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Adjournment of Congress-Independence of Texas.

great degree, to the advantage of the mother country: this regards the three lower counties, the strength of which is vastly on the side of the plaintiffs."

Thus, sir, it appears that the title of William Penn to "three lower counties upon Delaware," under the grants from the Duke of York, were recognised in the most solemn manner, and after a thorough investigation by the law officers of the Crown. Under this decision, he continued to hold them up to the period of our Revolution, when all portions not previously conveyed passed immediately to the State of Delaware. That State has ever since claimed and exercised exclusive jurisdiction over this territory. She has, therefore, not only a good, but the best possible of all titles, for she has both the right and the possession combined.

Having the right, she chose, for wise, and national, and patriotic purposes, to transfer it, so far as related to the island in question, to the United States. She did so on the condition before stated, that the United States should erect and maintain certain military works for the defence of that portion of our common country. She was fully aware of the importance and value of the island for that purpose, but she did not ask or accept a single farthing for it. The United States were well satisfied with her title at that time; and if, when they came to take possession, they found Dr. Gale there, (which I much doubt,) he was there as a trespasser and an intruder; for he did not pretend to claim under the State of Delaware, and I have shown, I think, that he could derive no possible title from New Jersey.

The effort, therefore, to awaken public sympathy in his behalf, as one who had been rudely treated by the strong arm of authority, is altogether out of place. There is nothing in the history of the proceedings to justify it. On the contrary, if there be any one who has a just right to complain, it is the General Government and its agents, who have been slandered for acts which they never performed, and pursued with vexatious demands which have no foundation in equity or law.

And the true question now is, will you, because an individual has the hardihood to lay claim to property which is in your possession, and which you are well satisfied lawfully belongs to you, pay him an exorbitant price to compromise, rather than send him to the courts and to a trial before his peers, where you are morally certain he cannot recover? Will any man believe that if the claimant himself had the slightest confidence in the strength of his title, he would hesitate about adopting this course? With a verdict in his favor, how differently could he appeal to this House, and how different a sum might he not demand. Sir, it is because he knows he cannot recover in a court of law, that he is now willing to come before Congress, and run the risk of getting what he asks or taking what you will give.

You already hold his agreement to part with any or whatever title he may possess, whenever you are satisfied as to its validity. But the gentleman from New Jersey complains that you will not pay him before this antecedent condition is complied with. What, I ask, is there to produce this conviction in your minds? What is the evidence relied upon? Why, simply that professional men have differed in their opinions as to the right of the claimant. But is not the weight of authority all one way? For while, on one side, you have nothing but the loose and ill-digested brief of the district attorney for the New Jersey district, together with the doubts of the present Attorney General of the United States on the other, you have the well-arranged and copious argument of the late celebrated Cæsar A. Rodney, and also the lucid and unequiv cal opinion of the equally distinguished and much-lamented William Wirt, when he was the Attorney General of the United States.

Under these circumstances, then, can you say, under

[MAY 30, 1836.

this man's own agreement, that the condition upon which the money was to be paid has been fufilled? It is morally impossible. There is nothing, literally nothing, in the case calculated to bring your minds to such a result. Is it, therefore, either just or expedient to adopt the provisions of this bill, which propose to allow him not merely the sum he originally agreed to take, but nearly double that amount? And if expedient for the United States, is it either just or expedient for the State of Delaware, from whom the cession of this island was obtained, and whose rights, I repeat, may be seriously affected by your giving any countenance to this claim? As her representative on this floor, bound at all times, both from inclination and duty, to defend her interests, I protest against it-I protest against any action on the part of this body, which shall have a tendency, directly or indirectly, to compromit her rights, or in any manner call in question her title to one inch of her territory. And, sir, I trust in this I shall find myself sustained not only by all those gentlemen who are the advocates of State rights, but by the sober judgment of the whole House. With a view of testing the opinion of the House, I shall first move to lay the bill on the table; and if I fail in this, I shall then offer a resolution, by way of amendment, proposing that a retrocession of this island be made to the State of Delaware.

When Mr. MILLIGAN had concluded,

Mr. INGERSOLL addressed the House at length on the subject.

