Gospel was written by John at the request of the other apostles and the bishops on the basis of a revelation made to Andrew. The letters of Paul are written to four individuals and to seven different churches, like the seven letters in the Apocalypse of John.

It is interesting to notice the coincidence of his list with the evidence gained from Tertullian for Africa and from Irenaeus for Gaul and indirectly for Asia Minor. Before the year 200 there was widespread agreement in the sacred body of apostolic writings read in Christian churches on the Lord's Day along with the Old Testament.

Muratori's Letters, with a Life prefixed, were published by Lazzarı, (2 vols., Venice, 1783). His nephew, F. G. Muratori, also wrote a Vita del celebre Ludov. Ant. Muratori (Venice, 1756). See also A. G. Spinelli" Bibliographia delle lettere e stampa di L. A. Muratori" in Bolletino dell' instituto storico italiano (1888), and Carducci's preface to the new Scriptores. in full with a translation in H. M. Gwatkin's Selections from Early The Muratorian Canon is given Christian Writers. It is also published as No. 1 of H. Lietzmann's Kleine Texte für theologische Vorlesungen (Bonn, 1902). See also Journal of Theological Studies, viii. 537.

MURAVIEV, MICHAEL NIKOLAIEVICH, COUNT (1845-1900), Russian statesman, was born on the 19th of April 1845. He was the son of General Count Nicholas Muraviev (governor of Grodno), and grandson of the Count Michael Muraviev, who became notorious for his drastic measures in stamping out the Polish insurrection of 1863 in the Lithuanian provinces. He was educated at a secondary school at Poltava, and was for a short time at Heidelberg University. In 1864 he entered the chancellery of the minister for foreign affairs at St Petersburg, and was soon afterwards attached to the Russian legation at Stuttgart, where he attracted the notice of Queen Olga of Württemberg. He was transferred to Berlin, then to Stockholm, and back again to Berlin. In 1877 he was second secretary at the Hague. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 he was a delegate of the Red Cross Society in charge of an ambulance train provided

and then minister at Copenhagen. In Denmark he was brought sively first secretary at Paris, chancellor of the embassy at Berlin, much into contact with the imperial family, and on the death of Prince Lobánov in 1897 he was appointed by the Tsar Nicholas II. years were a critical time for European diplomacy. The Chinese to be his minister of foreign affairs. The next three and a half and Cretan questions were disturbing factors. As regards Crete, Count Muraviev's policy was vacillating; in China his hands were forced by Germany's action at Kiaochow. But he acted with singular légèreté with regard at all events to his assurances to Great Britain respecting the leases of Port Arthur and Talienwan from China; he told the British ambassador that these would pledge. When the Tsar Nicholas inaugurated the Peace Conbe " open ports," and afterwards essentially modified this from a situation of some embarrassment; but when, subsequently, ference at the Hague, Count Muraviev extricated his country Russian agents in Manchuria and at Peking connived at the agitation which culminated in the Boxer rising of 1900, the relations of the responsible foreign minister with the tsar became strained. Muraviev died suddenly on the 21st of June 1900, of apoplexy, brought on, it was said, by a stormy interview with the tsar.

geologist, was born at Tarradale, in eastern Ross, Scotland, on MURCHISON, SIR RODERICK IMPEY (1792-1871), British the 19th of February 1792. His father, Kenneth Murchison (d. 1796), came of an old Highland clan in west Ross-shire, and having been educated as a medical man, acquired a fortune in India; while still in the prime of life he returned to Scotland, the estate of Tarradale and settled for a few years as a resident where, marrying one of the Mackenzies of Fairburn, he purchased Highland landlord. Young Murchison left the Highlands when three years old, and at the age of seven was sent to the grammar school of Durham, where he remained for six years. He was then placed at the military college, Great Marlow, to be trained for the army. With some difficulty he passed the examinations, A year later (1808) he landed with Wellesley in Galicia, and was and at the age of fifteen was gazetted ensign in the 36th regiment. present at the actions of Roriça and Vimiera. Subsequently under Sir John Moore he took part in the retreat to Corunna and the final battle there. This was his only active service. of advancement in the military profession, Murchison, after The defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo seeming to close the prospect eight years of service, quitted the army, and married the daughter he then spent rather more than two years on the Continent, of General Hugonin, of Nursted House, Hampshire. With her particularly in Italy, where her cultivated tastes were of signal enthusiasm of his character into the study of art and antiquities, influence in guiding his pursuits. He threw himself with all the intellectual pursuits. and for the first time in his life tasted the pleasures of truly

in Ross-shire and settled in England, where he took to field Returning to England in 1818, he soia his paternal property sports. He soon became one of the greatest fox-hunters in the midland counties; but at last, getting weary of such pursuits and meeting Sir Humphry Davy, who urged him to turn his energy Institution. This change in the current of his occupations to science, he was induced to attend lectures at the Royal was much helped by the sympathy of his wife, who, besides her artistic acquirements, took much interest in natural history. Eager and enthusiastic in whatever he undertook, he was fascinated by the young science of geology. He joined the Geological Society of London and soon showed himself one of its most active members, having as his colleagues there such men as Sedgwick, W. D. Conybeare, W. Buckland, W. H. Fitton and Lyell. Exploring with his wife the geology of the south of England, he devoted special attention to the rocks of the northwest of Sussex and the adjoining parts of Hants and Surrey, on which, aided by Fitton, he wrote his first scientific paper, read to the society in 1825. Though he had reached the age of thirtytwo before he took any interest in science, he developed his taste and increased his knowledge so rapidly that in the first