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more detail was the philosophy which the pupil learnt from the master? When Aristotle at the age of eighteen came to Athens, Plato, at the age of sixty-two, had probably written all his dialogues except the Laws; and in the course of the remaining twenty years of his life and teaching, he expounded "the socalled unwritten dogmas" in his lectures on the Good. There was therefore a written Platonism for Aristotle to read, and an unwritten Platonism which he actually heard.

To begin with the written philosophy of the Dialogues. Individual so-called things neither are nor are not, but become: the real thing is always one universal form beyond the many individuals, e.g. the one beautiful beyond all beautiful individuals; and each form (idéa) is a model which causes individuals by participation to become like, but not the same as, itself. Above all forms stands the form of the good, which is the cause of all other forms being, and through them of all individuals becoming. The creator, or the divine intellect, with a view to the form of the good, and taking all forms as models, creates in a receptacle (vodoxn, Plato, Timaeus, 49 A) individual impressions which are called things but really change and become without attaining the permanence of being. Knowledge resides not in sense but in reason, which, on the suggestion of sensations of changing individuals, apprehends, or (to be precise) is reminded of, real universal forms, and, by first ascending from less to more general until it arrives at the form of good and then descending from this unconditional principle to the less general, becomes science and philosophy, using as its method the dialectic which gives and receives questions and answers between man and man. Happiness in this world consists proximately in virtue as a harmony between the three parts, rational, spirited and appetitive, of our souls, and ultimately in living according to the form of the good; but there is a far higher happiness, when the immortal soul, divesting itself of body and passions and senses, rises from earth to heaven and contemplates pure forms by pure reason. Such in brief is the Platonism of the written dialogues; where the main doctrine of forms is confessedly advanced never as a dogma but always as a hypothesis, in which there are difficulties, but without which Plato can explain neither being, nor truth nor goodness, because throughout he denies the being of individual things. In the unwritten lectures of his old age, he developed this formal into a mathematical metaphysics. In order to explain the unity and variety of the world, the one universal form and the many individuals, and how the one good is the main cause of everything, he placed as it were at the back of his own doctrine of forms a Pythagorean mathematical philosophy. He supposed that the one and the two, which is indeterminate, and is the great and little, are opposite principles or causes. Identifying the form of the good with the one, he supposed that the one, by combining with the indeterminate two, causes a plurality of forms, which like every combination of one and two are numbers but peculiar in being incommensurate with one another, so that each form is not a mathematical number (μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμός), but a formal number (eldŋrixòs ápiÐμós). Further he supposed that in its turn each form, or formal number, is a limited one which, by combining again with the indeterminate two, causes a plurality of individuals. Hence finally he concluded that the good as the one combining with the indeterminate two is directly the cause of all forms as formal numbers, and indirectly through them all of the multitude of individuals in the world.

Aristotle knew Plato, was present at his lectures on the Good, wrote a report of them (Tepi rayaloû), and described this latter philosophy of Plato in his Metaphysics. Modern critics, who were not present and knew neither, often accuse Aristotle of misrepresenting Plato. But Heracleides and Hestiacus, Speusippus and Xenocrates were also present and wrote similar reports. What is more, both Speusippus and Xenocrates founded their own philosophies on this very Pythagoreanism of Plato. Speusippus as president of the Academy from 347 to 339 taught that the one and the many are principles, while abolishing forms and reducing the good from cause to effect. Xenocrates as president from 339 onwards taught that the one and many are principles,

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only without distinguishing mathematical from formal numbers. Aristotle's critics hardly realize that for the rest of his life he had to live and to struggle with a formal and a mathematical Platonism, which exaggerated first universals and attributes and afterwards the quantitative attributes, one and many, into substantial things and real causes.

Aristotle had no sympathy with the unwritten dogmas of Plato. But with the written dialogues of Plato he always continued to agree almost as much as he disagreed. Like Plato, he believed in real universals, real essences, real causes; he believed in the unity of the universal, and in the immateriality of essences; he believed in the good, and that there is a good of the universe; he believed that God is a living being, eternal and best, who is a supernatural cause of the motions and changes of the natural world, and that essences and matter are also necessary causes; he believed in the divine intelligence and in the immortality of our intelligent souls; he believed in knowledge going from sense to reason, that science requires ascent to principles and is descent from principles, and that dialectic is useful to science; he believed in happiness involving virtue, and in moral virtue being a control of passions by reason, while the highest happiness is speculative wisdom. All these inspiring metaphysical and moral doctrines the pupil accepted from his master's dialogues, and throughout his life adhered to the general spirit of realism without materialism pervading the Platonic philosophy. But what he refused to believe with Plato was that reality is not here, but only above; and what he maintained against Plato was that it is both, and that universals and forms, one and many, the good, are real but not separate realities. This deep metaphysical divergence was the prime cause of the transition from Platonism to Aristotelianism.