Mr. LANE remarked that much time had been spent in investigating this subject, and it was probable that the debate would, if not arrested, be continued for some time to come. As the facts were all before the House, and as every member was doubtless prepared to vote on the bill, he moved the previous question.

Mr. VANDERPOEL moved a call of the House, and asked for the yeas and nays; which were ordered, and were: Yeas 83, nays 14.

A motion was then made that the House adjourn; which was carried: Yeas 51, nays 48; and The House adjourned.

MONDAY, MAY 30.

ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS.

Mr. HIESTER moved to take up the resolution from the Senate fixing a day for the adjournment of Congress. Objections being made, Mr. H. moved to suspend the rules for that purpose.

Mr. CRAIG moved to amend the motion so as to suspend the rules for the further purpose of taking up and disposing of the resolution reported by the Committee of Ways and Means fixing a day for the consideration of the deposite bill. He was unwilling to fix a day for the adjournment until the bills to which he had referred were acted on.

Mr. McKIM moved a call of the House. Lost.

Mr. HOWELL moved to lay the motion to suspend the rules, together with the amendment, on the table.

Mr. HIESTER asked for the yeas and nays; which were not ordered, and the motion of Mr. HOWELL prevailed: Yeas 81, nays 56.

INDEPENDENCE OF TEXAS.

Mr. STORER asked the consent of the House to present a memorial, adopted at a meeting of the citizens of his district, praying Congress to recognise the independ ence of Texas.

Objection being made, Mr. S. moved a suspension of the rule, and asked for the yeas and nays; which were not ordered.

Mr. HARPER moved to amend the motion so as to suspend the rule for the additional purpose of allowing

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him to present similar memorials from citizens of the county and city of Philadelphia.

Mr. PARKS moved to lay the motion to suspend the rules on the table.

Mr. CLAIBORNE, of Mississippi, asked for the yeas and nays on this motion; which were ordered.

Mr. PARKS then withdrew his motion; when Mr. MANN, of New York, renewed it, and asked for the yeas and nays; which were ordered.

The motion to suspend the rules for the purpose stated was then laid on the table: Yeas 116, nays 52.

Mr. JOHNSON, of Louisiana, asked the consent of the House to permit him to present several petitions.

Mr. ADAMS objected, and gave notice that he would not consent to the presentation of any petition out of the usual order, as he had various petitions which he wished to offer.

DECISION OF THE CHAIR.

Mr. CRAIG moved to suspend the rules until one o'clock, for the purpose of considering a resolution reported by the Committee of Ways and Means, fixing a day for taking up and disposing of the bill regulating the deposites of the public moneys in certain local banks. Mr. OWENS asked for the yeas and nays on the motion; which were ordered.

When the name of Mr. PATTON, of Virginia, was called, he rose and asked to be excused from voting, and demanded that the question should now be taken on his application.

Mr. HAMER, of Ohio, hoped the call would proceed, as the question raised by the gentleman from Virginia had been very recently decided.

The CHAIR suggested that the call had better proceed until the roll was called through, passing over the gentleman from Virginia; and, before the result was announced, the question which the gentleman wished to make could be raised.

Mr. PATTON acquiesced in this suggestion, as it enabled him to present the same question, substantially, which he had indicated his purpose to make.

The roll having been called through,

The CHAIR remarked that it was for the House to say whether the motion of the gentleman from Virginia should be decided before the decision of the House was announced. Mr. PATTON said he wished to know whether the Speaker adhered to the decision he had made the other day, that the vote of the House on the main question must be reported before the motion of a member to be excused from voting was put to the House.

The CHAIR said the result of the vote just taken could not be changed by the vote of the gentleman on either side. Mr. PATTON said he desired a decision of the Chair, one way or the other, on the question he had made. He could not consent that it should be dodged or evaded, while he and others should be denounced as factious spirits for voting against a decision which those who made and sustained it would not, and dared not, discuss. The CHAIR stated that he had the other day decided this question, and his decision had been sustained by the House. He now decided that, where a member asked to be excused, or declined voting, the rule being silent as to the time when the question should be decided, the result of the vote should be announced before the question on the application was put. If a contrary practice prevailed, it would be in the power of a few members to arrest the decision of a question. In this case, the result could not be varied by the vote of the gentleman; and he decided that it was the duty of the Chair to announce that result, leaving the question on the gentle man's application to be excused for the subsequent decision of the House.

