nitz.

3

❝ nerves and brain, that there they may be perceiv"ed by the mind present in that place?" Dr. Clarke has expreffed the fame idea ftill more confidentiy, in the following paffage of one of his letters to Leib"Without being prefent* to the images of "the things perceived, the foul could not poffibly "perceive them. A living fubftance can only there "perceive, where it is prefent. Nothing can any ❝ more act, or be acted upon, where it is not pres "ent, than it can when it is not." "How body “acts upon mind, or mind upon body," (fays Dr. Porterfield,t) "I know not; but this I am very certain "of, that nothing can act, or be acted upon, where "it is not; and therefore, our mind can never per"ceive any thing but its own proper modifications, " and the various ftates of the fenforium, to which "it is prefent: so that it is not the external fun and 66 moon, which are in the heavens, which our mind "perceives, but only their image or reprefentation, impreffed upon the fenforium. How the foul of "a feeing man fees thefe images, or how it receives "thofe ideas, from fuch agitations in the fenforium,

66

* This phrase of "the soul being present to the images of external objects," has been used by many philosophers, since the time of Des Cartes; evidently from a desire to avoid the absurdity of supposing, that images of extension and figure can exist in an unextended mind.

"Quæris," (says Des Cartes himself, in replying to the objections of one of his antagonists) "quomodo existimem in me sub"jecto inextenso recipi posse speciem, ideamve corporis quod ex"tensum est. Respondeo nullam speciem corpoream in mente re"cipi, sed puram intellectionem tam rei corporeæ quam incorporea "fieri absque ulla specie corporea; ad imaginationem vero, quæ non nisi de rebus corporeis esse potest, opus quidem esse specie quæ sit verum corpus, et ad quam mens se applicet, sed non quæ in "mente recipiatur."It appears, therefore, that this philosopher supposed his images, or ideas, to exist in the brain, and not in the mind. Mr. Locke's expressions sometimes imply the one supposition, and sometimes the other.

66

66

† See his Treatise on the Eye, vol. ii. p. 356.

"I know not; but I am fure it can never perceive "the external bodies themselves, to which it is not "present."

*The fame train of thinking, which had led these philofophers to fuppose, that external objects are perceived by means of fpecies proceeding from the ob ject to the mind, or by means of fome material impreffion made on the mind by the brain, has fuggefted to a late writer a very different theory; that the mind, when it perceives an external object, quits the body, and is prefent to the object of perception. "The mind," fays the learned author of Antient Metaphyfics,)" is not where the body is, when it 65 perceives what is diftant from the body, either in "time or place, because nothing can act, but when, "and where, it is. Now, the mind acts when it per❝ceives. The mind, therefore, of every animal who "has memory or imagination, acts, and by confequence exifts, when and where the body is not ; " for it perceives objects diftant from the body both "in time and place." Indeed, if we take for ted, that in perception the mind acts upon the object, or the object upon the mind, and, at the same time, admit the truth of the maxim, that "nothing can "act but where it is," we muft, of neceffity, conclude, either that objects are perceived in a way fimilar to what is fuppofed in the ideal theory, or that,

gran

*"The slightest philosophy" (says Mr. Hume) "teaches us, that "nothing can ever be present to the mind, but an image, or per"ception; and that the senses are only the inlets through which

these images are conveyed; without being able to produce any "immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The "table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther "from it but the real table, which exists independent of us, suf*fers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image which "was present to the mind. These (he adds) are the obvious dic<tates of reason."

ESSAY on the ACADEMICAL or SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Ant. Met. vol. ii. p. 306.

in every act of perception, the foul quits the body, and is prefent to the object perceived. And accordingly this alternative is exprefsly ftated by Malebranche; who differs, however, from the writer laft quoted, in the choice which he makes of his hypothefis; and even refts his proof of its truth on the improbability of the other opinion. "I fuppofe," fays he," that every one will grant, that we perceive not "external objects immediately, and of themselves. "We fee the fun, the ftars, and an infinity of objects "without us; and it is not at all likely that, upon "fuch occafions, the foul fallies out of the body, in or "der to be prefent to the objects perceived. She fees "them not therefore by themfelves; and the im "mediate object of the mind is not the thing per"ceived, but fomething which is intimately united "to the foul; and it is that which I call an idea: fo "that by the word idea, I understand nothing else "here but that which is neareft to the mind when

