to 81.

Near the close of Mr. Jefferson's administration, the embargo was repealed, in conformity to Mr. Jefferson's recommendation, made on the strength of representations made by John Q. Adams to the President that the Federal leaders in Massachusetts had determined on resistance to the act, and that they would prefer civil war to a longer endurance of the restriction. This we have from Mr. Jefferson's own pen, at a later period. The Federalists had often been charged by their opponents with an intention to dissolve the Union, or overthrow the government-but none of these charges were ever substantiated or rendered plausible by any offer of proof. Mr. Adams's conviction was doubtless sincere, but in a subsequent correspondence with Mr. Otis, Mr. Prescott, and other leading Federalists, who requested proofs of his charge, he admits he could offer no direct proof, but intimates that he may publish the evidence which established the belief to a moral certainty in his own mind. He died without having redeemed the promise. The "Henry plot," in 1812, failed even to justify suspicion.

A new part of the policy introduced by the Republican administrations, arising out of the foreign difficulties, was the encouragement of Home Manufactures. Mr. Madison (Message of 1810) considered the growth of manufactures "as of itself more than a recompense for the privations and losses resulting from foreign injustice, which furnished the general impulse required for its accomplishment." Thenceforward a system of encouragement was pursued for the diversion of labor and capital from other pursuits to that of manufacturing, efforts being made to keep up the protection afforded during non-intercourse and war, by frequent revisions of the commercial tariff.

In the twelfth Congress, a number of new, young, but talented men came into the leadership of the party, in the House of Representatives, and resolved to substitute a more vigorous policy in the place of that hitherto pursued by Mr. Madison. Henry Clay (for the first time elected Speaker), John C. Calhoun, William Lowndes, and Langdon Cheves, in the

ate, infused a new spirit into their party associates, and even quickened the slow energies of Mr. Madison himself. The Navy was resuscitated, not as a temporary defence, but enlarged beyond the ideas even of the Federal administrations, to be relied on as a permanent protection of our commerce and our coasts.

After the election of Mr. Madison, the Republicans had regained their ground in New England, having control of the government in each State of that section, except Connecticut. As the war policy, however, became more apparent, the opposition were again aroused throughout the North, and were soon in possession of all the New England States and New York. The administration party was alarmed by these successes, and more by the determined opposition to their policy of the New York Republicans, who had already resolved on the support of De Witt Clinton against Mr. Madison, at the approaching election. However, under the lead of Clay and Calhoun, they were brought to the war point, and a caucus of the administration members having resolved on the extreme measure, a committee, of which those gentlemen were at the head, was sent to make known the determination of the party to the President. They found him, in his anxiety for peace, engaged in a fruitless negotiation with the British Minister. They informed him that the party was resolved, and would not retrace their steps; that the people would no longer tolerate a hesitating policy; that if the act was postoned until after the Presidential election, he would probably be defeated of a re-election; and that, In fact, unless he yielded to the sentiment of his friends, his nomination, even, was not to be relied on. In this dilemma, Mr. Madison reluctantly assented. The war bill passed the House 79 to 49, and the Senate 19 to 13.

Immediately on the passage of the act, an address, signed by 32 of the Federal members, and written by Hon. Harmanus Bleecker, of New York, was put in circulation. It was a mild, well-written, dignified document, arguing the inexpediency of the war, either to satisfy our honor, or compensate our losses.

(To be continued.)

We now proceed to an examination of the statistics of that correspondent.

While speaking of the cotton trade, our argument will be taken chiefly from the "Plough, Loom, and Anvil."* In the general argument, we shall indulge in some reflections of our own.

In his tables, the cotton crop of '46-7 is set down, as usual, for that of '47, and that of '47-8, for that of '48.

The whole business relative to the crop of '47-8 was closed in July, '48, just at the time when the tariff of '46 came into direct and practical operation upon the business of the country. One effect of the system was, however, felt before that time. The failure of the large English cotton brokers had disabled them from acting as usual for the American growers, and funds had fallen in consequence; this bankruptcy, the fifth of that class of dealers in one quarter of a century, being attributable to unforeseen causes in England, of which we shall not now make mention.