Fragmenta Aristotelis.-Aristotle's originality soon asserted itself in early writings, of which fragments have come down to us, and have been collected by Rose (see the Berlin edition of Aristotle's works, or more readily in the Teubner series, which we shall use for our quotations). Many, no doubt, are spurious; but some are genuine, and a few perhaps cited in Aristotle's extant works. Some are dialogues, others didactic works. A special interest attaches to the dialogues written after the manner of Plato but with Aristotle as principal interlocutor; and some of these, e.g. the weрi wоηTŵv and the Eudemus, seem to have been published. It is not always certain which were dialogues, which didactic like Aristotle's later works; but by comparing those which were certainly dialogues with their companions in the list of Aristotle's books as given by Diogenes Laertius, we may conclude with Bernays that the books occurring first in that list were dialogues. Hence we may perhaps accept as genuine the following:

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(3) Rhetorical:-
TEXTS THIS DEODÉKTov ovvaywyn: The Theodecica (cited
in the Preface to the Rhetoric to Alexander (chap. i.),
and as rà ОeodéкTela in the Rhetoric (iii. 9, 1410 b 2),
Texvŵv ovvaywyn: A historical collection of arts of
rhetoric.

Difficult as it is to determine when Aristotle wrote all these various works, some of them indicate their dates. Gryllus, celebrated in the dialogue on rhetoric, was Xenophon's son who fell at Mantineia in 362; and Eudemus of Cyprus, lamented in the dialogue on soul, died in Sicily in 352. These then were probably written before Plato died in 347; and so probably were most of the dialogues, precisely because they were imitations of the dialogues of Plato. Among the didactic writings, the rept Tayalou would probably belong to the same time, because it was Aristotle's report of Plato's lectures. On the other hand, the two political works, if written for Alexander, would be after 343-342 when Philip made Aristotle his tutor. So probably were the rhetorical works, especially the Theodeclea; since both politics and oratory were the subjects which the father wanted the tutor to teach his son, and, when Alexander came to Phaselis, he is said by Plutarch (Alexander, 17) to have decorated the statue of Theodectes in honour of his association with the man through Aristotle and philosophy. On the whole, then, it seems as if Aristotle began with dialogues during his second period under Plato, but gradually came to prefer writing didactic works, especially in the third period after Plato's death, and in connexion with Alexander.

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Platonic ethics from which Aristotle in his later days never swerved. But in the Protreplicus he goes on to say that seeming goods, such as strength, size, beauty, honours, opinions, are mere illusion (okay papia), worthless and ridiculous, as we should know if we had Lyncean eyes to compare them with the vision of the eternal. This indifference to goods of body and estate is quite Platonic, but is very different from Aristotle's later ethical doctrine that such goods, though not the essence, are nevertheless necessary conditions of happiness. Finally, in the spirit of Plato's Phaedo and the dialogue Eudemus, the Protrepticus holds that the soul is bound to the sentient members of the body as prisoners in Etruria are bound face to face is the vital principle of the body and the body the necessary organ of with corpses; whereas the later view of the De Anima is that the soul

the soul.

Thus we find that at first, under the influence of his master, Aristotle held somewhat ascetic views on soul and body and on goods of body and estate, entirely opposed both in psychology and in ethics to the moderate doctrines of his later writings. This perhaps is one reason why Cicero, who had Aristotle's early writings, saw no differ ence between the Academy and the Peripatetics (Acad. Post, i. 4. 17-18).

