opinion. George Bridges, the carpenter of the "Megara," in the course of an examination as to the measures adopted after the leak was discovered, said :"From my experience as a shipwright and my knowledge of the ship's bottom, nothing more could be done than was done to make the ship seaworthy and enable her to continue the voyage. From my own knowledge and the reports of the engineers I do not believe the ship was seaworthy and fit to go on to Australia." Joseph Peters, foreman of the fitters in Sheerness Dockyard, and William Owen, Assistant Master-Shipwright, gave evidence respecting the repairs of the vessel. James Alexander Bell, the diver on board, reported that on his examination of the hull the day before the vessel was stranded he found the plate round the leak so thin that he could easily have made the leak large enough to admit his shut hand by breaking away the edges. He thought that in six or eight days the hole would have become four times the size. Edward Brown, chief engineer of the "Blanche," a passenger on board the "Megara," considered the ship most unseaworthy, from the defective plates. Nothing could have been done to enable her to proceed on the voyage from St. Paul's with safety. Mr. Trickett, inspector of machinery at Devonport, and who was at Woolwich in 1866, described the condition of the ship at the time of the survey made in that year. She was then, after the repairs, fit for eighteen months or two years of temporary service. Alexander Brown, the leading stoker of the " Megara," who found the leak, said that the sea came in "like a water spout, rushing up against a plate of iron the height of the girders." The Court then, after a short adjournment, intimated that they required no further evidence. If Captain Thrupp wished to make a statement, or to call witnesses, he was at liberty to do so. Captain Thrupp said he should prefer to have some time for consideration, and on the following day, November 18th, he read to the Court the following statement: 66 "Before making any remarks on the loss of the ship, I wish to be allowed to state, that on the 'Megara' leaving Queenstown on the 14th March, 1871, neither I nor (that I am aware) any of the officers or ship's company had any knowledge that the bottom of the ship was in any way weak or likely to leak. She was a newly-commissioned ship, just out of dock, where her bottom had been cleaned and fresh coated, the defective bobstay and ports had been made good, and the ship had been lightened of 100 tons of cargo, so that we had every reason to be satisfied with all that had been done to remedy our defects, and I so expressed myself to the Admiral commanding before leaving that port. On the leak first breaking out it was true that I was as near the Island of Mauritius as St. Paul's, and if I had then had any idea of danger, it is probable that I should have at once hauled up for the former place; but I had none whatever. It was not until four days afterwards finding the leak did not proceed from a rivet hole, but was of a more serious nature, that I decided on calling at St. Paul's to examine the bottom and stop the leak. It was only after the divers had examined the ship's bottom, and the frames were found so defective, and I had further inspected the weak places myself, that I fully realized our position, and for the first time discovered the impossibility of continuing the voyage, and then it was of course equally impossible to proceed to the Mauritius. I did not at that time enter minutely into the question as to whether the plates became defective by the use of any particular cement or the absence of cement, or whether it arose from galvanic action. My anxiety was centred in discovering what the extent of the damage was, and in slowly realizing to myself the fact that it would be impossible to proceed on the voyage without the most imminent danger." After entering at some length upon the evidence with regard to the pumps, and stating that it was not a deficiency of pumping power, but the extreme weakness of the ship in the neighbourhood of the leak that induced him to decide as he did, he concluded by saying :-"I wish to state, on behalf of the officers and men who have returned with me, that I have always considered myself solely responsible for the step I took in beaching the 'Megæra,' and I feel it my duty to express my great satisfaction at the conduct of the whole of the officers and crew under the very trying circumstances in which we were placed. It was mainly owing to their exertions that, under Providence, there was no more serious casualty. I think, sir, it would be unnecessary for me to call any further witnesses, and I am willing to leave my case in the hands of this Court." After due deliberation, the finding of the Court was "that Her Majesty's Ship Megara' was stranded on the Island of St. Paul on the 19th day of June, 1871, by her Captain, Arthur Thomas Thrupp, but that, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, the said Captain Arthur Thomas Thrupp was fully justified in beaching the ship, and that he would not have been justified in continuing his course to Australia, and doth therefore acquit him of all blame in respect to it. The Court is further of opinion that no blame whatever is attributable to the other officers and men under trial hereinbefore named for the stranding and loss of Her Majesty's ship 'Megæra,' and doth therefore acquit them of all blame, and the said captain and other officers and men are hereby acquitted accordingly." The President rose from his seat, and taking up the sword which lay before him, handed it back to Captain Thrupp, whom he addressed in the following words :-"Captain Thrupp, I have great pleasure in returning you your sword." Captain Thrupp, in receiving the weapon, thanked the President, who then declared that the court was closed. A Royal Commission was subsequently