would be incalculable. If this branch of the public service were merged in the navy, these steamers would become proper men-of-war to be used as occasion might require. We can see no advantage in keeping the revenue duty distinct, provided it be properly organized. Our ships of the line, now decaying on the stocks, should be put in commission as a part of the public defence, and to qualify the superior officers for the conduct of fleets. And our smaller cruisers should be found in every quarter of the world, protecting our commerce, and exhibiting that readiness for hostilities which is the best security for the continuance of peace. The aphorism of Sir Walter Raleigh, "Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade, commands the riches of the world," can never be safely neglected in the councils of a people who rank the second among the nations in commercial wealth. Indeed, whatever considerations, founded upon extensive commerce, insulated position, national emulation, or the genius of the people, can be urged for the creation and maintenance of a naval force in any country, may be transferred with truth and wisdom to this. It is not too much to say that an ample naval armament is indispensable not only to the opulence and prosperity, but to the honor and even to the independence, of the United States. In free States, military, like civil, institutions, to rest upon a solid foundation, must be popular. They cannot exist permanently, unless the enlightened minds which sooner or later lead the general opinion, recognise their advantage and necessity. It needs hardly be said now, that this vital moral support upholds the American Navy with its full force. The necessity of a navy was admitted as a principle of the founders of the nation; and subsequent events have amply illustrated the wisdom of their decision. History has also taught this truth, that a navy is the only standing military establishment which is perfectly consistent with the safety of free institutions. "La force navale est la seule, qui jamais ne peut mettre en danger les libertés du peuple." We will profit by this opportunity to offer our opinion upon one or two subjects which seem to us of sufficient importance to require the earliest attention of the Department, and of Congress. The first of these relates to a Home squadron. It is a strange and startling fact, that not since of our the year 1810 has there been found at any time, in any harbours, a man-of-war of any class, commissioned, and thoroughly equipped for service, unless she were bound to, or had just returned from, a foreign station, except during the short period when an attempt was made to keep up a small squadron on the coast under Commodore Nicholson, and whilst that miscalled man-of-war, the Schooner Experiment, was performing her trial cruises from port to port, afraid to venture out into the open sea. When, in 1838, it was reported in Philadelphia that the packet ship Susquehanna had been captured by a pirate off the Capes of Delaware, the only vessel that could be found to send immediately to her rescue was a revenue cutter of four guns. The country will not have forgotten the sensation created by this alarm, the deep distress that filled the public mind, the agonized apprehension of friends, the fearful sympathy of all. It is true that this solemn warning produced a slight effort, but it failed to lead to any permanent protection. What renders this state of things more ridiculous, is the fact, that at this very moment our ships are rotting useless upon the stocks at our navy yards. One ship of the line at the Charlestown yard, the Vermont, has been twenty-five years under cover; another, the Virginia, twenty. Ten years may have elapsed since any foot but that of a curious visitor has trodden their decks. But we must qualify this remark, for even in their present state they not unfrequently require repairs, the expense of which would take so much from that of their equipment. A fleet of several sail of the line, always ready for active service, accompanied by a sufficient number of smaller vessels ever on the wing, and keeping constant watch over the whole line of coast from one extremity to the other, would supply to the navy that school of practice which is a grand desideratum, a school of practice not only for the inferior, but also for the superior officers. We consider it particularly desirable for the latter class, who will otherwise be called upon. to exercise the command of fleets without the previous experience indispensable to their skilful management. Such a fleet, meanwhile, would afford a degree of security against the danger of invasion, and the mortification and loss of future blockades. We will suggest that to render this protection effectual, some small steamers might be added to the fleet, to navigate along the shoal borders of the Southern States, where our heavier ships cannot venture. It is so clearly the interest and duty of the South to provide this protection, that we cannot but repeat the expression of our surprise at its attracting so little of the attention of her statesmen. We believe also that it would be for the interest of our commerce, if the number of small vessels were increased. To be satisfied of the efficiency and great utility of these vessels, we have only to look to the English and French marines. Every officer, who has been employed abroad for the last ten years, has had occasion to admire the beauty, active qualities, and comfortable internal economy of the French brigs. The British Admiralty are daily adding to this class of vessels, supplying the places of the old ten gun brigs (the wash tub), with new and beautiful models of Sir William Symond's construction. They suffice on ordinary occasions for the protection of merchantmen; are maintained in active service at a comparatively small cost; and the onerous duty which their command involves, falls very properly upon younger officers. A Retired List is another subject which presents itself to our minds. There are already officers who have virtually retired, being