On the other hand, the dialogue on Philosophy (repi dooopias, Fragm. 1 seq.) strikingly exhibits the origin of Aristotle's divergence from Platonism, and that too in Plato's lifetime. The young son of a doctor from the colonies proved too fond of this world to stomach his Athenian master's philosophy of the supernatural. position, both in its written and in its unwritten presentment, as a Accordingly in this dialogue he attacked Plato's fundamental hypothesis both of forms and of formal numbers. First, he attacked the hypothesis of forms (T Tŵvideŵv væóðesiv, Fragm. 8), exclaiming in his dialogues, according to Proclus, that he could not sympathize with the dogma even if it should be thought that he was opposing it out of contentiousness; while Plutarch says that his attacks on the forms by means of his exoteric dialogues were thought by some persons more contentious than philosophical, as presuming to disdain These early writings show clearly how Aristotle came to depart Plato's philosophy: so far was he, says Plutarch, from following it. from Plato. In the first place as regards style, though the Secondly, in the same dialogue (Fragm. 9), according to Syrianus, he disagreed with the hypothesis of formal numbers (rois didnrikois Stagirite pupil Aristotle could never rival his Attic master in apiμois). If, wrote Aristotle, the forms are another sort of literary form, yet he did a signal service to philosophy in number, not mathematical, there would be no understanding of it. gradually passing from the vague generalities of the dialogue to Lastly, in the same dialogue (Fragm. 18 seq.) he revealed his the scientific precision of the didactic treatise. The philosophy indestructible. According to Plato, God caused the natural world to emphasis on nature by contending that the universe is uncreate and of Plato is dialogue trying to become science; that of Aristotle become: according to Aristotle it is eternal. This eternity of the science retaining traces of dialectic. Secondly as regards subject-world became one of his characteristic doctrines, and subsequently matter, even in his early writings Aristotle tends to widen the enabled him to explain how essences can be eternal without being separate from this world which is also eternal (cf. Metaph. Z 8). scope of philosophic inquiry, so as not only to embrace metaThus carly did Aristotle begin, even in Plato's lifetime, to oppose physics and politics, but also to encourage rhetoric and poetics, Plato's hypothesis of supernatural forms, and advance his own which Plato tended to discourage or limit. Thirdly as regards doc-hypothesis of the eternity of the world. trines, the surpassing interest of these early writings is that they show the pupil partly agreeing, partly disagreeing, with his master. The Eudemus and Prolrepticus are with Plato; the dialogues on Philosophy and the treatise on Forms are against Plato. The Eudemus, on the soul (Fragmenta, 37 seq.), must have been in style and thought the most Platonic of all the Aristotelian writings. Plato's theory of the soul and its immortality was not the ordinary Greek view derived from Homer, who regarded the body as the self, the soul as a shade having a future state but an obscure existence, and stamped that view on the hearts of his countrymen, and affected Aristotle himself. After Homer there had come to Greece the new view that the soul is more real than the body, that it is imprisoned in the carcase as a prison-house, that it is capable of enjoying a happier life freed from the body, and that it can transmigrate from body to body. This strange, exotic, ascetic view was adopted by some philosophers, and especially by the Pythagoreans, and so transmitted to Plato. Aristotle in the Eudemus, written about 352, when he was thirty-two, also believed in it. Accordingly, the soul of Eudemus, when it left his body, is said to be returning home: the soul is made subject to the casting of lots, and in coming from the other world to this it is supposed to forget its former visions: but its disembodied life is regarded as its natural life in a better world. The Eudemus also contained a celebrated passage, preserved by Plutarch (Consolat. ad Apoll. 27; Fragm. 44). Here we can read the young Aristotle, writing in the form of the dialogue like Plato, avoiding hiatus like Isocrates, and justifying the praises accorded to his style by Cicero, Quintilian and Dionysius. It shows how nearly the pupil could imitate his master's dialogues, and still more how exactly he at first embraced his master's doctrines. It makes Silenus, captured by Midas, say that the best of all things is not to have been born, and the next best, having been born, to die as soon as possible. Nothing could be more like Plato's Phaedo, or more unlike Aristotle's later work on the Soul, which entirely rejects transmigration and allows the next life to sink into the background.

Hardly less Platonic is the Protrepticus (Fragm. 50 seq.), an exhortation to philosophy which, according to Zeno the Stoic, was studied by his master Crates. It is an exhortation, whose point is that the chief good is philosophy, the contemplation of the universe by divine and immortal intellect. This is indeed a doctrine of

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He made another attack on Platonism in the didactic work repi lder (Fragm. 185 seq.), contending that the Platonic arguments prove not forms (loat) but only things common (τα κοινά). Here, according to Alexander the commentator, he first brought against Plato the argument of" the third man (ο τρίτος ἄνθρωπος); that, if there is the form, one man beyond many men, there will be a third man predicated of both man and men, and a fourth predicated of all three, and so on to infinity (Fragm. 188). Here, too, he examined the hypothesis of Eudoxus that things are caused by mixture of forms, a hypothesis which formed a kind of transition to his own later views, but failed to satisfy him on account of its difficulties. Lastly, in the didactic work repi rayaboo (Fragm. 27 seq.). containing his report of Plato's lectures on the Good, he was dealing with the same mathematical metaphysics which in his dialogue on Philosophy he criticized for converting forms into formal numbers. Aristoxenus, at the beginning of the second book of the Harmonics, gives a graphic account of the astonishment caused by these lectures of Plato, and of their effect on the lectures of Aristotle. In contending, as Aristotle's pupil, that a teacher should begin by proposing his subject, he tells us how Aristotle used to relate that most of Plato's hearers came expecting to get something about human goods and happiness, but that when the discourses turned out to be all about mathematics, with the conclusion that good is one, it appeared to them a paradox, which some despised and others condemned. The reason, he adds, was that they were not informed by Plato beforehand; and for this very reason, Aristotle, as he told Aristoxenus himself, used to prepare his hearers by informing them of the nature of the subject. From this rare personal reminiscence we see at a glance that the mind of Plato and the mind of Aristotle were so different, that their philosophies must diverge; the one towards the supernatural, the abstract, the discursive, and the other towards the natural, the substantial, the scientific.