Mr. PATTON then appealed from the decision of the VOL. XII.-256

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Chair, and was proceeding to address the House in support of his appeal, when

Mr. MANN, of New York, rose and proposed to call for the orders of the day.

Mr. PATTON said he was entitled to the floor, and should not yield it, unless the gentleman rose to a question of order. He said he was pretty well apprized of what his rights were, and, with the blessing of God, he meant to maintain them.

The Chair has declared (said Mr. P.) the question whether he should be excused could not be decided until the vote of the House had been declared. I mean to show that the decision is not correct. The same decision had been made a few days ago by the Speaker, and sustained by the House. He bad, with forty-five other gentlemen, voted against the decision of the Chair on that occasion, and he had made this question at this time, again, for the purpose of having an opportunity of vindicating his opinion in argument, and of showing that his course and opinions on that occasion were in con. formity to his duty, and not factious or anarchical, as had been alleged. As to the particular question of which he had availed himself in order to raise the point upon the decision of the Chair, he had no difficulty in voting upon it. But no other means were left to him of bringing to the deliberate review of the House the decision made the other day, and which he (Mr. P.) considered as a subversion of the rules of the House, by violating the plain letter and spirit of one of their most important provisions. He wished to vindicate the cause of truth and reason, by resisting a decision which bade defiance to both, disappointing the purposes for which the rules were made, and was a virtual repeal of those rules. He made it now, also, because it afforded him the only means in the only place in which, consistently with his character and self-respect, he could vindicate himself, his course, and motives, from the most recklessly false and slanderous imputations made upon them in the paper of the official printers of this body, who were supplied with the means of pouring out their daily torrent of calumny and abuse by means of the public treasure paid to them by this House as public printers.

When several honorable members of this House, some days ago, had asked to be excused from voting, and others declined voting, another member, [Mr. WHITTLESEY, of Ohio,] in the exercise of his unquestionable rights as a member of this House, had moved an appeal from the decision of the Chair similar to that now appealed from. We were compelled to express our opinions on that question, whether we would or not; we had no option but to say, upon our honor as gentlemen, and、 our conscientious convictions as Representatives, whether the rule of the House was as the Speaker said it was. And those of us who were of opinion that the Speaker had mistaken the meaning of the rule, who knew that it was directly in the teeth of the only precedent that we know of, for thus deciding upon this mere question of order, are now denounced by the official organs of this body as "the factious spirits of the House," engaged in "a joint plot to unsettle the Government and disturb the Union;" as those "who, for partisan objects, would revolutionize the principles of order in Congress and in the Government; who would throw every thing into anarchy," &c. These are the developments, stupendous and tremendous, which are derived from the fact that forty-five or six gentlemen happened to differ from the Speaker on a mere question about the construction of the rules. And, besides all this, I suppose we are now to understand, so far as the authority of three self-constituted high priests of republicanism and democracy (the editors of the Globe) can accomplish it, that it is henceforth to be considered as one of the established canons of political orthodoxy, that no man who claims to

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Decision of the Chair.

[MAY 30, 1836.

man; I do not believe they ever will wish themselves so represented.

be, or wishes to be considered a republican, must dare to vote against any decision of a party Speaker, be it right or wrong, wise or unwise, consistent with reason and authority, or in the face of both; and this, too, when by another rule, made by the Speaker, and sustained by the House, every man's mouth is gagged, and he is not allowed to justify his vote by argument. I say all this is to be inferred, because, in the same article of this of-sustained, the mouth of every man who dissented was ficial organ of the House, it is said that there is but one "stanch republican vote" among the factious forty-six; and it is more than insinuated that he, too, must forfeit his place in the good opinion of the said high priests, unless he will accept the apology they have good-naturedly tendered to him, viz: "that he got there under some misconception of the question."