The crop of the present year's consumption is the first that came under the operation of the tariff of '46; and yet the Union gives us tables showing a large increase of consumption of cotton during three years, under the operation of a tariff whose practical effects could not be felt by any crop previous to the one of the year that has just ended.

Observe the crop produced and sold in '47-8 is the crop of '47. The increas

tables, 103,805 bales. Just at this time, the practical effects of the tariff of '46 begin to be felt; and the increase for the succeeding year is only 20,000! and the price, until very lately not above the cost of production.

When cotton was low, the purchasers sent their orders early and purchased largely. Thus, of the crop of 1847-8, 281,497 bales were taken in the first seven months, being at the rate of 40,000 a month, leaving for the last five months, 250,000-і. е., 50,000 a month.

Of the crop of '48-9, there were taken in the first six months, 307,303 bales51,000 per month, leaving to be taken, to equal the last year, less than 83,000 a month.

Thus it appears that low prices, and a large supply, induce larger sales in the early part of the year, and vice versa.

"If our readers will now re-peruse our extract from the Union, they will find the whole effect of the article to be produced by comparing the early purchases of the present year, which were large, with the early purchases of last year, which were small.

The real facts we will now show, made up to the time at which we write:

The remaining period may give 30,000, but that is exceedingly doubtful, for within a month we have seen notice of the total stoppage of three or four large factories in our own immediate neighborhood, and the same causes that stop them must tend to produce the stoppage of others. Allowing, however, that 30,000 additional bales will be required, we obtain as the consumption of the year, 512,360; against a consumption of the previous year of 531,772; being a falling off of 20,000 bales in a year, instead of an increase of 20,000 in ten months.

The consumption and exportation of cotton cloth for the year, notwithstanding the low prices, will thus fall short of last year not less than 20,000 bales; and then the following will be the result of the years affected by the tariffs

of 1842 and 1846 :

This, however, tells but a small part of the

is greatly affected by the price.

1842 remained unchanged? Would not we now be consuming 250,000 additional bales? And would not the demand have sustained the price at ten cents, as it now stands, instead of the low rates that have prevailed through the year? And is not this the price that has been paid by the South, not less than $55,000,000, for refusing to allow the products of the land to be consumed on the land?

And now upon the topic of the Southern factories, upon which the correspondent remarks that they have no protection against New England. It is true they have no legal protection against New England, but they have the prodigious advantage over the New England factories, of having their raw material growing almost at the door of the factory. Against England, however, the South maintains a protection for herself in the shape of the tariff of 1846, and there is every probability that if that were removed, she would be

in ditto, 42,000.

1846. Crop 840 millions pounds, about 8 cents.

Increase

in ditto, 33,000. 1847. Crop 711 millions pounds, average 10 cents. Increase 5,000.

Total increase, then, over 1842, 16,000 bales; increase of home demand over do., 70,000 bales; showing the extraordinary permanence and certainty of the home market over the foreign one.

1848.-Crop again large-price seven cents. Home consumption increased 103,000 bales, and exceeded by 206,000 the quantity taken in 1843, when the crop was nearly the same, showing a large decrease in the power of consumption abroad.

1849. Crop 1100 millions pounds, average price eight and a half cents; and yet the consumption, so far as seaboard is concerned, has, for the first time in some years, absolutely gone backward, while our population has increased with immense rapidity.

Now, if the consumption of 1847, with a crop of 711 millions, average above ten cents, increased 5000 bales, what would be the increase of the present year, with a crop 389 millions larger, had the tariff of

of foreign manufacture, and her new and flourishing factories be broken down.

Another topic of importance, touched upon by the "Plough, Loom, and Anvil," is that of emigration. Every emigrant to the West is an additional producer of corn or cotton in the West, whose competition tends to lower the price of Eastern and Southern products, and, we may add, to raise the price of manufactures; and every individual workman who is kept at home and employed in manufacture, is an addi

tional consumer of Eastern and Southern products, whose competition lowers the price of manufactures, and raises that of corn and cotton.