no longer employed by the department, and for whom any active professional occupation seems to be out of the question; and we grieve to say that there are undoubtedly some unworthy of promotion, and utterly unfitted by bad habits and lost reputation for places of trust. The latter stand in the way of better men, impeding their advancement. It is well understood that the position of five or six worthless names near the head of the list of lieutenants, known to the Department to be entirely undeserving of a commander's commission, prevented the promotions that would otherwise have taken place at the close of the last session of Congress. The President did not feel authorized to pass over their names, no distinct charges against them being filed at the Department. We have authority for saying, that Mr. Van Buren assigned this as a reason for making no nominations from the grade of lieutenants, on his retiring from the Presidential chair. A Retired List would also become an appropriate refuge for such as are inclined by ill health, private circumstances, or professional disqualification (not discreditable) to seek an escape from the occupation and exposures of a sea life. The question how officers are to be placed upon a Retired List against their will, is a serious and difficult one. We will not discuss it at present. But it is a notorious fact, as we have before asserted, that the Department have exercised an equivalent power in refusing to employ officers who have fallen under their displeasure. Instances of this must occur to every one acquainted with the details of the Navy. The measure, however, which will result in the highest benefit to the organic improvement and discipline of the navy, and most effectually reanimate its drooping spirit, is the creation of the grade of Admirals. This measure is demanded alike by policy and justice, whilst the objections urged against it are answered with facility. For the want of this grade the navy has suffered, and will continue to suffer, from a deficiency of proper subordination in the higher ranks, where the influence of bad example is eminently pernicious. When the present division of grades was adopted, our little navy required no higher rank. But we have come now to take a stand among naval powers, and have obtained a naval distinction which is a pledge both to the world and ourselves, of future prowess. We must hereafter equip fleets. It is our sure destiny, if we continue a united nation, to become a great naval power. We must provide for the proper conduct of these fleets. The necessary knowledge cannot be acquired in the course of any service at present within the reach of the superior officers, the utmost extent of which is the command of small squadrons consisting of two or three vessels. Fleet Tactics is of itself a separate study; and one which can only be thoroughly pursued in actual practice upon the ocean. The creation of Admirals is essential to the wholesome subordination and discipline of the service. A marked distinction of ranks is an elementary principle of the military system. Authority and high station are, by the very nature of things (if we may use the phrase), indissolubly united. We find the argument in the constitution of society, in the constitution of our own minds. It is equally applicable to all stations. Captains require, not less than midshipmen, that the officer who commands them should be their superior. This superiority must be intrinsic. It must be the property and quality of the officer, and not an occasional and temporary investment. This seems to be a superfluous announce ment, yet the truth is lost sight of by those who oppose the introduction of the highest grade into our naval establishment. At present, the brevet rank of Commodore is made to supply the deficiency. This officer takes up his ephemeral dignity when he hoists his flag, and lays it down on the termination of the cruise, returning to an equality with those over whom, for a series of years, he has exercised his high command. He possesses none of the legitimate protection, the irresponsibility to inferiors, which real, and not nominal, rank alone can give. One of the evil consequences, resulting from this state of things, is, that frequently our flag-ships are not properly officered, because the Commodore must, if he take a Captain to his ship, receive an equal. We are aware, that the lines of duty and authority are marked out by the Department. But, whoever is versed in military affairs, and reflects upon the absolute necessity for distinct subordination in them, will understand, that this is not a sufficient remedy for an inherent evil. A fresh instruction from the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, will not create an occasional and detached sentiment of obedience. His fiat, powerful as it may be, cannot originate a new principle of military subordination, or violate an old one with impunity. There are various moral influences connected with the intercourse of Commodores and Captains, which we cannot hope to make intelligible to general readers. If the Commodore be asked, whether he intends to take a fighting-Captain (as the immediate commander of a flag-ship is styled), he may reply, "that he prefers to command his own ship." It would seem, then, that with a Captain of his own virtual grade, — and such only are qualified to command a frigate, or ship of the line,-it is a matter of doubt, whether he can command the ship he sails in, though there is no doubt, that he commands every other ship in the squadron. Yet it is equally his duty to command one ship as another, and one no more than another. He might as well insist upon being the first Lieutenant of the flag-ship. But this reply betrays another evil. The Commodore is wanting in the feeling belonging to his temporary rank. He is as much in heart and mind a Captain, and nothing more, as when he wore his pendant on a ten-gun brig. He is deficient in the enlarged views, the comprehensive regard for the general good discipline of the service, and the high sense of au - No. 112. 13 |