Whether that honorable gentleman will avail himself of this apology, and feel flattered by the left-handed compliment he has received, I know not. For myself, I have no hesitation in saying that I feel much more honored by the abuse and denunciation I have received, than I should be by such a compliment from any quarter, and especially from such a source as this proceeds from.

I have furthermore been induced, Mr. Speaker, to raise this question of order, because I know the fact that some honorable gentlemen, whose republicanism and democracy will stand the test of the latest and most approved standard, which will not even be questioned by the great Globe itself, for they have all the attributes of a democrat, and especially that one thing needful, (being in favor of a particular gentleman for the presidency,) which will, in the opinion of certain editors, in the twinkling of an eye, quick as the touch of the wand of a magician, convert the most discordant political elements into one homogeneous mass of democracy. I say I know that there are such honorable gentlemen on this floor, who voted to sustain the Speaker's decision, who, after a little reflection, became satisfied that they had fallen into an error, and that the Speaker's decision was wrong, and ought to be reversed. I trust and believe that, upon this question being deliberately considered and discussed, many others will be found who will be convinced of their error, and have firmness and independence enough to avow it.

Mr. PATTON said he was not in the habit of making a parade of professions of democracy or republicanism; ready at all proper times and places to give a frank disclosure of his opinions and principles as to men and measures to those who have a right to know them, he left it to them to call him "democrat," "republican," or whatever else they please. I disclaim and disavow (said Mr. P.) any inference from my opinions in regard to the comparative merits and claims of the different candidates for the presidency, whatever they may be, (and I certainly do not mean to make any avowal of them here and now,) upon any votes I give here upon any question whatever. I have decided, and shall continue to do so, every question which I may be called on to decide, upon its own merits, without regard to its effect upon the prospects and success of any aspirant or any party; and when the time comes that I can be induced to vote here upon questions of constitutional law or practical policy in the administration of the affairs of the Government, or upon the interpretation of the rules established for the government of the House, not in conformity with the convictions of my own judgment and reason, but according to the behests and dictation of party leaders and editors, and for the accomplishment of mere party objects, I should feel that I was sunk into the depths of political prostitution, and the high-minded and intelligent people I represent would feel that I was unworthy to represent them. Just as certainly as (I am proud to say) if they desired a representative such as I have described, they know me well enough to know that I am not their

When this question of order was pending a few days ago, by another construction of the rules of the House, made by the Speaker, and sustained by the House, that no debate could be permitted upon a question of order arising incidentally after the previous question had been closed, and no one allowed to argue against the decision. Sir, this is another invention of the present session; an entire novelty in the practice and order of the House. You know as well as I do, Mr. Speaker, that, on many occasions since you and I have been members of this House, questions of order have been debated, during the administration of both your predecessors, after the previous question had been called on the main question; and it never entered into the imagination of any man to conceive that we could not debate a question of order under the operation of a rule which merely forbids debate upon the main question. I know, sir, that a late Speaker of this House (Mr. Stevenson) considers this decision as an innovation upon the rules and constant practice of the House. At the very last session of Congress, upon an appeal taken by myself from the decision of Mr. Speaker BELL, it was decided upon yeas and nays that it was in order to move a call of the House after the previous question had been demanded. That appeal was debated for hours. You, Mr. Speaker, I believe, as well as myself, took part in that debate. Mr. BELL made that decision, contrary to his own opinion, in compliance with a decision made by Mr. Stevenson at a previous session, when Mr. Stevenson's decision was sustained by a majority of two upon a sort of vote which I always blush to see upon such a question as this--I mean a strictly party vote, with the exception of some seven or eight of those who were called administration men. I was one of that seven or eight, and, on my appeal, as I have before said, the decision was reversed. Mr. Stevenson confined his denial of the right to move a call of the House to the particular stage of a demand of the previous question before it was ascertained whether it was seconded. He expressly admitted it was in order after the motion was seconded, and after it was ordered that the main question should be now put; and, until this session, no man ever questioned that the pendency of the previous question did not preclude debate upon any incidental question of order.