ઘર

"we perceive any object.- It ought to be careful"ly obferved, that, in order to the mind's perceiv"ing any object, it is abfolutely neceffary that the "idea of that object be actually present to it. Of "this it is not poffible to doubt. The things which "the foul perceives, are of two kinds. They are "either in the foul, or they are without the foul. "Those that are in the foul, are its own thoughts; "that is to fay, all its different modifications. The "foul has no need of ideas for perceiving thefe "things. But with regard to things without the "foul, we cannot perceive them but by means of "ideas."

To thefe quotations, I fhall add another, which contains the opinion of Buffon upon the fubject. As I do not understand it fo completely, as to be able to tranflate it in a manner intelligible to myfelf, I fhall tranfcribe it in the words of the author.

86

L'ame s'unit intimement à tel objet qu'il lui piâit,

"la diftance, la grandeur, la figure, rien ne peut "nuire à cette union lorfque l'ame la veut : elle se "fait et fe fait en un inftant la volonté "n'eft-elle donc qu'un mouvement corporel, et la " contemplation un fimple attouchement? Com"ment cet attouchement pourroit-il fe faire fur un

objet éloigné, fur un fujet abftrait? Comment "pourroit-il s'opérer en un inftant indivisible? A-t-on "jamais conçu du mouvement, fans qu'il y êut de l'espace et du tems? La volonté, fi c'est un mouve' ment, n'est donc pas un mouvement matériel, et " fi l'union de l'ame à fon objet eft un attouchement, un contact, cet attouchement ne fe fait-il pas au "loin? ce contact n'eft il pas une pénétration?"

દ

All these theories appear to me to have taken rise, firft, from an inattention to the proper object of philofophy, and an application of the fame general maxims to phyfical and to efficient caufes; and, fecondly, from an apprehenfion, that we understand the connexion between impulfe and motion, better than any other phyfical fact. From the detail which I have given, it appears how extenfive an influence this prejudice has had on the inquiries both of natural philofophers and of metaphyficians.

In the foregoing reasonings, I have taken for granted, that motion may be produced by impulfe; and have contented myself with afferting, that this fact is not more explicable, than the motions which the Newtonians refer to gravitation; or than the intercourfe which is carried on between the mind and external objects in the cafe of perception. The truth, however, is, that some of the ableft philofophers in Europe are now fatisfied, not only that there is no evidence of motion being in any cafe produced by the actual contact of two bodies; but that very ftrong proofs may be given, of the abfolute impoffibility of fuch a fuppofition; and hence they have been led to conclude, that all the effects which

L

are commonly referred to impulse, arise from a power of repulfion, extending to a small and imperceptible distance round every element of matter. If this doctrine fhall be confirmed by future fpeculations in phyfics, it must appear to be a curious circumftance in the hiftory of fcience, that philofophers have been fo long occupied in attempting to trace all the phenomena of matter, and even fome of the phenomena of mind, to a general fact, which, upon an accurate examination, is found to have no existence.I do not make this obfervation with a view to depreciate the labours of these philofophers; for, although the fyftem of Bofcovich were completely established, it would not diminish, in the smallest degree, the value of thofe phyfical inquiries, which have proceeded on the common hypothefis, with refpect to impulfe. The laws which regulate the communication of motion, in the cafe of apparent contact, are the moft general facts we obferve among the terrestrial phenomena; and they are, of all phyfical events, thofe which are the most familiar to us, from our earliest infancy. It was therefore not only natural but proper, that philofophers fhould begin their phyfical inquiries, with attempting to refer to thefe, (which are the moft general laws of nature, exposed to the examination of our fenfes,) the particular appearances they wifhed to explain. And, if ever the theory of Bofcovich fhould be coinpletely established, it will have no other effect, than to refolve these laws into fome principle ftill more general, without affecting the folidity of the common doctrine, fo far as it goes.