issued to the Right Hon. Lord Lawrence, the Right Hon. Abraham Brewster, late Lord Chancellor of Ireland; Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, G.C.B.; Sir Frederick Arrow, Deputy Master of the Trinity House; Mr. Rothery, Registrar of the High Court of Admiralty; and Mr. Thomas Chapman, F.R.S., Chairman of the Committee for Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping, and a Vice-President of the Institution of Naval Architects, directing them to inquire into and report upon the state and condition of Her Majesty's late ship " Megara" when selected for her recent voyage to Australia; the circumstances under which she was despatched from this country; the extent and cause of the leak subsequently discovered in the ship, and of any other defects in the ship's hull at the time when she was beached at St. Paul's; also, as far as may be deemed expedient, the general official history of the ship previous to her said voyage, and her classification at successive dates. The Commission held their first meeting on the 7th of December in a committee-room of the House of Commons, but adjourned on the 21st till the 8th of January, 1872. APPENDIX. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND STATE PAPERS. I. THE BELGIAN TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PRUSSIA. (Signed at London, August 9th, 1870; Ratifications exchanged at London, August 26th, 1870.) ARTICLE I. His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium. It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839. ARTICLE II. His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium. ARTICLE III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the 1st Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. ARTICLE IV. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms. Done at London, the ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy. (L.S.) GRANVILLE. (L.S.) BERNSTORFF. A similar Treaty between England and France was signed on the 11th, and ratified on the 26th August at London. THE II. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE UPON THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. Diplomatic Correspondence anxiously expected (says the Times, of Feb. 14) has now been issued. It forms a volume of 260 pages, and we hope to render our readers a service by presenting them with an analysis of it. The papers now published range from the beginning of August to the conclusion of the present Armistice. The earliest despatches from our Ambassador at Paris describe the stormy scenes in the French Chambers which followed the disasters at Woerth and Spicheren. Lord Lyons states on the 12th of August that the universal feeling even then was that a further defeat would be absolutely and immediately fatal to the dynasty, while it was by no means considered certain that even the success of the army in the field would suffice to avert a revolution. The first point of importance relates to the engagements entered into for the general maintenance of neutrality. It appears from a despatch of Lord Granville to Lord Lyons on the 16th of August that "several Powers, since the beginning of the war, had proposed that a combined neutrality should be formed of all the Neutral Powers." Her Majesty's Government, however, "had always objected to any formal compact, although expressing their desire to exchange freely ideas which would tend to circumscribe the War or which would lead to any prospect of Peace." The Italian Government seems to have been the most anxious for some such mutual understanding, and in answer to their renewed suggestions Lord Granville replied that he still objected to any formal engagement, but that, if the Italian Government wished to interchange an assurance that Great Britain and Italy would not depart from their neutrality without announcing to each other their intention, he was ready to do so. proposal was accepted, and assurances were accordingly exchanged between England, on the one hand, and Italy, Austria, Russia, and other Powers. The Russian Government hastened to close with this proposal, and even anticipated the proceedings of England, observing that "the general concert thus established among them would greatly increase the moral influence which the neutral Powers would be entitled to exercise in any Conferences which might take place for the establishment of Peace." This Count Beust desired, on the part of Austria, to render this mutual engagement more extensive. He said on the 23rd of August he would be ready to agree to the proposal, "on the condition that the Powers did not act separately in the future work of mediation between France and Germany." Eventually Count Beust waved his reservation, and exchanged the common form of assurances. The Spanish Minister subsequently inquired whether it was intended that this exchange of Notes should be "effected solely between England and the other Powers, or whether those Powers should also do so among themselves?" Lord Granville replied that Her Majesty's Government would be glad to see carried out the latter interpretation, but did not wish to press their views upon any one of the Powers. He The Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne presided at the French Foreign Office during the brief Ministry of Count Palikao, and a despatch from Lord Lyons, dated the 16th of August, gives important information respecting the attitude of the French authorities at that critical moment. said the French Government had no objection to an understanding between the Neutral Powers, for he believed them all to be well disposed towards France. At the same time it was evident that "under present circumstances France could listen to no offer of mediation from any quarter." She had no reason to despair, and she could not treat while she had the means of continuing the war on equal terms and driving the Prussians