Aristotle then even in the second period of his life, while Plato was still alive, began to differ from him in metaphysics. He rejected the Platonic hypothesis of forms, and affirmed that they are not separate but common, without however as yet having advanced to a constructive metaphysics of his own; while at the same time, after having at first adopted his master's dialectical treatment of metaphysical problems, he soon passed from dialogues to didactic works, which had the result of separating metaphysics from dialectic. The

all-important consequence of this first departure from Platonism was that Aristotle became and remained primarily a metaphysician. After Plato's death, coming to his third period he made a further departure from Platonism in his didactie works on politics and rhetoric, written in connexion with Alexander and Theodectes. Those on politics (Fragm. 646-648) were designed to instruct Alexander on monarchy and on colonization; and in them Aristotle agreed with Plato in assigning a moral object to the state, but departed from him by saying that a king need not be a philosopher, as Plato had said in the Republic, but does need to listen to philosophers. Still more marked was his departure from Plato as regards rhetoric. Plato in the Gorgias, (501 A) had contended that rhetoric is not an art but an empirical practice (Tpiß kai iμTepia); Aristotle in the Gryllus (Fragm. 68-69), written in his second period, took according to Quintilian a similar view. But in his third period, in the Theodectea (Fragm. 125 scq.), rhetoric is treated as an art, and is laid out somewhat in the manner of his later Art of Rhetoric; while he also showed his interest in the subject by writing a history of other arts of rhetoric called rexvŵv Ouraywy (Fragm. 136 seq.), Further, in treating rhetoric as an art in the Theodectea he was forced into a conclusion, which carried him far beyond Plato's rigid notions of proof and of passion: he concluded that it is the work of an orator to use persuasion, and to arouse the passions (rò τà æáðŋdiaɣéîpac), e.g. anger and pity (ib. 133-134). Nor could he treat poetry as he is said to have done without the same result.

On the whole then, in his early dialectical and didactic writings, of which mere fragments remain, Aristotle had already diverged from Plato, and first of all in metaphysics. During his master's life, in the second period of his own life, he protested against the Platonic hypothesis of forms, formal numbers and the one as the good, and tended to separate metaphysics from dialectic by beginning to pass from dialogues to didactic works. After his master's death, in the third period of his own life, and during his connexion with Alexander, but before the final construction of his philosophy into a system, he was tending to write more and more in the didactic style; to separate from dialectic, not only metaphysics, but also politics, rhetoric and poetry; to admit by the side of philosophy the arts of persuasive language; to think it part of their legitimate work to rouse the passions; and in all these ways to depart from the ascetic rigidity of the philosophy of Plato, so as to prepare for the tolerant spirit of his own, and especially for his ethical doctrine that virtue consists not in suppressing but in moderating almost all human passions. In both periods, too, as we shall find in the sequel, he was already occupied in composing some of the extant writings which were afterwards to form parts of his final philosophical system. But as yet he had given no sign of system, and-what is surprising no trace of logic. Aristotle was primarily a metaphysician against Plato; a metaphysician before he was a logician; a metaphysician who made what he called primary philosophy (πpwτn piλooopia) the starting-point of his philosophical development, and ultimately of his philosophical system.

III. COMPOSITION OF HIS EXTANT WORKS

The system which was taught by Aristotle at Athens in the fourth period of his life, and which is now known as the Aristotelian philosophy, is contained not in fragments but in extant books. It will be best then to give at once a list of these extant works, following the traditional order in which they have long been arranged, and marking with a dagger (†) those which are now usually considered not to be genuine, though not always with sufficient reason.

A. LOGICAL

1. Karnyopia: Categoriae: On simple expressions signifying different kinds of things and capable of predication [probably an early work of Aristotle, accepting species and genera as "secondary substances" in deference to Plato's teaching]."

2. περὶ Ερμηνείας: De interpretatione: On language as expression of mind, and especially on the enunciation or assertion (ἀπόφανσις, ἀποφαντικός λόγος) (rejected by Andronicus according to Alexander; but probably an early work of Aristotle, based on Plato's analysis of the sentence into noun and verb).

3. Apaλurixà #роrepa: Analytica Priora: On syllogism, with a view to demonstration.

4. 'AvaλUTIKà borepa: Analytica Posteriora: On demonstration, or demonstrative or scientific syllogism (áródeiĝis, áπodeiktiKOS επιστημονικός συλλογισμός).

5. Τοπικά: Topica: On dialectical syllogism (διαλεκτικός oλorious), so called from consisting mainly of commonplaces (rozos, loci), or general sources of argument.

