motive to provide ourselves for it when this is only approximately known is a most uncertain process, as the Americans found in the course of their late war with Spain. They dredged for the cables outside Santiago with very moderate success. On one occasion, when they thought they had found the line, it was discovered that what they had secured was in fact only a broken cable which had been long lying at the bottom of the sea as a valueless wreck. In every case when they did contrive to cut the communications of the Spanish officials with their superiors, and with one another, it was by going close inshore, and breaking the cable at some spot where its locality was indicated by buildings at the landing - place. This is the obvious course to follow where circumstances allow it to be adopted. But it cannot always be easily taken. Where the sea deepens gradually it is possible to get at the cables with very simple appliances, and yet at such a distance from the shore that the boats engaged on the work are not subject to the fire of the defenders. When, however, the coast is what the sailors call "steep up"-when, that is to say, the deep water is soon reached because the land sinks near the beach - the case is much altered. Special appliances of greater power are needed to bring up the cable from deep water. To find it in shallow water there is need to come close, and to run the risk of being sunk by fire from the shore. The Americans did There are two ways in which a submarine cable can be cut. It can be dredged up even from deep water, or it can be severed at the place where it touches the land. When its exact course is known, a vessel fitted with the necessary appliances can get at it anywhere, and then its destruction follows. But to do this it is absolutely necessary to know the precise course of the line. To dredge take this hazard at Cienfuegos with complete success, partly because the fire of the Spaniards was wild, partly because they were, according to their well-established habit, wanting in everything at the critical moment. Yet even so the danger was great, and it is very doubtful whether the Americans would have gained their object if the exact spot at which the cable reached the shore had not been indicated for them by buildings. Of course it is obvious that if the Americans could have taken Cienfuegos with a landing-party, they need not have given themselves the trouble to dredge. In order, then, to attain the utmost possible security that a submarine cable will not be cut, certain conditions must be fulfilled. Absolute security cannot be obtained, because there is always the chance that the enemy will fish it up from deep water. Exact knowledge of the course of an opponent's wire is certainly one of the things which an alert Intelligence Department will strive to obtain. Once in possession of the information, the work of destruction is a mere question of fitting out a properly provided ship. But if perfect protection cannot be attained, it is always possible to make the work of severing the cable difficult. These conditions are that it shall only touch the shore at places in your power, that there shall be no tell-tale signs to mark out the precise landing - place, that the post shall be defensible against landing-parties, and that it shall be provided with such an artillery as will keep the assailant's boats and small craft at a distance. If we apply these tests to our cable on the west coast of Africa, we see at once that it is wanting in security. Our communication either goes through places belonging to other States, or it touches on spots where we certainly could not be sure that an alert enemy would not make himself master by a sudden raid. There is a cable from the Cape to Ascension, but it stops on that island. To attain to the nearest possible approach to absolute security that our power of communicating with the Cape will not be broken, we ought to carry on the line from Ascension till it reaches the Land's End. This would be feasible enough, but it is not quite sufficient. In order to maintain a complete control over the South Atlantic, it is desirable to be able to do more than send information and orders from home to Ascension. The vital part of the route for us is in fact rather the portion which lies between the island and the Channel. It is eminently improbable that in naval war any the ships of an enemy would be found as far south as St Helena. Even when, if ever, the French have made a real port of war out of Diego Suarez, they will hardly cruise from thence round the Cape into seas in which they have practically no chance of finding coal. Unless the South American republics of the east develop effective fleets, or are in alliance against us with some Power which has one, the South Atlantic will in all probability be more more free from hostile ships than any other sea. Dependence on coal goes far to counterbalance the greater mobility of steamers. We have, therefore, good reason to make the calculation that it is to the north, and not to the south, of Ascension, that the chief perils will have to be met, and that we shall have most need for secure places where information may be found. Now it happens that it is just on this portion of the route that we are worst off for secure stations of our own. The Cape Verd Islands, the Canaries, and Madeira are all admirably placed to serve the purpose. For all commercial purposes they serve very well as landingplaces for a submarine cable, but the question is, What use could be made of them in war? The answer to this inquiry must needs be, "Very little." Let us suppose that we are at war with a formidable opponent, and that we wish to avail ourselves of the cable which goes by Lisbon to Madeira and the Cape Verd Islands and thence to the Cape. Of course at the same time we shall wish to prevent our antagonist from taking advantage of the line, and as it is in English hands, we shall always be able to do this. What is the position which will be immediately created? We shall be making use of Portuguese territory for a warlike purpose, and our foe will have every reason, and also a perfect right, to call upon the Government at Lisbon to oberve its neutrality-that is to say, to prevent us from using its ports as bases of operations. During the war