out of France. There were two conditions which he regarded as indispensable under all circumstances-namely, "the preservation of the integrity of the territory of France and the maintenance of the dynasty." Lord Granville, in reply, authorized Lord Lyons to assure the French Minister "that he does right to count on the friendship of England," and although Her Majesty's Government had certainly no intention or desire to obtrude their mediation either on France or on Prussia, the Prince might be assured that "if at any time recourse should be had to their good offices, they would be freely given and zealously exerted." This elicited from Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, in a conversation with Lord Lyons, a repetition of his previous language, and he added that, speaking for himself only, he would say that "if signal success should attend the French arms he would be very moderate," and would only urge that with the concurrence of Europe some settlement should be made which would obviate the antagonism between France and Prussia which had led to the war. Russia at this moment showed a disposition "to prepare for an offer of mediation," though Prince Gortchakoff appeared to be conscious that the time had not yet arrived. Lord Granville, in a despatch of the 17th of August to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, says Her Majesty's Government are convinced that any suggestion of the kind would be now disregarded by the two belligerents, and "this would make it a matter of greater delicacy and difficulty hereafter for neutral Powers who might be anxious to exert themselves for the restoration of Peace." Prince Gortchakoff, in reply, expressed "his entire concurrence in this view of the case." Count Beust on the 11th of August told Lord Bloomfield he had been informed of Lord Granville's anxiety "to profit by the first opening to suggest propositions of Peace to France and Prussia." He expressed his desire to aid in establishing an understanding among the neutral Powers for this purpose; but "at present he saw no chance of entering upon any negotiations with either belligerent," and he added "that if fortune continued to favour the arms of Prussia as it had done up to the present moment, he apprehended there would be no expectation of treating of Peace until the German armies were under the walls of Paris." Italy, however, towards the end of August, again came forward in the matter, and a despatch from Lord Granville to Sir A. Paget, on the 27th of August, lays down the position which the Government continued consistently to maintain. Russia at this time betrayed considerable anxiety to be, at all events, prepared for interposition; but Prince Gortchakoff at length expressed to Sir A. Buchanan his entire concurrence in the opinion of Lord Granville, that neither France nor Prussia desired interference. On the 6th of September M. de Lavalette loft the French Embassy at London in the charge of M. Tissot, and from this moment the diplomatic relations between England and the belligerent Governments became completely changed. Henceforward Lord Granville is incessantly solicited by the French authorities, in one form or another, to interpose by making propositions to Prussia. As early as the 7th of September Lord Granville sends a despatch to Lord Lyons in answer to the first of these applications, and here, again, Lord Granville states the position he consistently maintained in the future. M. Favre had told Lord Lyons that France would certainly agree to an Armistice if a neutral Power were to propose it, and that he would be glad for an offer of mediation to be made to Prussia on the basis of the integrity of the French territory. But Lord Granville replied, as usual, that more harm than good would be done by attempting to mediate unless there were reasons to believe that both parties would receive such mediation, and unless there were a basis which both would accept. On the 8th of September M. Tissot communicates to Lord Granville the Circular of the 6th of September, in which M. Jules Favre formally announces the resolution of the Government of National Defence to yield "neither an inch of our territory nor a stone of our fortresses." Meanwhile it appears that M. Jules Favre had been exerting himself in other quarters to bring mediatory influence to bear upon Prussia. It is evident he was most anxious to avoid the tremendous responsibility of carrying on the conflict, and was prepared to do almost any thing provided it would not be inconsistent with his epigrammatic programme. On the 8th of September Lord Granville informs Baron Brunnow of M. Favre's desire for the proposal of an Armistice by a neutral Power, while stating that "the maintenance of our territorial integrity is still an absolute condition for us," without which we have determined to "carry on a war à outrance." M. Jules Favre promptly accepted Lord Granville's offer to transmit any communication which might tend to Peace, and on the 9th of September Prince Metternich brought to Lord Lyons a letter from M. Favre, requesting that the following inquiry might immediately be conveyed to Count Bismarck :-"Is Count Bismarck willing to enter into verbal negotiations for an Armistice and for a Conference upon the conditions of Peace, and with whom does he propose to hold this conversation ?" This was instantly forwarded; but the circuitous communications occasioned by the war entailed considerable delay in its transmission, and Lord Lyons had no little difficulty in inducing M. Favre to wait patiently for a reply. Meanwhile the French Minister repeated his instructions to M. Tissot to urge on Lord Granville that "it was important for the common interest of all that the British Cabinet should unite with other Powers in order to bring about the signature of an Armistice which might serve as a preliminary towards the con |