6. Σοφιστικοί έλεγχοι : Sophistici Elenchi: On sophistic (σοφιστικός) or eristic syllogism (Εριστικός συλλογισμός), so called from the fallacies used by sophists in refutation (Exeyxor) of their opponents, [Numbers 1-6 were afterwards grouped together as the Organon.] B. PHYSICAL

1. Þvoiký åkphagus: Physica Auscultatio: On Nature as cause of change, and the general principles of natural science. 2. Tepi ovрavou: De coelo: On astronomy, &c.

3. περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς: De generalione el corruptione: On generation and destruction in general.

4. Μετεωρολογικά : Meteorologica: On sublunary changes. 5. #epi кóσμov: De mundo: On the universe. [(Supposed by Zeller to belong to the latter half of the 1st century B.C.] 6. περὶ ψυχῆς: De anima: On soul, conjoined with organic body. On sense

7. περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν: De sensu et sensili: and objects of sense.

8. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως : De memoria et reminiscentia: On memory and recollection. 9. περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως:

and waking.

De somno el vigilia: On sleep

10. #epi évvæviwv: De insomniis: Ou dreams.

11. περὶ τῆς καθ ̓ ὕπνον μαντικής, οι περὶ μαντικῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις: De divinatione per somnum: On prophecy in sleep. 12. περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος: De longitudine et brevilale vitae: On length and shortness of life.

13. περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου: De juventute el senectule et de vita et morte: On youth and age, and on life and death. [Numbers 7-14 are grouped together as Parva naturalia.] 14. Tepi ávaπvons: De respiratione: On respiration. 15.teрi vеvμaros: De spiritu: On innate spirit (spiritus vitalis).

16. repi rà fwa ioropiai: Historia animalium: Description of facts about animals, i.e. their organs, &c.

17. περὶ ζῴων μορίων: De partibus animalium: Philosophy of the causes of the facts about animals, i.e. their functions.

18. † περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως: De animalium motione: On the motion of animals. (Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]

19. Tepi sywn Topeías: De animalium incessu: On the going of animals. 20. περὶ ζώων γενέσεως: De animalium generatione: On the generation of animals.

21.† Tepi xpwμȧrov: De coloribus: On colours. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]

22. Tepi ȧKOVOT@r: De audibilibus. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]

23. volviká: Physiognomonica: On physiognomy, and the sympathy of body and soul..

24.† Epi OUTOR: De plantis: On plants. [Not Aristotle's work on this subject.]

25. repi Oavpaolwr åxovopárwr: De mirabilibus auscultationibus: On phenomena chiefly connected with natural history. 26.† Mnxariká: Quaestiones mechanicae: Mechanical questions. C. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Προβλήματα: Problemata: Problems on various subjects [gradually collected by the Peripatetics from partly Aristotelian materials, according to Zeller].

2.† Tepi droμŵr ypaμμŵr: De insecabilibus lineis: On indivisible lines. (Ascribed to Theophrastus, or his time, by Zeller.]

3.† ἀνέμων θέσεις καὶ προσηγορίας; Ventorum situs el appellationes: A fragment on the winds.

4. περὶ Ξενοφάνους, περὶ Ζήνωνος, περὶ Γοργίου: De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia: On Xenophanes, Zeno and Gorgias.

D. PRIMARY PHILOSOPHY OR THEOLOGY OR WISDOM Tȧ μeTȧ Tȧ Quoiká: Metaphysica: On being as being and its properties, its causes and principles, and on God as the motive motor of the world. E. PRACTICAL

1. 'Hoikȧ Nikoμάxea: individual.

Ethica Nicomachea: On the good of the 2.] Ηθικὰ μεγάλα : Magna Moralia: On the same subject. According to Zeller, an abstract of the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics, tending to follow the latter, but possibly an early draft of the Nicomachean Ethics.]

3.7 Ηθικά Ευδήμια or προς Εύδημον: Ethica ad Eudemum: On the same subject. Usually supposed to be written by Eudemus, but possibly an early draft of the Nicomachean Ethics.)

4.1 #epi åperŵv kal kakiŵv: De virtutibus et vitiis: On virtues and vices. [An eclectic work of the 1st century B.C., half Academic and half Peripatetic, according to Zeller.]

5. Пorina: De re publica: Politics, on the good of the state. 6.† Olkovoμiká: De cura rei familiaris: Economics, on the good of the family. [The first book a work of the school of Theophrastus I or Eudemus, the second later Peripatetic, according to Zeller.]

F. ART

I. TEXη 'PпTopikh: Ars rhetorica: On the art of oratory.

2. † 'Pηropik pos: 'Altavoрov: Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: On the same subject. [Ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (f. 365. Diodorus xv. 76) by Petrus Victorius, and Spengel, but possibly an earlier rhetoric by Aristotle.]