The question decided by Mr. Stevenson was made during the panic session, as it has been called, when parties were divided and classified according to their opinions upon the questions connected with the removal of the deposites. I voted against his decision, because I thought it was wrong; and the fact that almost the entire body of the friends of the administration voted the other way was a matter of mere indifference to me. In so far as I sustained the administration in that struggle, I sustained it because in doing so I was sustaining, as I then thought and now think, the true principles of the constitution and the just authority of the laws; and whenever any measure or measures of this or any other administration shall be, according to my judgment, con. stitutional and expedient, they will have my support. So far I have sustained this, and will sustain any other administration; and beyond this I have not and will not support any.

Mr. P. further said that he did not flatter himself that he should succeed in persuading the House to reverse its decision. He knew well the effect of the pride of consistency on the minds of gentlemen who have already voted once on the question. In addition to this, he was aware that many gentlemen, especially new members, who were not familiar with the operations of our rules, strongly inclined, as a matter of course, to sustain the

MAT 30, 1836.]

Decision of the Chair.

decision of the presiding officer, especially when there
are any even plausible arguments in support of the de-
It was natural; it
cision. He did not complain of this.
was right; he felt and acted upon it himself in many
cases. He believed that the Speaker knew well that he
(Mr. P.) had never desired to embarrass him in the dis-
charge of his arduous and difficult duties; but, on the
contrary, that he had on many occasions given him proof
of his anxiety to support and sustain him, whenever he
could do so. It always gave him much more pleasure to
be able to agree with the Speaker than to differ. There
were no considerations, personal or political, that pre-
vented him from doing so.

In addition to other things which prevent me from expecting to reverse the decision of the House now, apprehend much the effect of the terror of party denunciation. There may be, too, some who think that it is right and justifiable to act upon party grounds on such questions as this. Of course, they, from convictions of party obligation and allegiance, will be wholly inaccessible to the convictions of reason and argument. Besides, sir, I am bound to believe, and do believe, that gentlemen may, from as honest and deliberate a conviction that it is right, as I claim mine to be that it is wrong, adhere to their vote in support of the Speaker's decision.

I will now proceed to show that the decision is erroneous. The question arises under the 28th rule, in these words:

"Every member who shall be in the House when the question is put shall give his vote, unless the House, for special reasons, shall excuse him.

The House is to decide whether the member shall be excused from voting. When shall it so decide? When the question is put, and the member is called on to vote; or when the qestion is not put, and he is not called on to vote? When, if not excused, his vote may be counted so as to affect the result; or after the question is decided, and, according to established rule, the member cannot vote if he would? Shall it be decided when the question is depending; or when the matter is ended, and there is nothing to be voted on to which the decision upon his application to be excused can apply? Sir, these are only different modes of stating the questions arising upon this appeal; and to state the questions is to indicate the only answers that can be given, and they carry with them the plain refutation of the Speaker's decision, by showing the absurdities to which it leads.

If the question whether the member shall vote is not decided until the result is announced, it is then useless to decide it at all, because the judgment of the House has been entered, the decision of the question is made and recorded, the bill or resolution is passed; and what difference does it then make whether he is excused or not?

Some three or four gentlemen the other day declined voting, and some asked to be excused. Suppose the vote upon the passage of the resolution had been a close one, and that the votes of these gentlemen would decide the question either way, according to the decision of the Speaker, it must be decided that the resolution is passed or is rejected; and then we are to decide whether the House will agree that they shall be excused from voting. Why, sir, according to your decision, they have been permitted not to vote; they have been excused, or rather prevented, from voting, not by the judgment of the House that they shall be excused, but by preventing the House from passing upon the question. There can be The rule requires every man to vote. no decision of the House until every man bound to vote A decision does vote, or until he peremptorily refuses. of any question, without the vote of every member who is required to vote, is not the decision of the House; and who is bound to vote can only be determined after the

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House has passed upon the question of excusing every
one who asks to be excused.

Suppose that so many members ask to be excused as that
those who do vote are less than a quorum-and this is by
no means an extreme case, for many questions have been
What would you
taken this session, when the refusal of very few members
would have left less than a quorum.

do, then, Mr. Speaker, under your decision? You have
a quorum present; you must go on with business; and
yet, upon your decision, you could do no business.