between Spain and the United States some jealousy was felt and expressed in America lest the Spaniards should be unduly favoured in the use of the French WestIndian cable. It may be considered as certain that any powerful enemy of ours would protest energetically against our exclusive use of a line working through through Portugal. Among ourselves it is not uncommon to hear doubts expressed whether the Portuguese could defend their neutralitythat is to say, prevent a belligerent from seizing the station at Madeira and cutting the line. But the neutrality of Portugal - which means its absolute impartiality between the combatants - is not what we must desire. If neither side is to derive an advantage from the cable to the hurt of the other, the Portuguese must insist either that it shall be equally used, or that neither shall avail himself of it. The one course shall be as little to our good as the other. Portugal, as things stand, must either take up a position of real neutrality, or put herself on our side. In the latter case the station at Funchal becomes liable to attack, and the obligation to provide it with effectual defence will assuredly be thrown on us, since the authorities at Lisbon want the power, even if they have the will, to defend the island against a raid of very moderate strength. What is true of Madeira holds equally good for the Cape The Verd Islands, and indeed for any and every station not in our direct possession. The neutrality of any port is as much destroyed when it is used for the transmission of messages for the advantage of one side only, as when it is used for forwarding stores or men. aggrieved party in such a case is perfectly entitled to protest, and if expostulations are neglected, or even seem likely to be of no effect, then to take hostile measures. In easily conceivable circumstances this is the line which any enemy of ours might be relied upon to follow. His Since, then, we cannot be sure of being allowed to make exclusive use of telegraphstations on Portuguese territory, it would seem to follow that we ought to endeavour to secure some spot on the searoute from the Channel to Ascension for ourselves. A writer in the 'St James's Gazette' has recommended that we should secure the Desertas, which lie close to Madeira and afford fair anchorage. suggestions, it is true, go much further, for he holds that we ought to secure "a series of small island stations along the deep-sea route to the Cape," to be used as naval bases for the "coaling, docking, repairing, and refitting of our warships.' This is a larger question, and one into which it is not our present purpose to enter. It may be pointed out, however, that "naval base is one of a good-sized family of words, to which also "strategical," and "tactical," and "command of the sea" belong, all the sea" belong, all very useful when properly employed, of which a monstrous misuse is made in the papers. In the opinion of many competent judges it is not desirable to multiply stations for "coaling, docking, repairing, and refitting." Coal deteriorates rapidly when left in store, and most particularly in the tropics. The only good coaling-station is a great port like Hong-Kong, where there is a constant demand for fuel for purposes of trade, and where it is brought by way of business, and is necessarily renewed, so that it can always be obtained fresh. As for docking and repairing, they imply great works, which again call for fortifications and garrisons. Fortifications and garrisons run away with money. It is not by multiplying vulnerable points of this kind, and causes of expense on immobile instruments, that a naval Power can make its strength felt, but by ships. As regards this route down the West Coast of Africa, it is not more fortified bases we need, but only the security that we can transmit orders, and that there will be a few known centres to which the cruisers can always revert for instructions, and the trading-ship for information. In our hands the Desertas would serve that purpose very well, but in order to be of real value to us, they ought to be wholly in our possession. That Portugal should allow us to use them would unquestionably be to our convenience; but it is what no serious enemy of ours would allow her to do with impunity. If, when war came, Portugal asked us, under pressure of our opponents, to withdraw our officials from the Desertas, we should either have to do so or to occupy the post by force. But supposing things to have come to that pitch, Madeira is far better worth taking, and so is St Vincent in the Cape Verds, than a handful of barren and, at present, uninhabited islets. The one advantage of securing the Desertas would be that it would preserve us from a dilemma of this character at a crisis. Moreover, the bargain must be made well before war is on us, since it will not only be necessary to establish the machines, but to provide them with such amount of protection as will make them safe against capture by the boats of some roaming cruiser. More serious attack they will hardly experience, unless the enemy's great fleets are at sea, unmolested for the time being at any rate by our fleet. But in the absence of some such protection, the Desertas would become a pure burden on the navy, since it would be necessary to tell a ship off to act guard over them, and in that case she would be deducted from the cruising fleet. If, however, we can secure the islets, the bargain might be a good one to make, unless we paid very much too dear. As the Desertas can be of very little value to Portugal, they ought to be purchasable at least at a pretium affectionis which it would be worth our while to give. With them in our hands, a deep-sea cable, protected as well as such a thing can be, would be at our disposition from the Channel to the Cape from the moment we had laid down the piece required to join Ascension to the Channel. The line would be one which existed purely for political and military purposes. It could not pay as a commercial speculation, and would necessarily have to be constructed at the expense of the State. But the outlay would be a profitable one from the political and military point of view, and is indeed necessary if we are to retain the power combine the movements of our ships in all parts of the world. to |