3. Tepi ПoinтIKĤs: De poetica: On the art of poetry [fragmentary]. G. HISTORICAL

Αθηναίων πολιτεία: De republica Atheniensium: On the Constitution of Athens. [One of the Пloria, said to have been 158 at least, the genuineness of which is attested by the defence which Polybius (xii.) makes of Aristotle's history of the Epizephyrian Locrians against Timaeus, Aristotle's contemporary and critic. Hitherto, only fragments have come down to us (cf. Fragm. 381-603). The present treatise, without however its beginning and end, written on a papyrus discovered in Egypt and now in the British Museum, was first edited by F. G. Kenyon 1890-1891.] (See the article CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.)

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puzzling catalogues of Aristotelian books, one given by Diogenes
Laertius, another by an anonymous commentator (perhaps
Hesychius of Miletus) quoted in the notes of Gilles Ménage on
Diogenes Laertius, and known as
46 Anonymus Menagii," and a
third copied by two Arabian writers from Ptolemy, perhaps King
Ptolemy Philadelphus, son of the founder of the library at
Alexandria. (See Rose, Fragm. pp. 1-22.) But the extraordinary
thing is that, without exactly agreeing among themselves, the
catalogues give titles which do not agree well with the Aristotelian
works as we have them. A title in some cases suits a given work
or a part of it; but in other cases there are no titles for works
which exist, or titles for works which do not exist.

These difficulties are complicated by various hypotheses concerning the composition of the Aristotelian works. Zeller supposes that, though Aristotle may have made preparations for his philosophical system beforehand, still the properly didactic The Difficulty.-The genuineness of the Aristotelian works, as treatises composing it almost all belong to the last period of his Leibnitz truly said (De Stilo Phil. Nizolii, xxx.), is ascertained life, i.e. from 335-334 to 322; and from the references of one by the conspicuous harmony of their theories, and by their work to another Zeller has further suggested a chronological uniform method of swift subtlety. Nevertheless difficulties lurk order of composition during this period of twelve years, beginning beneath their general unity of thought and style. In style they with the treatises on Logic and Physics, and ending with that on are not quite the same: now they are brief and now diffuse: Metaphysics. There is a further hypothesis that the Aristotelian sometimes they are carelessly written, sometimes so carefully as works were not originally treatises, but notes of lectures either to avoid hiatus, e.g. the Metaphysics A, and parts of the De for or by his pupils. This easily passes into the further and still Coelo and Parva Naturalia, which in this respect resemble the more sceptical hypothesis that the works, as we have them, under fragment quoted by Plutarch from the early dialogue Eudemus | Aristotle's name, are rather the works of the Peripatetic school, (Fragm. 44). They also appear to contain displacements, from Aristotle, Theophrastus and Eudemus downwards. "We interpolations, prefaces such as that to the Meteorologica, and cannot assert with certainty," says R. Shute in his History of the appendices such as that to the Sophistical Elenchi, which may Aristotelian Writings (p. 176), “ that we have even got throughout have been added. An Aristotelian work often goes on continu- a treatise in the exact words of Aristotle, though we may be ously at first, and then becomes disappointing by suddenly pretty clear that we have a fair representation of his thought. introducing discussions which break the connexion or are even The unity of style observable may belong quite as much to the inconsistent with the beginning; as in the Posterior Analytics, school and the method as to the individual." This sceptical which, after developing a theory of demonstration from necessary conclusion, the contrary of that drawn by Leibnitz from the principles, suddenly makes the admission, which is also the main harmony of thought and style pervading the works, shows us theory of science in the Metaphysics, that demonstration is about that the Homeric question has been followed by the Aristotelian either the necessary or the contingent, from principles either question. necessary or contingent, only not accidental. At times order is The Solution. Such hypotheses attend to Aristofle's philofollowed by disorder, as in the Politics. Again, there are re-sophy to the neglect of his life. He was really, as we have seen, petitions and double versions, e.g. those of the Physics, vii., and those of the De Anima, ii., discovered by Torstrik; or two discussions of the same subject, e.g. of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics, vii. and x.; or several treatises on the same subject very like one another, viz. the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia; or, strangest of all, a consecutive treatise and other discourses amalgamated, e.g. in the Metaphysics, where a systematic theory of being running through several books (B, F, E, Z, H, O) is preceded, interrupted and followed by other discussions of the subject. Further, there are frequently several titles of the same work or of different parts of it. Sometimes diagrams (διαγραφαί or υπογραφαί) are mentioned, and sometimes given (e.g. in De Interp. 13, 22 a 22; Nicomachean Ethics, ii. 7; Eudemian Ethics, ii. 3), but sometimes only implied (e.g. in Hist. An. i. 17, 497 a 32; iii. 1, 510 a 30; iv. 1, 525 a 9). The different works are more or less connected by a system of references, which give rise to difficulties, especially when they are cross-references: for example, the Analytics and Topics quote one another: so do the Physics and the Metaphysics; the De Vita and De Respiratione and the De Partibus Animalium; this latter treatise and the De Animalium Incessu; the De Interpretatione and the De Anima. A late work may quote an earlier; but how, it may be asked, can the earlier reciprocally quote the later?

