als out of which mediocrity may felect and combine, fo as to efcape the charge of plagairism. And, in fact, in our own language, this, as well as the other great refource of poetical expreffion, the employment of appropriated words, has had its effect fo much impaired by the abufe which has been made of it, that a few of our beft poets of late have endeavored to ftrike out a new path for themfelves, by refting the elevation of their compofition chiefly on a fingular, and, to an ordinary writer, an unattainable union of harmonious verfification, with a natural arrangement of words, and a fimple elegance of expreffion. It is this union which feems to form the diftinguishing charm of the poetry of Goldfmith.

From the remarks which have been made on the influence of the affociation of ideas on our judg ments in matters of tafte, it is obvious how much the opinions of a nation with refpect to merit in the fine arts; are likely to be influenced by the form of their government, and the ftate of their manners. Voltaire, in his discourse pronounced at his reception into the French academy, gives feveral reasons why the poets of that country have not fucceeded in defcribing rural scenes and employments. The principal one is, the ideas of meanness, and poverty and wretchednefs, which the French are accuftomed to affociate with the profeffion of husbandry. The fame thing is alluded to by the Abbé de Lille, in the preliminary difcourfe prefixed to his tranflation of the Georgics. "A tranflation," fays he," of this ર poem, if it had been undertaken by an author of 66 genius, would have been better calculated than any other work, for adding to the riches of our "language. A verfion of the Eneid itself, howev"er well executed, would, in this refpect, be of lefs "utility; inafmuch as the genius of our tongue ac"commodates itself more eafily to the defcription

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"of heroic achievements, than to the details of nat "ural phenomena, and of the operations of husband66 ry. To force it to express these with suitable dig. "nity, would have been a real conqueft over that "falfe delicacy, which it has contracted from our "unfortunate prejudices."

How different muft have been the emotions with which this divine performance of Virgil was read by an ancient Roman, while he recollected that period in the hiftory of his country, when dictators were called from the plough to the defence of the state, and after having led monarchs in triumph, returned again to the fame happy and independent occupation. A ftate of manners to which a Roman author of a later age looked back with fuch enthusiasm, that he afcribes, by a bold poetical figure, the flourishing ftate of agriculture under the republic, to the grateful returns which the earth then made to the illuftrious hands by which fhe was cultivated.— "Gaudente terra vomere laureato, et triumphali "aratore."*

SECTION III.

Of the Influence of Affociation on our active Principles, and on our moral Judgments.

IN order to illuftrate a little farther, the influence of the Affociation of Ideas on the human mind, I fhall add a few remarks on fome of its effects on our active and moral principles. In ftating thefe re. marks, I fhall endeavor to avoid, as much as poffible, every occafion of controverfy, by confining myself to fuch general views of the fubject, as do not prefuppofe any particular enumeration of our original principles of action, or any particular fyftem con.

*Plin. Nat. Hist. xviii. 4.

cerning the nature of the moral faculty. If my health and leifure enable me to carry my plans into execution, I propofe, in the fequel of this work, to refume these inquiries, and to examine the various opinions to which they have given rise.

The manner in which the affociation of ideas operates in producing new principles of action, has been explained very diftinctly by different writers. Whatever conduces to the gratification of any natural appetite, or of any natural defire, is itfelf defired on account of the end to which it is fubfervient; and by being thus habitually affociated in our apprehenfion with agreeable objects, it frequently comes, in procefs of time, to be regarded as valuable in itself, independently of its utility. It is thus that wealth becomes, with many, an ultimate object of pursuit ; although, at firft, it is undoubtedly valued, merely on account of its fubferviency to the attainment of other objects. In like manner, men are led to defire drefs, equipage, retinue, furniture, on account of the eftimation in which they are supposed to be held by the public. Such defires are called by Dr. Hutchefon* fecondary defires; and the origin is explained by him in the way which I have mentioned. "Since "we are capable," fays he, "of reflection, memory, "obfervation, and reafoning about the diftant ten"dencies of objects and actions, and not confined to "things prefent, there muft arife, in confequence of our original defires, fecondary defires of every "thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary defires; and that with ftrength proportioned to "the feveral original defires, and imagined ufeful"nefs or neceffity of the advantageous object.""Thus," he continues, " as foon as we come to ap"prehend the use of wealth or power to gratify any "of our original defires, we muft alfo defire them; "and hence arifes the univerfality of thefe defires * See his Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions,

"of wealth and power, fince they are the means of gratifying all other defires." The only thing that appears to me exceptionable in the foregoing paffage is, that the author claffes the defire of power with that of wealth; whereas I apprehend it to be clear, (for reafons which I fhall ftate in another part of this work,) that the former is a primary defire, and the latter a fecondary one.

Our moral judgments, too, may be modified, and even perverted, to a certain degree, in confequence of the operation of the fame principle. In the fame manner in which a person who is regarded as a model of taste may introduce, by his example, an abfurd or fantastical drefs; fo a man of fplendid virtues may attract fome esteem alfo to his imperfections; and, if placed in a confpicuous fituation, may render his vices and follies objects of general imitation among the multitude.

"In the reign of Charles II." fays Mr. Smith,* " a degree of licentiousness was deemed the charac"teriftic of a liberal education. It was connected, "according to the notions of thofe times, with gen"erofity, fincerity, magnanimity, loyalty; and pro"ved that the person who acted in this manner, was "a gentleman, and not a puritan. Severity of man"ners, and regularity of conduct, on the other hand, "were altogether unfashionable, and were connect❝ed, in the imagination of that age, with cant, cun

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ning, hypocrify, and low manners. To fuperfi"cial minds, the vices of the great feem at all times ❝ agreeable. They connect them, not only with "the fplendor of fortune, but with many fuperior "virtues which they afcribe to their fuperiors; with

the fpirit of freedom and independency; with "franknefs, generofity, humanity, and politeness. "The virtues of the inferior ranks of people, on

*Theory of Moral Sentiments.

"the contrary, their parfimonious frugality, their "painful industry, and rigid adherence to rules, "feem to them mean and difagreeable. They con"nect them both with the meannefs of the station "to which thefe qualities commonly belong, and "with many great vices which they fuppofe ufually "accompany them; fuch as an abject, cowardly, ill"natured, lying, pilfering difpofition."

The theory which, in the foregoing paffages from Hutchefon and Smith, is employed fo juftly and philofophically to explain the origin of our fecondary defires, and to account for fome perverfions of our moral judgments, has been thought fufficient, by fome later writers, to account for the origin of all our active principles without exception. The firft

of thefe attempts to extend fo very far the application of the doctrine of Affociation was made by the Rev. Mr. Gay, in a differtation "concerning the ❝ fundamental Principle of Virtue," which is prefixed by Dr. Law to his tranflation of Archbishop King's Effay "On the Origin of Evil." In this differtation, the author endeavours to fhew, "that "our approbation of morality, and all affections "whatsoever, are finally refolvable into reason, "pointing out private happiness, and are conver"fant only about things apprehended to be means "tending to this end; and that wherever this end "is not perceived, they are to be accounted for "from the affociation of ideas, and may properly "be called habits." The fame principles have been fince pushed to a much greater length by Dr. Hart'ley, whose system (as he himself informs us) took rife from his accidentally hearing it mentioned as an opinion of Mr. Gay, "that the affociation of i"deas was fufficient to account for all our intellect"ual pleasures and pains*."

*Mr. Hume too, who in my opinion has carried this principle of the Association of Ideas a great deal too far, has compared the