In short, sir, the effect of the decision of the Chair is,
that no man shall vote who asks to be excused; while the
rule is express that every man shall vote unless excused
by the House.

But we are met with a precedent. I am not one of those, Mr. Speaker, who allow themselves to be governed by precedent against their own clear convictions of I was one of those who stood by this right and reason. administration in the violent struggle through which we have just passed with the Bank of the United States, which I believe to be unconstitutional, although there were precedents in its favor at various stages of the Gov ernment, and by all parties. However, some gentlemen may respect a precedent more than I do, and I will therefore examine this famous precedent, and the manner in which it has been used. After having from one day to another to examine the question, the Speaker, who seems to have some absolution from the rules which are applied to the members on this floor, comes into the House and decides the question, and proceeds to make a speech, in the course of which he refers to this prece dent, describes it as a direct authority in favor of the decision he was about to pronounce, and that the course he should take was in conformity to the proceedings of the House in the case of Mr. Adams, in 1832. We, sir, who knew that this precedent was against the Speaker's decision, were gagged. That rule against debating a question of order pending the previous question, which

have before referred to, was rigidly enforced; and the reading even of the journal containing the precedent was not allowed. I dare say some gentlemen voted in favor of the decision of the Chair in consequence of this alleged precedent; and I desire the attention of every man who is really disposed dispassionately to decide this question, and feels himself open to conviction, while I examine this precedent.

It is amazing how any one who had seen and read this journal could come into this House and refer to this case as an authority in favor of the decision of the Chair. He must have seen and known, if he read the journal, that the precedent, or example rather, of the House in 1832, in the case of Mr. Adams, was precisely and exactly a precedent or example against the decision of the Chair. No man shall hereafter pretend the contrary, without being convicted of deliberate misrepresentation. I read from the journal:

"The previous question having been sustained,

"The main question was then stated from the Chair, viz: Will the House agree to the resolution moved by Mr. Bates, of Maine?

"Whereupon, the Clerk having commenced calling called the name of John Q. Adams; thereupon, the roll in the order prescribed by the rules of the House,

"Mr. Adams asked to be excused from voting on the said resolution, for the reasons assigned in a paper hand"I ask to be excused from voting on the resolution, beed to the Clerk, which was read, in the following words: lieving it to be unconstitutional," &c. &c. [I omit the rest of the reasons.]

"And on the question, Shall Mr. Adams be excused from voting on the question?

"It was decided in the negative.

"The question was then pronounced from the Chair,

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and the Clerk was again ordered to call the roll; and having called the name of John Q. Adams, Mr. Adams said "I decline to answer."

"A motion was made by Mr. Davenport, that the House do reconsider the vote on the application of Mr. Adams to be excused from voting.

"And on the question, Will the House reconsider the said vote?

"It was decided in the negative: Yeas 59, nays 74. [Here follow the yeas and nays, but it is not necessary, of course, to read them.]

"The putting of the said main question was then resumed, and, by direction of the Speaker, the Clerk again called the name of John Q. Adams, and no response being made by Mr. Adams, who was in his seat in the House,

"Mr. Drayton moved the following resolutions, viz: "Resolved, That John Quincy Adams, a member from Massachusetts, in refusing to vote when his name was called by the Clerk, after the House had rejected his application to be excused from voting for reasons assigned by him, has committed a breach of one of the rules of the House.

"Resolved, That a committee be appointed for the purpose of inquiring and reporting to this House the course which it ought to adopt in a case so novel and important.

"The said resolutions were read; and, after debate thereupon,

"A motion was made by Mr. Wayne, that the further consideration of the said resolutions be postponed until to-morrow; which motion was agreed to.

"And the Clerk proceeded in the call of the roll, on the question to agree to the resolution submitted by Mr. Bates, of Maine."

All this, it is seen, took place after "the Clerk had commenced calling the roll," and before any other name than that of Mr. ADAMS was called. And this is the precedent solemnly quoted by the Chair as in point for his decision that the main question must be decided before the question upon excusing a member shall be submitted to the House.

The resolutions offered by Colonel Drayton having been postponed, I have not examined what became of them, as it does not affect at all the question I am debating, or the question on which I voted the other day, or that now to be decided. Let us proceed with the journal.