Besides these difficulties in and between the works there are others beyond them. On the one hand, there is the curious story given partly by Strabo (608-600) and partly in Plutarch's Sulla (c. 26), that Aristotle's successor Theophrastus left the books of both to their joint pupil, Neleus of Scepsis, where they were hidden in a cellar, till in Sulla's time they were sold to Apellicon, who made new copies, transferred after Apellicon's death by Sulla to Rome, and there edited and published by Tyrannio and Andronicus. On the other hand, there are the curious and

a prolific writer from the time when he was a young man under Plato's guidance at Athens; beginning with dialogues in the manner of his master, but afterwards preferring to write didactic works during the prime of his own life between thirty-eight and fifty (347-335-334), and with the further advantage of leisure at Atarneus and Mitylene, in Macedonia and at home in Stagira. When at fifty he returned to Athens, as head of the Peripatetic school, he no doubt wrote much of his extant philosophy during the twelve remaining years of his life (335-322). But he was then a busy teacher, was growing old, and suffered from a disease in the stomach for a considerable time before it proved fatal at the age of sixty-three. It is therefore improbable that he could between fifty and sixty-three have written almost the whole of the many books on many subjects constituting that grand philosophical system which is one of the most wonderful works of man. It is far more probable that he was previously composing them at his leisure and in the vigour of manhood, precisely as his contemporary Demosthenes composed all his great speeches except the De Corona before he was fifty.

Turning to Aristotle's own works, we immediately light upon a surprise: Aristotle began his extant scientific works during Plato's lifetime. By a curious coincidence, in two different works he mentions two different events as contemporary with the time of writing, one in 357 and the other in 356. In the Politics (E 10, 1312 b 10), he mentions as now (vv) Dion's expedition to Sicily which occurred in 357. In the Meteorologica (iii. 1, 371 a 30), he mentions as now (vv) the burning of the temple at Ephesus, which occurred in 356. To save his hypothesis of late composition, Zeller resorts to the vagueness of the word "now" (vv). But Aristotle is graphically describing isolated events, and could hardly speak of events of 357 and 356 as happening" now "in or near 335. Moreover, these two works contain further proofs that they were both begun carlier than this

happiness (evdaμovia), and happiness with virtuous action. But when it comes to the moral virtues (Book iii. 6), a new motive of the "honourable" (toû kaλoû éveka) is suddenly introduced without preparation, where one would expect the original motive of happiness, Then at the end of the moral virtues justice is treated at inordinate length, and in a different manner from the others, which are regarded as means between two vices, whereas justice appears as a mean only because it is of the middle between too much and too little. Later, the discussion on friendship (Books viii.-ix.) is again inordinate in length, and it stands alone. Lastly, pleasure, after having been first defined (Book vii.) as an activity, is treated over again (Book x.) as an end beyond activity, with a warning against confusing activity and pleasure. The probability is that the Nicomachean Ethics is a collection of separate discourses worked up into a tolerably systematic treatise; and the interesting point is that these discourses correspond to separate titles in the list of Diogenes Laertius (περὶ καλοῦ, περὶ δικαίων, περὶ φιλίας, περὶ nôovns, and wepi ndovŵv). The same list also refers to tentative notes (υπομνήματα ἐπιχειρηματικά), and the commentators speak of ethical notes (noкà vжоμvýμara). Indeed, they sometimes divide Aristotle's works into notes (vñоμμатiká) and compilations (ovvтayμatiká). How can it be doubted that in the gradual composition of his works Aristotle began with notes (vñoμvýμатa) and discourses (λMóyo), and proceeded to treatises (ярayμaтeiαi)? He would even be drawn into this process by his writing materials, which were papyrus rolls of some magnitude; he would tend to write discourses on separate rolls, and then fasten them together in a bundle into a treatise.