"We are gravely assured that the consumer benefits largely by the low prices, but whence come the low prices? Is it not from the depression of the South? And can the

South consume as much cloth with cotton at five cents, as they could do at ten? Certainly not. The South is now clothing the world at its own loss, and the power to consume cloth is there diminished, and would be still more so, were it not that it is to a certain extent maintained by the introduction of a new species of employment, that would long since have been naturalized there had the plough, the loom, and the anvil been permitted to come together. The consumption of the North diminishes, notwithstanding a vast increase of population, and notwithstanding the great diminution of cost, and it does so because the

paper

"Every increase in the ratio of consumers to producers tends to raise the price of food and cotton, and of all other agricultural products, and to enable farmers and planters to consume more largely of cloth and iron, shoes and hats, and bo books, and the producers of these latter commodities are thereby enabled to consume more largely of food and cotton, and thus it is that the owner of land benefits by an increase in the home consumption of the products of the land. Every man that is driven to seek the West, there to raise food or cotton, tends to diminish the power of farmers and planters to consume cloth and iron, and to diminish the power of the makers of cloth and iron to consume food or cotton, and thus it is that the owner of land is injured by a diminution in the home consumption of the products of the land." -Plough, Loom, and Anvil.

It is a fact but little attended to by the enemies of protection, that the wealth of the farmer is not to be measured by his production merely, but by his power of exchanging his surplus products. A sheaf of corn rotting unused in the stack is not wealth; but when a market opens for it, then it becomes wealth. Now, by the free trader's plan of trusting to the contingencies of an European market, the wealth of the United States is to be gauged by the wants of EuA good crop and low prices in Europe is to bring the entire trade of America to a dead stop. Let us suppose that not a single manufactured article was produced on this side of the Atlantic, that our entire commerce consisted in an exchange of breadstuffs for manufactures, which would be the paridisaical condition of free trade, we are then under the necessity of keeping the prices of breadstuffs down so low as to compete with the farmers of England and the grain-growers of Europe, who produce at a half or one third the price that we do; and being subject to this competition, we should be obliged to pay our own freights and brokerages, and run our own risks of insurance, and other expenses, while we have twice or thrice the distance to travel over, and the political contingencies of corn-laws, embargoes, and maritime wars hanging perpetually over us; to say nothing of the certainty of a time to come, and that not far distant, when the improvements in

without the aid of corn-laws, with a full supply of better food than the stale corn, rancid meal, and withered potatoes, which our farmers send across the Atlantic.

1. Either the farmer depends on the contingency of a deficient supply of fooe in foreign countries, raising prices to th famine point there; or, in times of plenty

2. He must expect to undersell the European producer, who is able to produce at half the cost. Again,

1. At all times, the wealth of the farmer depends upon his ability to exchange his surplus products for manufactured articles, or for money wherewith to purchase such articles.

2. The increase of his wealth is limited to his ability to dispose of his surplus: that is to say, to the ability of the foreign manufacturer to supply him.

3. The foreign manufacturer will supply him at prices regulated by the dearth or abundance of grain in Europe and Great Britain.

4. If food is abundant in Great Britain and Europe, the home demand in those countries for manufactures will raise their price, while at the same time it raises the price of food in America.

5. Thus it appears that the American producer has a double disadvantage of selling less food, and getting less for it, whenever the price of food falls in other countries.

But there is still another consequence to be taken into the account.

The surplus of the farmer is that which remains over, when he has fed himself and his dependents. The home market is therefore composed of those who are not engaged in farming.

But these are chiefly the artisans, and handicraftsmen, and those connected with them.

The farmer is almost always able to produce a considerable surplus, the sale of which is his source of wealth; and the more there are of handicraftsmen and others who consume this surplus, the greater will be the wealth of the farmer.

When the number of handicraftsmen and operatives is sufficient to supply the farmer with all he needs, both parties will sustain