"During the call, Mr. Daniel moved to be excused from voting on the question, but his motion was refused by the House; and, thereupon, his name was called, and he gave his vote.

The name of Elisha Whittlesey being called, he asked to be excused from voting on the question, because the resolution assumes the existence of facts not proven, nor attempted to be proven. His request was also refused by the House; and his name being called, he gave his vote.

"The call having been finished, there appeared for the resolution 93, against it 44.

"And so the House resolved," &c.

Now, sir, it is clear that the decision of the Speaker, so far from being warranted by the proceedings of the House in the case of Mr. ADAMS, is directly in the teeth of that proceeding. That, instead of Mr. ADAMS's ap. plication to be excused from voting being postponed until the main question was decided, or even until the roll was called through, it was voted upon by the House im. mediately upon his asking to be excused. And the House twice solemnly decided that he should not be excused; and his name was solemnly called three times before the calling of the roll was proceeded in. It further appears that, in the case of two other gentlemen who asked to be excused, the question upon excusing them

[MAY 30, 1836.

was taken upon each, respectively, as his name was called, and before proceeding in the call.

When Mr. Adams peremptorily refused to vote, there was obviously great difficulty in the House as to what ought to be done. His vote could not be obtained, and then the only thing that could be done was to decide what punishment the House would inflict. This question was postponed to a subsequent period, as it was not at all necessary or proper to postpone the decision of the main question until the recusant member was punished for contumacy. Every allegation or intimation that I have given any vote, or entertained any wish, to embarrass or delay the decision of the House on the slavery question, by interposing a trial of Mr. WISE, or any body else, for refusing to vote, is absolutely and wilfully false. There were three gentlemen who asked to be excused, and it is probable that they [Mr. GLASCOCK, Mr. PICKENS, and Mr. ROBERTSON] would have been excused; or, if not, would have voted. The House has been prevented, by the decision of the Speaker, from deciding what it was their express duty, under the rule, to decide. The gentleman from Georgia, and the other two named, have been deprived of their right to vote, and exempted from the duty of voting, if the House had deemed their reasons for not voting insufficient; and this decision was defended by the Speaker in his remarks, when it was made, exclusively, according to my recollection, on the authority of the precedent in 1832, to which no man was permitted to reply; and now, when the precedent is examined, it contains the plain proof that, in the case of Mr. ADAMS and those of two other gentlemen, the action of the House is in direct conflict with the Speaker's decision, and sustains precisely and exactly the construction of the rule which I voted for.

There is another curious fact in connexion with this decision of the Chair. Whether, upon further reflection, it was found that the precedent would not answer, and that, having served its turn of producing a vote of the House in favor of the Speaker's decision, it would be too much to enter such a reason upon the journalwhether this is so or not I do not know. But certain it is, that this only reason advanced by the Speaker, and for thinking which insufficient the bandogs and bloodhounds of party are let loose to bark at our heels, and fly at our throats, is abandoned by the Speaker himself, and a new reason entered upon the journal. This new reason, after thought of, is, that if the Speaker's decision is reversed, and a contrary practice prevailed, it would be in the power of a few members to arrest the decision of a question; that, in this case, the result could not be varied by the vote of the gentleman; and that it was the duty of the Chair to announce that result, and leave the application to be excused for the future decision of the House. Now, sir, the precedent of 1832 is equally in conflict with this new reason of the Chair. There, the vote upon excusing members who asked to be excused was taken before the Speaker could possibly know whether the result would be affected by the votes of those asking to be excused, and, in point of fact, the result in that case could not be affected, yet the vote was taken before the decision was made.

This reason of the Speaker seems to be the founda tion, and to have given countenance to the denunciation of myself and those who voted with me, as the "fac tious spirits of the House," whose design was to prevent any decision upon the abolition subject, by raising question after question to be excused from voting, ad infinitum-an imputation, I have no doubt, wholly unfounded, and even ludicrously false, in regard to every man who voted against the Speaker's decision. But what sort of a reason is it to be given for construing a rule of the House, even if there were such "factious spirits" in the House That might be a ground for changing the

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