date. The Politics (B 10) mentions as having happened lately | Thus the Nicomachean Ethics begins by identifying the good with (PEWσTi) the expedition of Phalaecus to Crete, which occurred towards the end of the Sacred War in 346. The Meteorologica (7) mentions the comet of 341. It is true that the Politics also mentions much later events, e.g. the assassination of Philip which took place in 336 (E 10, 1311 b 1-3). Indeed, the whole truth about this great work is that it remained unfinished at Aristotle's death. But what of that? The logical conclusion is that Aristotle began writing it as early as 357, and continued writing it in 346, in 336, and so on till he died. Similarly, he began the Meteorologica as early as 356 and was still writing it in 341. Both books were commenced some years before Plato's death: both were works of many years: both were destined to form parts of the Aristotelian system of philosophy. It follows that Aristotle, from early manhood, not only wrote dialogues and didactic works, surviving only in fragments, but also began some of the philosophical works which are still parts of his extant writings. He continued these and no doubt began others during the prime of his life. Having thus slowly matured his separate writings, he was the better able to combine them more and more into a system, in his last years. No doubt, however, he went on writing and rewriting well into the last period of his life; for example, the recently discovered 'A0ŋvaiwv Toλureia mentions on the one hand (c. 54) the archonship of Cephisophon (329–328), on the other hand (c. 46) triremes and quadriremes but without quinqueremes, which first appeared at Athens in 325-324; and as it mentions nothing later it probably received its final touches between 329 and 324. But it may have been begun long before, and received additions and changes. However early Aristotle began a book, so long as he kept the manuscript, he could always change it. Finally he died without completing some of his works, such as the Politics, and notably that work of his whole philosophic career and foundation of his whole philosophy-the Metaphysics-which, projected in his early criticism of Plato's philosophy of universal forms, gradually developed into his positive philosophy of individual substances, but remained unfinished after all.

On the whole, then, Aristotle was writing his extant works very gradually for some thirty-five years (357-322), like Herodotus (iv. 30) contemplated additions, continued writing them more or less together, not so much successively as simultaneously, and had not finished writing at his death.

There is a curious characteristic connected with this gradual composition. An Aristotelian treatise frequently has the appearance of being a collection of smaller discourses (λóyo), as, e.g., K. L. Michelet has remarked.

This is obvious enough in the Metaphysics: it has two openings (Books A and a); then comes a nearly consecutive theory of being (B, г, E, Z, H, O), but interrupted by a philosophical lexicon A; afterwards follows a theory of unity (1); then a summary of previous books and of doctrines from the Physics (K); next a new beginning about being, and, what is wanted to complete the system, a theory of God in relation to the world (A); finally a criticism of mathematical metaphysics (M, N), in which the argument against Plato (A 9) is repeated almost word for word (M 4-5). The Metaphysics is clearly a compilation formed from essays or discourses; and it illustrates another characteristic of Aristotle's gradual method of composition. It refers back to passages "in the first discourses" (èv roîs πρúτOLS XÓYαs) -an expression not uncommon in Aristotelian writings. Sometimes the reference is to the beginning of the whole treatise; e.g. Mel. B 2,997 b 3-5, referring back to A 6 and 9 about Platonic forms. Sometimes, on the other hand, the reference only goes back to a previous part of a given topic, e.g. Met. O1, 1045 b 27-32, referring back to Z 1, or at the earliest to T 2. On either alternative, however, "the first discourses" mentioned may have originally been a separate discourse; for Book T begins quite fresh with the definition of the science of being, long afterwards called "Metaphysics," and Book Z begins Aristotle's fundamental doctrine of substance.

Another indication of a treatise having arisen out of separate discourses is its consisting of different parts imperfectly connected.

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If then Aristotle was for some thirty-five years gradually and simultaneously composing manuscript discourses into treatises and treatises into a system, he was pursuing a process which solves beforehand the very difficulties which have since been found in his writings. He could very easily write in different styles at different times, now avoiding hiatus and now not, sometimes writing diffusely and sometimes briefly, partly polishing and partly leaving in the rough, according to the subject, his own state of health or humour, his age, and the degree to which he had developed a given topic; and all this even in the same manuscript as well as in different manuscripts, so that a difference of style between different parts of a work or between different works, explicable by one being earlier than another, does not prove either to be not genuine. As he might write, so might he think differently in his long career. To put one extreme case, about the soul he could think at first in the Eudemus like Plato that it is imprisoned in the body, and long afterwards in the De Anima like himself that it is the immateriate essence of the material bodily organism, Again, he might be inconsistent; now, for example, calling a universal a substance in deference to Plato, and now denying that a universal can be a substance in consequence of his own doctrine that every substance is an individual; and so as to contradict himself in the same treatise, though not in the same breath or at the same moment of thinking. Again, in developing his discourses into larger treatises he might fall into dislocations; although it must be remembered that these are often inventions of critics who do not understand the argument, as when they make out that the treatment of reciprocal justice in the Ethics (v. 5-6) needs rearrangement through their not noticing that, according to Aristotle, reciprocal justice, being the fairness of a commercial bargain, is not part of absolute or political justice, but is part of analogical or economical justice. Or he might make repetitions, as in the same book, where he twice applies the principle, that so far as the agent does the patient suffers, first to the corrective justice of the law court (Eth. v. 4) in order to prove that in a wrong the injurer gains as much as the injured loses, and immediately afterwards to the reciprocal justice of commerce (ib. 5) in order to prove that in a bargain a house must be exchanged for as many shoes as equal it in value. Or he might himself, without double versions, repeat the same argument with a different shade of meaning; as when in the Nic. Ethics (vii. 4) he first argues that incontinence

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